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Abstract
A prerequisite for the assurance of any mission-critical system is a comprehensive
understanding of a system’s properties and behaviours. This is a challenging proposition
for many AI-based Systems (AISs). Their functionality is often dictated by factors that
are often outside the scope of the assurance concerns typical of conventional software
systems. These distinctions have implications for all phases of the design, development,
deployment and operation of AISs. They pose serious problems for existing software
assurance standards, guidelines and techniques: the application of existing practices to
an AIS will fail to expose or mitigate numerous system aspects that can contribute to
hazardous system behaviours.
This thesis introduces a number of techniques that aim to support the resolution of
these problems for Bayesian Network-based Systems (BNSs). This class of system has
been deployed in many applications, ranging from medical diagnostic systems to naviga-
tional controls aboard autonomous systems. To date, there is no published literature on
the deployment of these systems in directly safety-critical roles. This thesis introduces ap-
proaches aimed at addressing three particular challenges. Firstly, it proposes a framework
for conceptualising and communicating the distinctions between BNSs and conventional
software systems and uses this framework to generate and refine a set of BNS verification
and validation objectives. Secondly, it introduces an assurance-focussed BNS analysis
technique that can provide targeted information on mission-critical aspects of a BNS.
Finally, it outlines an approach for describing how BNS-specific safety evidence relates
to BNS aspects, and how the evidence can be used to derive sufficient confidence in a
mission-critical BNS.
These contributions are then evaluated in the context of a case study that indicates the
utility of the proposed techniques, and how these can be used to comprehensively structure
and target the unconventional assurance concerns associated with the development of a
mission-critical BNS.
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Thus to have a retentive memory, and to proceed ‘by the book,’ are points
commonly regarded as the sum total of good playing. But it is in matters beyond
the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst is evinced. He makes, in
silence, a host of observations and inferences. So, perhaps, do his companions;
and the difference in the extent of the information obtained, lies not so much in
the validity of the inference as in the quality of the observation. The necessary
knowledge is of what to observe.
Edgar Allan Poe, 1841
The actual science of logic is conversant at present only with things either
certain, impossible or entirely doubtful ... Therefore, the true logic of this
world is the calculus of probabilities, which takes account of the magnitude of
the probability which is, or ought to be, in a reasonable man’s mind.
James Clerk Maxwell, 1850
The power to become habituated to his surroundings is a marked characteristic
of mankind ... We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our late
advantages as natural, permanent and to be depended on, and we lay our plans
accordingly.
John Maynard Keynes, 1919
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Bayesian Networks
Bayesian Networks (BNs) have been used in a variety of state-of-the-art Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) applications over the course of their existence.1 One of the earliest success sto-
ries in the history of AI was the development of so-called Expert Systems (ESs) throughout
the 1980’s. These systems were initially hailed as a major breakthrough in the field, with
significant commercial and research funding focussing on the development of increasingly
advanced ESs that could model the reasoning processes of human experts [1, 2].
However, after a number of early breakthroughs, it quickly became clear that the
development of human-like ESs demanded the introduction of techniques that provided a
more nuanced reflection of the world. For example, a doctor’s diagnosis is rarely the only
possible explanation for a patient’s symptoms: it is, however, generally the most probable
explanation given the available information and the doctor’s expert judgement. If this
doctor were to receive additional information, they may revise their belief in the diagnosis
- either positively or negatively - and take action if required. Such forms of reasoning were
not generally feasible in early ESs [3].
The difficulties of these ‘traditional’ ESs in handling complex, uncertain scenarios
prompted the development of a number of belief modelling approaches. The BN framework
would ultimately emerge from this research. As a modelling approach, BNs provide a
flexible approach that both explicitly captures the uncertainty inherent in many domains,
1Bayesian Networks have been known by many names, including: Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs),
Belief Networks, Causal Networks, and Probabilistic Belief Networks (PBNs). Commonly used variants
include Naive Bayes Classifiers, Kalman Filters, and Gaussian Mixture Models.
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while also dynamically revising the current belief of the model in the state of the world in
the presence of ever-shifting information and observations.2
As the framework has matured, it has integrated a number of techniques for performing
inference over highly complex BNs, thereby supporting the utilisation of BNs in increas-
ingly complex applications. It has also introduced several new representational concepts,
each supported by an array of tailored structure and parameter learning techniques. The
modern BN modelling framework is part of a larger Probabilistic Graphical Modelling
(PGM) framework. This more general framework has deep connections to many other
widely-used AI and Machine Learning (ML) approaches. This includes Markov Networks
(MNs), Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Kalman Filters (KFs), Naive Bayes Networks
and Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) to name a few [2].
The ability of BNs to capture highly complex, nuanced domains and to provide robust,
effective reasoning in the presence of significant uncertainty has made them popular in a
number of academic and industrial fields. In particular, the approach has experienced
enduring popularity in the fields of medicine, aerospace, robotics, natural language pro-
cessing and computer vision [4, 5, 6, 7]. However, at the time of writing, BNs have not
been utilised to any significant extent in the core functionality of safety-critical systems -
they have been used almost exclusively as either decision support tools, or in other highly
constrained applications where they demonstrate well-defined technical behaviours [8].
There is therefore no existing guidance on the direct utilisation of a BN-based Sys-
tem (BNS) in mission- and safety-critical contexts. However, the properties of BNS make
them an attractive prospect for the fulfilment of a number of safety-critical roles aboard
autonomous systems. In particular, they offer powerful capabilities of use in various mis-
sion management and system monitoring roles. In such roles, a BNS will likely constitute
a significant proportion of the control logic of the autonomous system: BN-based software
components will directly support mission planning (in autonomous vehicles this may in-
clude aspects of route planning, the system’s behavioural profile, system availability and
endurance etc.), as well as other advanced fault diagnostic and prognostic capabilities. Fur-
2The term ‘domain’, or alternatively ‘target domain’ is used here – and throughout this thesis – to refer
to the knowledge, system or process a BN model may be designed to capture. For example, the domain
of a BN model developed for use in medical applications may be the diagnostic knowledge of medical
practitioners, the dynamics of a hospital ward, or the current state of a patient. In the case of the latter,
the BN may represent a mathematical model of a patient’s vital signs or other key statistics.
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thermore, BNs may be used to provide a coherent framework for the integration of many
other AI modelling approaches, including - but not limited to - Artificial Neural Networks
(ANNs), Random Forests (RFs), and Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [9, 10, 11]. Some
current state-of-the-art AI-based Systems use combinations of AI approaches in precisely
this way [12,13].3
1.2 Motivation
The research conducted for this thesis was motivated by the proposed utilisation of a
Prognostic Health Monitoring (PHM) system in an on-line decision-making role that sup-
ports other mission planning capabilities of an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). In this
role, the outputs of the BN-based PHM would be used to directly inform the functional
behaviour of the UAS platform. In this context, such a PHM system would constitute a
mission-critical application of a BNS.
This application raises several assurance challenges for which there is no existing safety-
focussed guidance. Current safety-critical software used in the aviation domain is often
developed in compliance with well-established software safety standards and practices
such as ARP4754, ARP4761 and DO-178C. These standards are used across the civil and
military aerospace domains and are generally well regarded by system safety practitioners.
For the purposes of this thesis, the following definitions for the terms ’safety-critical’ and
’mission-critical’ systems are adopted [14]:
Mission-critical - A mission-critical system is one where a hazard can degrade or prevent
the successful completion of an intended operation. Causing property damage certainly
fits this description; exposing or damaging a company’s reputation would align with the
definition as well.
Safety-critical - A safety-critical system is a system that poses a physical hazard to
human life. If a failure occurs and exposes a hazard, it might cause physical harm
to users, patients, practitioners, doctors, nurses, bystanders, and even people in the
proximity of an accident.
Currently, however, there is limited research into the application (and relevance) of
3An AI-based System is defined as any system that relies on any number of AI techniques for the
provision of core system functionality.
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these standards and practices to the development and assurance of modern AISs generally
– and specifically in the case of BNSs. Moreover, there is a general lack of research in
this area for many other widely-used system safety and software safety standards and
guidelines. In particular, there is an absence of clarity on potential weaknesses in existing
guidance for this class of system, and very limited guidance on how to approach and
mitigate these weaknesses. The core motivations for the research presented in this thesis
can therefore be summarised as follows:
• To understand and articulate the general weaknesses of existing assurance practices
in the context of BNSs and, by extension, to identify the assurance challenges asso-
ciated with their development.
• To establish a comprehensive conceptual framework for the description and assur-
ance of mission-critical BNSs that can be used to address the identified assurance
challenges.
• To develop analysis techniques that mitigate the weaknesses of existing assurance
practices and explicitly address the identified assurance concerns associated with
this class of system.
1.3 Thesis Hypothesis
With these considerations in mind, the hypothesis of this thesis has been defined as follows:
It is possible to provide targeted assurance for Bayesian Network-based Sys-
tems through the analysis and evaluation of underlying probabilistic models,
data artefacts and computational techniques that have the potential to affect
confidence in the safety of a system.
The following terms are defined for clarity:
Probabilistic Models - At the core of any BNS is one or more BN models. These models
are declarative representations of a target domain. This is a purely abstract mathematical
model that can be considered independent of any given software implementation and of
any algorithms applied to it. Consequently, the properties and behaviours associated
with this model are intrinsic to it [2, 3].
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Data Artefacts - Modern BNSs typically rely on some form of learning to define a
given BN model. A BN model is said to be trained on a data set. This data set may be
composed of one or more data artefacts. These artefacts may range from quantitative,
empirically derived component reliability metrics, to relatively unstructured, qualitative
data in the form of maintenance logs or expert statements.
Computational Techniques - The ability to process large quantities of data and to
extract information from BN models is facilitated through the development and utilisa-
tion of learning and inference algorithms. Learning algorithms enable the construction
of BN models from data, thereby generating a model that to some degree reflects the
properties of that data, and the limitations of the learning algorithm. Inference algo-
rithms support the efficient querying of BN models, enabling BNs to be used to support
complex reasoning and decision making tasks.
This hypothesis is principally concerned with four considerations. First, that assurance
efforts must explicitly target those aspects of a BNS that make this class of system distinct
from conventional software-intensive systems. A prerequisite for targeting these aspects is
a clear and comprehensive enumeration of the ‘unconventional’ properties of BNSs, and a
rigorous understanding of how these properties may affect the safety of such a system. This
implies that common assumptions about the development, implementation and operation
of software-intensive systems may need to be revised in the context of BNSs.
Next, the behaviour of a BNS is heavily influenced by the properties and behaviours
of the BN models that may be utilised in the provision of safety-critical functionality.
As indicated above, the properties and behaviours of a BN model is intrinsic to it. This
is analogous to the manner in which the predictions of Newton’s Laws of Motion are
intrinsic to the mathematical model they define: the conclusions are the same irrespective
of how they are computed (e.g. their software implementation). Similarly, errors in these
predictions are also intrinsic to the law itself. For example, Newton’s Laws begin to break
down when a physical body begins to move very quickly or is in a strong gravitational
field. This occurs due to the omission of a number of crucial terms in Newton’s original
formulation of these Laws. Likewise, a failure to account for (or accurately represent)
certain mathematical behaviours within a BN model will produce errors that are intrinsic
to it. This has important implications for the effectiveness of current assurance techniques
and software analysis approaches in relation to their ability to identify certain forms of
hazardous behaviour.
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Thirdly, the data-driven nature of modern BNSs may introduce several atypical as-
surance considerations. Unlike many conventional software systems, data-driven BNSs
are often more directly exposed to the operational environment they are to be deployed
into - potentially both during development and operation. The data used to train a BNS
inevitably influences what a BNS can ‘know’ about the world around it; the data acts as
the raw material from which a BN model is generated. In this sense, aspects of a BNS’s
control logic may be considered to be ‘open’ to the domain being modelled.
Finally, the hypothesis aims to capture the need to address the role of novel computa-
tional techniques in the development and operation of this class of system, with particular
reference to the implications of the use of learning and inference algorithms upon the be-
haviours of BNSs. In particular, both the use of learning algorithms in the development
of a BN and the utilisation of adaptive learning algorithms in an operational context may
introduce important assurance considerations. These three aspects were identified based
on an initial review of the primary concerns of BN developers and the limited available
guidance on AISs more generally. In essence, large sections of a BNS’s control logic are
likely to be automatically generated according to a confluence of behaviours defined by
each of these three system aspects. Indeed, some within the field of AI have suggested
that these types of systems may constitute a conceptually distinct form of software. As
Karpathy notes in the context of Deep Learning (DL) [15]:
“Software 2.0 is written in [model parameters]. No human is involved in writing
this code ... we specify some constraints on the behavior of a desirable program
... and use the computational resources at our disposal to search the program
space for a program that satisfies the constraints.”
The intention of this hypothesis is therefore to understand the implications of these
system aspects in the context of BNSs and ensure that they are adequately targeted by
assurance practitioners.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 - This chapter introduces the key concepts underpinning the BN framework,
reviews the development lifecycles of BNSs and outlines a number of existing use-cases
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of BN models in both academic and commercial applications. An overview of current
approaches to software and system safety is then provided, followed by a critique of the
applicability of these techniques in the context of BNSs. Finally, a review of existing work
on the assurance of AISs is provided, and a number of recurrent themes are identified
and discussed.
Chapter 3 - The focus of this chapter is on the definition of a general framework for
the comprehensive description and modelling of a BNS, and the use of this framework in
the generation of a set of verification and validation objectives for BNSs. The chapter
aims to provide a conceptual overview of assurance considerations for BNSs, to provide
a mechanism for shared understanding of a BNS between BN developers and assurance
practitioners, and to introduce a flexible set of objectives to support the assurance of a
mission-critical BNS.
Chapter 4 - This chapter introduces a technique for establishing the criticality of all
BN models and BN model components in a BNS. The intention of this technique is
to introduce an approach that supports the safety-focussed analysis of BN models, and
to partially address the challenges of maintaining traceability of the behaviours of a
BNS, at the point in which a BN model becomes the principal determinant of a BNS’s
functionality.
Chapter 5 - The aim of this chapter is to outline an approach to establishing the suffi-
ciency of assurance activities in the context of BNSs. An evidence-classification approach
is provided to support this goal. This approach extends existing assurance techniques to
BNSs and integrates closely with the RM-BNS framework defined in Chapter 3.
Chapter 6 - This chapter provides an evaluation of the concepts, frameworks and tech-
niques introduced in this thesis in the context of the thesis hypothesis. The evaluation
also addresses the practical applicability of this work to ‘real-world’ use cases. This is
addressed partly using a case study to demonstrate the application of the ideas proposed
in this thesis to an example BNS. The contributions of the thesis are discussed and
evaluated in the context of the broader field.
Chapter 7 - Finally, this chapter provides concluding remarks on the contributions of
the thesis. It provides an overview of potential future research directions that could be
taken on the basis of the work presented in the thesis, as well as potential research gaps
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identified during the course of research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
While there is extensive published research on the development of Bayesian Network-based
Systems (BNSs) and on the development and assurance of conventional software systems,
there is a near-complete absence of existing research into the assurance of mission-critical
BNSs. However, there is a small but relatively established body of research into the
development of Artificial Intelligence-based Systems (AISs) for safety-critical applications.
Furthermore, many of these applications utilise Artificial Intelligence (AI) approaches that
overlap conceptually with aspects of BNSs and can therefore be utilised to provide an
insight into potential assurance concerns for BNSs.
With these considerations in mind, this chapter first reviews published work on the
use of the BN representational framework within the field of AI, and then outlines key BN
concepts upon which much of this thesis will be based. This review is then extended to
explore BNS-specific development practices. Following this, a review of existing practices
in the development of safety-critical systems is provided. This focusses on existing assur-
ance techniques and concepts, typical assurance lifecycles and the application of existing
safety standards to conventional software systems. Finally, a survey of relevant research
into the development of safety-critical AISs is introduced. This focusses on those AISs
that share conceptual or contextual similarities with BNSs or with the motivating example
introduced in Chapter 1. Where appropriate, observations and experiences in this research
that are relevant to BNSs will be discussed and criticised.
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2.2 Bayesian Networks
The term ‘Bayesian Networks’ and the modern formalism of the BN framework was intro-
duced by Pearl in the late 1980s [16,17]. This work was motivated by the need to develop
a computational model that reflected the ability of humans to integrate data taken from
multiple sources and to reason effectively over this information. Pearl recognised the need
to accommodate the subjective, uncertain and incomplete state of knowledge of the world
that frequently characterises human decision making [17,18]. This early research identified
the failure of many then-current AI techniques in accurately replicating and capturing the
uncertainties and reasoning processes of human experts as an inherent limitation of the
approaches then available to AI developers [3]. The work of Pearl and others ultimately
contributed to the formation of a field within AI research often referred to as ‘Probabilistic
AI’. This sub-field develops approaches to AI that utilise the laws of probability and the
tools of statistics and mathematics to support the development of ‘artificially intelligent’
systems. The BN framework forms one part of this expansive and highly active area of
research.
2.2.1 Uncertainty and Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence
Uncertainty is near-ubiquitous in the real-world: many aspects of the world appear to
exhibit non-deterministic properties and the ability of observers to measure these proper-
ties is often constrained by the noise inherent in their measurements, or of the limitations
of tools available to them. This form of uncertainty is often referred to as statistical
uncertainty, and can be defined as:
Statistical Uncertainty – The uncertainty that arises from limitations in the precision
of measurement devices, or in statistical fluctuations arising from random background
processes. For example, uncertainty of this kind may arise when measuring the tempera-
ture of angular resolution of a star in the night sky: each independent measurement may
vary due to random fluctuations as light passes through the Earth’s atmosphere. Impor-
tantly, this uncertainty can – in principle – be mitigated through the use of alternative
equipment or more measurements [19,20].1
This form of uncertainty characterises many aspects of a range of scientific and en-
1Statistical uncertainty is also referred to as aleatoric or ontological uncertainty.
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gineering disciplines. However, there are other forms of uncertainty. A second form,
commonly defined alongside statistical uncertainty, is the uncertainty arising as a conse-
quence of the restrictions on the observability of the world: only a subset of aspects of the
world are observed at any given point. This form of uncertainty is frequently referred to
as systemic uncertainty, and can be defined as:
Systemic Uncertainty – The uncertainty arising from limitations in the ability of
observers to access or capture information about the world. For example, this may
occur as a consequence of neglecting certain variables within a mathematical model (such
as in the case of the Schiaparelli lander, where an aerodynamic model utilised during
development did not account for some atmospheric effects arising from its supersonic
entry into Mars’ atmosphere), or because of unknown biases in data [20]. 2
These forms of uncertainty play an important role in the decision making of human
experts. For example, medical practitioners frequently work with partially complete data
– they can observe only a subset of a patient’s physical attributes at any one time, and do
not have access to a truly exhaustive history of their patient’s health. Furthermore, there
are very few disease-symptom mappings that are entirely deterministic: not all patients
with a disease will manifest an identical set of symptoms, nor may the causes of a disease
be the same in all patients. In this case, both forms of uncertainty are therefore present.
In practice, medical practitioners focus instead on reducing the state-space of a problem
and on establishing what is most probable as opposed to what is certain.
Attempting to model many aspects of the world using approaches that do not – or
cannot – capture this uncertainty can produce systems that are severely limited in their
capacity to reason about the world around them. Such systems may utilise models that
mask the uncertainty and complexity of the environment they operate in. This can lead
directly to an inferior quality of reasoning and decision making by a given system and may
ultimately restrict the utility of these systems [21].
Indeed, it was experience of precisely these limitations in early rule-based AI ap-
proaches that prompted the development of many of the modern approaches to AI [3,22].
These experiences motivated the development of a number of schools of thought within
the AI domain, each proposing various philosophical, theoretical or practical concepts
2This form of uncertainty is also referred to as epistemic or systematic uncertainty.
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and approaches for the development and deployment of AISs that provide mechanisms for
overcoming the challenges inherent in earlier approaches.
The sub-field of ‘Probabilistic AI’ utilises approaches that are built upon probability
theory and utilise probabilistic methods for representation, learning and reasoning. Prob-
abilistic methods naturally support the representation of a domain in terms of states that
are probable or improbable as opposed to those that are certain or impossible: they are
designed to enable the integration of multiple observations alongside additional uncertain
items of information in order to provide an assessment of the system’s belief in the state
of the world [2, 22].
The development and adoption of probabilistic approaches has met with broad success
in a number of domains. Many state-of-the-art AI applications are either based directly
upon principles developed within the probabilistic AI domain, or can be interpreted within
a probabilistic framework [23]. These approaches can avoid the (often intractable) problem
of enumerating all possible states within a domain, and the associated developmental and
computational challenges that may accompany the development of such large state-spaces.
Within the field of statistics and artificial intelligence, the state-space of a model is defined
as:
State-space – The set of all possible states of a system; each state of the system cor-
responds to a unique point in the state-space. The state or the measurement can be
either continuous or discrete. In this context, the term originates in the field of control
engineering [24].
A probabilistic framework can be used to capture and reason over the most probable
states in a given model. This can produce models that maintain a degree of interpretabil-
ity. Consequently, probabilistic approaches can sometimes provide more faithful (or more
nuanced) representations of the state of a given domain – and thereby facilitate the de-
velopment of a more effective AIS [2, 23,25].
2.2.2 Probabilistic Graphical Models
There are many approaches to utilising probabilistic approaches in AISs. One of the most
common approaches is to represent (and reason over) domains using Probabilistic Graph-
ical Models (PGMs). In general, the complexity and nature of many domains is such that
‘traditional’ probabilistic or statistical methods become impractical or intractable for com-
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plex problems [1]. In particular, the state-space that must be modelled may be extremely
large and may prohibit the effective use of alternative methods [3, 26]. PGMs build upon
concepts from discrete mathematics and graph theory in order to provide a representa-
tional approach that can support the development of systems that can manage this com-
plexity: they facilitate a compact graphical representation of high-dimensional probability
distributions that could not be practically captured using traditional approaches [2, 3].
Models developed within the PGM framework can be categorised as belonging to one
of three distinct groups of models: undirected models, mixed models and directed models.
The first group, undirected models, are commonly referred to as Markov Networks (MNs).
Examples of this group of graphical models include Markov Chains (a one-dimensional
MN) and Markov Random Fields (a two-dimensional MN). These modelling approaches
have been used extensively in many AI applications, including decision making, process
modelling, computer vision, natural language processing, as well as in some state-of-the-
art reinforcement learning techniques.3 They can provide a flexible, intuitive approach
to representing complex relationships within a domain, and for building up associative
relationships between observed features in a target domain. This latter property has
made them particularly valuable within the computer vision domain as an efficient means
of providing basic computer vision functionality, such as image segmentation and image
synthesis [29,30,31].
The second group of models, mixed models, are those models that contain both directed
and undirected edges; they are generalisations of directed and undirected probabilistic
models [32].4 These models can be used to represent more complex relationships between
aspects of domains and have been used to boost the interpretability of models [33]. This
group of PGM models is generally the least widely used (and discussed) of the three groups.
The final class of PGMs are the family of probabilistic Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs).
The most prominent of these is the widely used Bayesian Networks (BNs) framework.
2.2.3 The Bayesian Network Framework
Early research on BNs was motivated by the recognition of the need to develop com-
putational models of human inferential reasoning that could support the integration of
3A discussion of reinforcement learning is beyond the scope of this chapter. A good introduction to the
topic can be found in [27] and here [28].
4These models are also referred to in some literature as Chain Graph Models [33, 34].
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information from multiple sources and of varying types into a single, coherent description
of the world [22]. A primary motivator for this research was the need to develop a system
that supported ‘bi-directional reasoning’: the ability to integrate top-down and bottom-
up reasoning within a model.5 The resulting probabilistic modelling framework became
known as Bayesian Networks.6
The development of the BN framework in the late 1980’s led to the emergence of BNs
as a state-of-the-art solution to many applications previously dominated by rule-based AI
approaches. In current research, BNs continue to provide state-of-the-art performance in
many AI applications, including in their ‘traditional’ role in probabilistic expert systems,
as well as in advanced medical and fault diagnosis, data fusion, drug discovery, robot
navigation and natural language processing applications [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. The BN
framework represents a generalised version of many other commonly used machine learning
techniques. For example, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Kalman Filters (KFs) fall
into this category [2, 34].7 A further example of a specific version of a BN – and perhaps
the most widely used BN variant – are those used in many document classification and
‘spam’ filters: the so-called Na¨ıve Bayes models [41].
Bayesian Networks derive their name from the mathematical basis upon which the
framework is based: they facilitate the generalised application of Bayes’ Theorem to arbi-
trarily large problems. Equation 2.1 shows this theorem. This theorem provides a formal
basis for revising the probability (belief) of an event in the presence of new evidence (i.e.
the current state of the world). Bayes’ Theorem consists of four components. The first
P (A|B) is a conditional distribution capturing the probability of an event A given an event
B.8 This component represents the posterior distribution: the degree of belief in the occur-
rence of event A given all available information about event B. The component P (A) then
represents the prior marginal distribution: the degree of belief in the occurrence of event
5This refers to the ability to reason based upon knowledge of the world and observations (or perceptions)
respectively.
6Bayesian Networks are referred to using a number of different names. Somewhat archaic names include
Probabilistic Belief Nets and Bayesian Belief Networks [2, 3]. Other names include Causal Networks (in
specific contexts).
7Note that in this context the ‘Markov’ in the term Markov Models refers to the dynamics of the process
being modelled, not the modelling framework itself.
8For example, the probability of a coin coming up heads given the coin is known to be loaded. The
expectation of the outcome of a coin flip would vary based on whether or not it is known that the coin is
loaded: Bayes’ Theorem explicitly captures this problem.
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A in the absence of information on the status of event B. This reflects the background
rate of occurrence of an event independent of any additional information. Similarly, P (B)
represents the marginal probability of event B. Finally, P (B|A) represents the conditional
probability of the occurrence of event B given knowledge of the state of event A. This is
sometimes referred to as the likelihood component of Bayes’ Theorem [2].
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(2.1)
Formally, events A and B are described as being Random Variables (RVs).9 In statis-
tics, RVs can be described as being a variable in a model whose value is the product of a
stochastic process. RVs are described as being either continuous or discrete. For example,
a discrete RV may be used to model the probability of a coin toss, or the probability of a
student receiving a particular grade. In these cases, there are a finite number of possible
outcomes. For example, for an RV used to model a coin toss, the RV may be modelled
as using a Bernoulli distribution with two outcomes: heads or tails.10 In contrast, a
continuous RV may be used to represent a velocity of a robot, or the heart rate of a hos-
pital patient. In either case, the RV may be modelled using any appropriate continuous
probability distribution.
A RV also has a more general definition: it describes a mapping that associates each
outcome with the probability of the occurrence of that outcome: RVs within a BN model
may represent any mathematical function that captures a valid probabilistic mapping of
states. In general, a RV can be defined as:
Random Variable – A function that assigns numerical values to the outcomes of a
random phenomenon [42].
A RV is parameterised. In the most basic cases, this parameterisation may correspond
to discrete probabilities: a coin-flip RV may be defined by a single parameter (i.e. 0.5).
9The term ‘Random Variable’ and ‘Variable’ are often used interchangeably in the context of statistics
and PGMs.
10Probability distributions are a central concept to BNSs, and arguably the Bernoulli distribution is the
most important single distribution to understand in this context. However, an in-depth technical review
of the statistical concepts including this distribution is beyond the scope of this chapter. An excellent
introduction to statistical concepts can be found in Barlow’s textbook, and Kendall’s series on advanced
statistics [19].
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These mappings are sometimes referred to as the local structures in a BN model. The
most widely used local structure for RVs is the table representation: these are commonly
referred to as Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). Local structures are also referred
to as Conditional Probability Distributions (CPDs): this makes no assumptions about the
structure of the RV and is a generalisation of a ‘CPT’.
Coin = Heads Coin = Tails
State = Loaded 0.7 0.3
State = Fair 0.5 0.5
(a) The joint conditional distribution for P (Coin|State).
Coin = Heads Coin = Tails
0.6 0.4
(b) The marginal distribution P (Coin|State = Unknown).
Coin = Heads Coin = Tails
0.5 0.5
(c) The marginal distribution P (Coin|State = Fair).
Figure 2.1: A comparison of a table-structured Conditional Probability Distributions
(CPDs) before and after marginalisation.
Figure 2.1a shows an example table-structured CPD (CPT) for an experiment in which
a coin may – or may not – be biased, and the associated conditional probabilities of the
outcomes (i.e. whether the coin turns up heads or tails) given the state of the coin. As
will be discussed later, the mapping of variables within this table and the parameters that
express relationships between them are commonly learned from data. The parameters
in this example refer to the probability of the occurrence of a given state. Intuitively,
if the coin-flipper knows the coin is biased, then the probability of the coin turning up
heads is known (in this case it would be 0.7). However, a key feature of this approach
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can be seen when there is uncertainty in whether or not the coin is biased. By computing
the marginal distribution for this RV (i.e. the distribution with respect only to whether
the coin is heads or tails) we can express a belief in the coin turning up heads given the
nature of the coin is unknown. The marginal CPT is shown in Figure 2.1b. If the nature
of the coin becomes known, or additional data becomes available, this distribution can be
revised. This is shown in Figure 2.1c. In this case, the marginal distribution is revised to
reflect a fair coin.
Table-structured CPDs are the most common local structure in BN models. However,
they are not the only local structures that are used in BNs. As the RV definition suggests, a
number of alternative local structures can be used. These include several Artificial Neural
Network (ANN), Random Forest (RF) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) variants, as
well as other BN models.11 This enables the development of hierarchical and object-based
BN (OOBN) models for high-complexity domains [4, 43]. It is possible to ‘embed’ some
ANNs, SVMs or indeed any other approach that meets the RV definition within a single
BN model [9, 10,11,44].
Taken together, these properties make the BN framework an ideal mathematical tool
for integrating information from many distinct AI approaches into a single coherent model.
This model is a representation of a domain that can be used to effectively reason over all
available information – and may be revised when new information becomes available.
Bayesian Networks therefore offer a representational framework that directly model the
world, as Pearl notes [18]:
Perhaps the most important aspect of Bayesian Networks is that they are direct
representations of the world, not the reasoning process.
As will be discussed later, the implications of this fact strongly influence the interpre-
tation of individual BN models and the development process for complex BNSs.
2.2.3.1 Representation
As a framework for capturing uncertainty in the ‘real world’, BN models share many
conceptual similarities with mathematical models developed in the natural sciences – par-
ticularly in the domain of physics. A fundamental aim of a BN model is to provide a
11The local structure of a variable within a BN may itself be a complete BN model in its own right.
See [2] for a review of this form of BN model.
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compact representation of complex problems in a computationally (and developmentally)
tractable mathematical construct. Formally, they are used to represent high-dimensional
Joint Probability Distributions (JPDs) in a factorised format. Practically, this means that
the BN framework allows developers to mathematically decompose highly complex proba-
bilistic models into (theoretically) less complex mathematical components, and to use this
factorised representation to perform efficient computations over the model. Without this
factorised representation, the state-space of complex probabilistic models can become too
large for computations utilising the model to remain tractable.
Figure 2.2: A visualisation of the structure of the ‘Asia Model’.
For example, consider the model shown in Figure 2.2. This figure shows a simple (fic-
titious) medical diagnostic model for diagnosing respiratory diseases in patients returning
from a trip to Asia. This model was introduced by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter in their
early work on BNs and remains a common example within the field of Probabilistic AI
and is typically referred to as the ‘Asia Model’. In this case, the model’s JPD encodes the
joint distribution over the eight discrete RVs within the model. Each of these variables is
represented with a standard table-structured CPD, and each is defined as having only two
states (i.e. as a binary discrete RV). Each node within the BN represents the CPD for
that variable conditioned on its parents (i.e. ancestor nodes). For example, the Dyspnoea
variable is entirely defined by the CPD shown in Figure 2.3 – only the conditional depen-
dencies of the Dyspnoea variable and its parent variables (Either Disease and Bronchitis)
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are encoded in the local structure. The Asia Model represents one of the simplest possible
BN architectures.
D = Y D = N
B = Y, E = Y 0.9 0.1
B = N, E = Y 0.7 0.3
B = Y, E = N 0.8 0.2
B = N, E = N 0.1 0.9
Figure 2.3: The tabular representation of the P (Dyspnoea|Bronchitis, Either) CPD,
where D = Dyspnoea, B = Bronchitis, and E = Either.
Despite this simplicity, the Asia Model highlights an important property of the BN
framework. The full JPD of this model contains 256 individual parameters. By defining
the model according to only local structures and therefore parameterising the CPDs indi-
vidually, the decomposed representation facilitated by the BN framework can be captured
using less than 36 individual parameters. This reduces the modelling challenge associated
with developing a probabilistic model of this diagnostic problem. From a practical per-
spective, this compartmentalises the development of the model: each variable within the
BN can – in principle – be modelled with consideration only of its parent variables. In
contrast, specifying the full JPD using alternative methods may require the consideration
of each variable in the context of each other variable within the model – thereby creating
a combinatorial explosion in the complexity of the model’s state-space.12
12From a software perspective, the exponential growth in the size of a model’s state-space given the
introduction of each new variables can quickly produce models in which an explicit (i.e. unfactorized) rep-
resentation of the model’s JPD may exhaust all computational resources that could possibly be dedicated
to it.
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Figure 2.4: A visualisation of Beinlich’s ‘ICU Alarm’ model [45,46].
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An example of this problem can be seen in the model shown in Figure 2.4. This
model is also commonly used within the BN domain and is often referred to as Beinlich’s
Alarm ICU model. It was originally developed to reduce false positive alarms to medical
practitioners on hospital Intensive Care Unit (ICU) wards. It represents the diagnostic
knowledge of medical practitioners and has been integrated with the health statistics of
many patients and the results of a number of medical studies. It provides a small-to-
moderately sized BN model that is commonly used to benchmark analysis and inference
techniques and will be returned to later in the thesis. Technically, it remains relatively
simple.
However, it highlights the problem of combinatorial explosion in BN models: an explicit
representation of this model’s JPD would be composed of more than 1 × 10500 unique
states. This is a large number. For scale, there are estimated to be only 1 × 1080 atoms
in the universe. The BN framework reduces the number of parameters that must be
specified to less than 2 × 104 independent parameters.13 This makes the development
of larger BN models technically challenging but generally practicable, especially when
automated learning algorithms are utilised. Clearly, however, an exhaustive exploration
of such models will be infeasible.
The Alarm model also reinforces Pearl’s assertion about the nature of BN models as
direct, declarative representations of the world: any conclusions derived from a BN model
are intrinsic to the model and (in principle) reflect some state of the world according to
the model. By extension, errors in this representation are intrinsic to the model too. In
the case of the models shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.2, they represent expert knowledge
of disease diagnosis and the health of patients. In other cases, they may represent the
relationships between sensor readings and vehicle positions, the type of a document given
the occurrence of a sequence of words, or the probability that a component in an aircraft
may fail given its current operational context. Consequently, the properties (and errors)
of these models are independent of any other underlying implementation details – whether
these implementation details be related to hardware or software [1, 2].
This property has resulted in the majority of BN literature broadly neglecting any
specific implementations or tools in favour of treating BN models as abstract mathematical
constructs; research focusses on understanding what has been built (or learned) and the
13This can be further reduced by exploiting independence properties within the network. However, the
number of independent parameters that must be specified (or learned) remains in the hundreds.
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dynamics of these models. This is consistent with the concerns of BN developers: a single
software implementation may support many models. In many cases, the models will be
the most valuable artefacts in a given system.
2.2.3.2 Inference
The ability of BNs to factorise complex probabilistic spaces into more easily tackled math-
ematical problems is a key property of the framework. However, as outlined in section
2.2.3, the utility of a BN model lies in the ability to infer the state of the world according
to that model and any available information about the world. This requires updating and
manipulating the model’s JPD. As discussed in section 2.2.3.1, an explicit representation of
the model’s JPD is typically prohibitively large for the purposes of tractable computation.
The aim of BN inference algorithms is therefore to update and manipulate the model’s
JPD without computing the joint distribution. In the BN literature, this process is typ-
ically referred to as querying the model.14 This involves instantiating a model with any
available information, and then computing the model’s degree of belief in the state of the
variables in the model. The inference algorithms that facilitate these operations fall into
two categories: exact inference algorithms and approximate inference algorithms.
Figure 2.5: A high-level visualisation of the Junction Tree algorithm.
In general, algorithms in the former category are favoured whenever they can be fea-
sibly used: as their name suggests they provide the exact degree of belief in an RV’s state
given all available information. There are several approaches to exact inference for BNs.
The most ubiquitous approach relies on ‘belief propagation’ (BP) within a BN model.
Figure 2.5 shows the general process of a BP inference algorithm. As the figure indicates,
14This language appears to have somewhat fallen out of favour as the use-cases for BNs have grown and
the field has matured.
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the algorithm begins by performing a series of transformations (Moralisation and Tri-
angulation) over the graph structure of a BN. This produces an undirected and further
compacted representation of the original model. However, the semantic value of the origi-
nal model is often eroded or lost in the resulting structure. This structure is often referred
to as a Junction Tree (JT).15 The JTs produced from this process are then ‘calibrated’:
the probabilistic information from the originating BN is used to configure the JT’s struc-
ture. This ensures that the JT encodes an equivalent probabilistic representation to the
original model – even if some of the semantic value of the originating representation is
lost.
At this stage, the JT is ready for belief propagation. Belief propagation is typically
performed using some variant of a message-passing algorithm. These algorithms ensure
the probabilistic integrity of the JT is maintained (i.e. that the distribution encoded by
the JT remains a valid probability distribution). When this message passing is complete,
the distributions encoded within the JT are exactly equivalent to the state of belief in
the originating BN given all available information. The marginal distributions for each
variable within the JT can then be computed and represented within a BN model.16 An in-
depth review of belief propagation algorithms for BNs is beyond the scope of this chapter.
However, detailed explorations of this area can be found in the work of Lauritzen, Koller,
or in Pearl’s original publications [2, 16,17,32].
Whilst exact inference engines are generally desirable, they cannot always be employed
in BNSs. This is often because of the specific properties of the structure encoded by the BN
model, or because the complexity of the model undermines the ability of exact inference
approaches to function effectively. Circumstances such as this are common in applications
focussed on image processing, natural language processing and some robot localisation
and navigation tasks [47, 48, 49]. These applications are characterised by models that
can rapidly become extremely large and complex – even for relatively simple tasks. In
these cases, approximate inference methods are utilised. There are several approximate
inference algorithms available to BN developers. Amongst the most prominent of these
15The state-space of a JT is typically defined such that the combinatorial growth typical of other rep-
resentations is to some degree mitigated. However there are many open research problems relating to the
optimal construction of JTs and most rely on heuristics or brute-force search methods.
16Note that the Input and Output nodes inf Figure 2.5 correspond to model inputs (sometimes referred
to as evidence) and the marginal posterior distributions respectively.
23
Chapter 2: Literature Review
are approaches that utilise Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling to estimate a
BN model’s marginal distributions.17
Inference techniques utilising MCMC methods are based on a simple concept: that
by generating a sequence of samples drawn from the underlying probability distribution
encoded in the BN model, an estimate of the ‘true’ posterior distribution of the BN can
be approximated. This approach is mathematically guaranteed to converge to the ‘true’
posterior of a BN model given a sufficient number of samples. However, sampling the
a BN’s distribution proceeds at random, and while these algorithms are guaranteed to
converge to an accurate estimate, when they will converge can sometimes be difficult to
estimate and therefore guarantee [2, 51, 52]. Furthermore, these approaches are typically
sensitive to their ‘initial conditions’ – the initial configuration of the algorithm and the
first random samples drawn from the BN model. This introduces additional uncertainty
into the estimate of the posterior that is obtained. A number of mitigation strategies
have been developed to tackle these problems, but ultimately, they remain an inherent
consideration for this class of algorithm.
2.2.3.3 Learning
Beyond the representational and inferential capabilities of the BN framework, there is the
final aspect of BNs that has driven the popularity and interest in these approaches – and
other techniques in the field of AI generally. This is the ability to define and develop a
BN model such that it can learn from data rather than being ‘manually’ programmed.
Indeed, many AI approaches have been developed and designed to accomplish tasks that
traditional, explicit, and therefore transparent programming methods are poor at (or inca-
pable of) performing. These tasks are often too complex, variable or novel for conventional
software development approaches to effectively tackle [53,54].
In the case of BNs, the semi-transparent mathematical constructs that drive them may
constitute a significant proportion of a system’s programming. The learning algorithms
that identify and define these models can be considered to (partially) take the place of
a software system’s programmer. The BN developer’s role is then shifted to a parallel
but distinct set of considerations focussed on identifying and configuring a learning (i.e.
programming) method that will achieve desired performance characteristics when exe-
17Another widely used approximate inference approach is Variational Inference, an introduction to this
can be found in the work of Blei et al and Jordan [50,51].
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cuted; this is as opposed to designing the software architecture and ultimately manually
programming the system.18
From this perspective, the properties of learning algorithms and the hyperparameters
used to configure the algorithms that are used in the development of a BNS are of central
importance to the functional behaviours of the completed system. This is true even if these
algorithms are not physically encoded in the final system or otherwise deployed aboard
the completed system. In the context of learning algorithms, a hyperparameter can be
defined as follows:
Hyperparameter – Parameters that are set prior to the model learning process. For
example, these parameters can tune the rate of learning of an algorithm or the algorithm’s
tolerance to noise in any training data. This is in contrast to parameters: these are
derived through the learning process [51]. There may be additional optimisation/learning
phases focussed on identifying an optimal set of hyperparameters [55].
For BNSs, there are two principal aspects of a model that learning algorithms aim to
optimise: a model’s structure and/or a model’s parameters. In BNSs, the semantic value
of a model’s structure has driven the development of a wide variety of structure learning
algorithms for knowledge discovery; these algorithms can be used to automatically discover
relationships between variables within a domain. This has been used extensively in a
number of medical knowledge discovery studies [56,57]. The structure learning problem in
the case of BN models is often more important in than in alternative AI approaches [1,2].
For example, learning algorithms for ANNs and SVMs are often only minimally con-
cerned with directly learning the structure of a model – structure learning is instead
dominated by more ‘coarse’ structure aspects such as the higher-level architecture of an
ANN, or the size and variant of an SVM. In many cases these models have limited inherent
semantic value. The problem of learning models in these cases is instead generally more
focussed on parameter learning algorithms to identify an effective weighting configuration
for the model.19 For BN models, structure learning algorithms can identify model struc-
tures that imply conditional relationships that may in turn indicate causal relationships
18This is of course still an important phase of the development of a BNS, but its importance is diminished
for many systems utilising modern AI approaches.
19There is an equivalence in parameter learning and structure learning in ANNs: a zero-weighted con-
nection in an ANN is precisely equivalent to learning part of the model’s structure.
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between domain aspects [22]. This structure will define the reasoning behaviours of a BN
model and therefore directly influence the behaviour of a BNS utilising this model – it will
therefore also directly influence the interpretability of the model.
The most widely-used class of learning algorithm for BNSs are those that focus on
parameter learning. Algorithms of this class aim to parameterise the local structures of a
BN model. They often do not indicate the conditional or causal dependencies of variables
in a model and therefore do not influence the interpretability or reasoning performance
of a model in the manner of structure learning algorithms. Instead, parameter learn-
ing algorithms generally modify the degree of dependence of variables upon one another.
Expressing the quantified strength of dependence of variables within a domain is often
problematic for human experts, and the ability to achieve this with an automated pro-
cess has proved invaluable in a number of practical contexts [58, 59, 60]. For example,
the state-space of BN models is commonly so large that eliciting parameters from human
experts is impracticable. The combination of the limitations in the ability of experts to
quantify dependencies in a domain and the size of the state-space of a model can make
the assessment of the accuracy of individual learned (and expert-elicited) parameters a
challenging problem. The development of techniques that explore these learned properties
is an ongoing area of research [56,61].
While learning algorithms for BNs can be generally divided into those focussed on
either structure or parameter learning, they can also be used in support of ‘off-line’ and
‘on-line’ learning. These cases can be defined as follows:
Off-line Learning – A learning/optimisation activity that occurs prior to the deploy-
ment of the system. AISs using this form of learning are sometimes referred to as ‘pre-
trained’ or ‘static’ models.
On-line Learning – A learning/optimisation activity that may begin prior to the de-
ployment of the system, but continues after the system is operationally deployed. AISs
using this form of learning are sometimes referred to as ‘adaptive’ or ‘active’ models.
In the former case, a BN model would be a static artefact that does not vary after a
BNS is deployed. This learning approach is often appropriate for diagnostic roles or other
decision support roles where – to a good approximation – the domain being modelled can
be captured using only off-line training techniques (i.e. the domain will not vary signifi-
cantly over time). For example, a diagnostic problem may be well characterised by expert
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experience and extensive empirical trials: the problem may be sufficiently constrained so
as to ensure the continued validity of a static model.
However, in other cases, the target domain may be inherently dynamic and therefore
constantly evolving. In these cases, a pre-trained BN model may become obsolete dur-
ing deployment. In such cases, adaptive learning approaches may therefore be required
to maintain the performance of the BNS. Adaptive methods typically allow a model’s
structure and/or parameters to be updated in the presence of new data [62,63]. This can
allow a BNS to compensate for environmental and operational changes that may not have
been present during the development of the system. When effectively implemented, these
approaches can theoretically improve the robustness of a system to problems associated
with ‘distribution shift’ and shifting operational contexts.20
Any errors or distortions in the sensory capabilities of a system utilising a BNS –
or indeed in any input to the BNS – will be used by an adaptive learning algorithm to
revise the state of the world as captured by the BN models driving the systems. From an
assurance perspective, this introduces the possibility of a safety and security vulnerability
for this class of systems. This could be in the form of novel ‘hacking’ approaches that
target BNSs deployed with adaptive learning capabilities (and other AISs using similar
techniques). For example, an adaptive learning approach used aboard an Unmanned Aerial
System (UAS) for mission planning could be manipulated by low-levels of systematic biases
in inputs (i.e. through the vehicles sensory capabilities: radar, cameras, etc.). This may
have the effect of producing unexpected effects – the UAS may become situationally blind
or compromised (either in terms of ‘physical’ perception or in terms of its ability to reason
about its operational capabilities). As these vulnerabilities would exploit the learning and
model aspects of these systems, a platform could be compromised without access to its
hardware or software: the exposed ‘API’ of the system would be the world around it.
To summarise, the learning algorithms used by a BNS play a central role in the func-
tional behaviour of a BNS. In both the on-line and off-line cases, the effect of the precise
configuration of a learning algorithm may introduce significant differences in the reason-
ing and performance of two BN models trained on otherwise identical data. Indeed, the
manner of their use – in conjunction with the nature of the BN models they are used to
20Distribution shift refers to the slow, sometimes random, changes in the statistical profile of the processes
being modelled by an AIS. Technically this can result in increased statistical error in a model’s predictions.
Practically, this could result in an AIS manifesting apparently erratic or erroneous behaviours [21].
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define – is considered by some to be a new form of software. This approach has been
referred to within the AI community as differentiable programming, as Yann LeCunn, a
pioneer in the field of ANNs, states:
“... people are now building a new kind of software by assembling networks of
parameterized functional blocks and by training them from examples using some
form of . . . optimization . . . It’s really very much like a regular program, ex-
cept it’s parameterized, automatically differentiated, and trainable/optimizable
[sic].”
The emphasis on the optimisation of this class of system is critical. The learning algo-
rithms optimise a software system’s programming for a target problem. This optimisation
is a key aspect of the properties and capabilities that make many AI approaches desir-
able, and indeed the only currently practicable solutions to many computational problems.
However, these properties make them radically different from the conventional software
systems that form the focus of existing software development lifecycles and software as-
surance literature.
2.2.4 Development Lifecycle
The development of a BNS is often dependent on information and system aspects that
are not generally known a priori. For example, the quantity, breadth and type of data
required for the development of a BNS may not be known. Similarly, the specific learning
algorithm, its configuration and mathematical properties may be unknown at the incep-
tion of a project. These aspects may remain unknown or otherwise poorly defined until
comparatively late in the development of a BNS [5, 6]. Aspects such as these are refined
through iterative design, analysis and evaluation. The development lifecycle of many BNSs
is therefore characterised by highly iterative design and testing phases, the duration and
extent of which may not be possible to specify in advance. This is sometimes cited as the
major source of technological risk in the development of AISs: it may not be possible to
know whether a system will be performant until much later in the lifecycle of a BNS than
is typical in conventional software systems [2, 6, 58, 64]. The difficulty in pre-emptively
defining and decomposing a set of requirements alongside a general set of systematic de-
velopment practices is well known within the AI domain [2, 64]. It is a major ongoing
research challenge within the field. This is highlighted by Koller who states:
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“... at the moment, the design process is more the result of trial-and-error
experimentation, combined with some rough intuitions that practitioners learn
by experience. It would be an important achievement to turn this process from
a black art into a science.”
Indeed, the development of an effective BNS can share more conceptual similarities
with the empirical experimental practices common to the natural sciences than to ‘top-
down’ design processes more common to software engineering practices: whether a new
experiment will succeed or fail at providing a particular observation cannot be known
in advance. Moreover, precisely how an observation will be made may not be known in
anything other than the most coarse-grained terms. Typically, experimentation proceeds
from a high-level goal, and the decomposition of this goal into sub-goals (requirements) is
commonly a highly iterative process of discovery. The decomposition process may reverse
or change as new information becomes available to refine the experimental process. If a
BN model is considered to be an empirical, probabilistic model of a target domain, this
could be considered to be an unavoidable consequence of the framework – and is shared
with other AI approaches.
While a generic framework for the development of a BNS has not yet been established,
several authors have published work on the development of domain- and context-specific
development practices which each aim to systematise or formalise some aspects of the iter-
ative lifecycle of BNS [6,59,65]. One approach, proposed by Przytula et al, was developed
specifically for constructing BN models for fault diagnosis aboard complex systems. It
aims to provide a systematic process for the development of BN models. However, it is
high level and still somewhat driven by BN developer intuition. The process defines four
steps based on developing and deploying diagnostic BNs for complex aerospace systems:
1. System Decomposition The system is systematically decomposed on the basis of
expert guidance into a set of subsystems. The boundaries of subsystems are then
defined in accordance with the scope of knowledge of individual human experts (or
teams of experts focussed on a given system aspect or subsystem). These subsystems
are then decomposed further if the complexity of the subsystem is assessed to be too
high. The principal aim of this stage of development is stated as being to identify
individual BN models or model fragments, and to ensure the objective of these
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models (i.e. to diagnose subsystem faults) is minimally complex.21
2. Subsystem Definition With the preliminary set of subsystems identified, the enu-
meration and definition of all faults and observations associated with each given
subsystem then begins. Once again, the process aims to establish a minimal level
of granularity for a BN model by defining faults in accordance with maintenance
practices and knowledge of system experts. The process advocates defining faults
according to replaceable subsystem components and standard maintenance activi-
ties. The example provided is as follows: if a group of circuit boards is replaced en
masse, then this group of boards should be considered a single fault (as opposed to
each individual board). At this point, the complexity of the subsystem should be
re-evaluated. Further decomposition may be necessary in the event the complexity
of the subsystem has grown beyond a heuristically derived value – though this can-
not be established until after this phase of development. The process should then
proceed iteratively until a minimal level of granularity of the subsystem model is
agreed upon by relevant stakeholders.
3. Subsystem Modelling Next, the process advocates the development of BN models
using the outputs from the previous phase (i.e. a list of faults and observations) by
beginning from a minimal fault model of the subsystem. This initially takes the form
of BN model with a single fault node: all faults within the subsystem are represented
as being mutually independent and are all regarded to be direct causal factors in the
occurrence of each observation. Therefore, at this stage, the subsystem is modelled
as being equivalent to a na¨ıve Bayesian Network. This is the simplest representation
possible in the BN framework. If the model is not performant, an iterative process of
refinement begins whereby the faults are gradually modelled as increasingly granular
faults (i.e. iteratively broken into separate nodes with their own dependencies). This
process continues until the model satisfies domain experts and may require regression
to the previous phase of development for continued decomposition of the system or
subsystem.
4. Subsystem Model Integration The final stage of the development of the models
21The emphasis of this development methodology on establishing ‘minimally complex’ models can be
summarised by the quote attributed to Einstein that says; ‘Everything should be made as simple as possible,
but no simpler’. The aim here is to ensure the modelling activities produce parsimonious models.
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is the integration of subsystem BN models into larger hierarchical models. These
hierarchical models are iteratively tested over the course of these integration ac-
tivities to ensure that the models remain performant when integrated with other
models. If there are any shared dependencies across subsystems, the integration of
these subsystem models may erode the performance of the models. The guidance
suggests the parallel development and testing of such interdependent subsystems to
avoid these issues where possible. However, it is noted that the integration process
is highly application dependent. The guidance provided for the model integration
phases is therefore comparatively scarce. It also indicates the potential need for
further regression to previous development phases.
With little existing guidance into the development of large, complex BNSs for ‘real
world’ applications, this research provides insight into the development of these systems
in a practical context. However, as a piece of guidance, it applies only to a subset of
BN applications: it makes a number of assumptions with respect to the BN models used
– particularly with regard to the structure variants and modelling objectives of the BN
models and subsystems. Consequently, the guidance does not provide (nor does it attempt
to provide, given the research scope) a generic framework for developing BNSs. For the
class of BNS it targets, it provides a set of heuristics for identifying when a development
phase is complete. Finally, the research highlights a recurrent feature of existing BN
development literature and methodologies: a near-complete absence of discussion of the
role of the software and hardware implementation aspects – those aspects most of concern
to software safety practitioners in conventional systems. The emphasis is once again placed
on the BN models and the data (and expert input) used to develop the system. It again
raises the issue of the effective communication of these unconventional system aspects to
other domain experts and system stakeholders.
Another more general development methodology – referred to as the Knowledge Engi-
neering for Bayesian Network (KEBN) methodology – has also been proposed by Pollino
[59]. This approach does not assume any specific application but does assume that the
BNS being developed is a knowledge-based decision support tool; this therefore narrows
the scope of the guidance. The methodology was proposed to support the development of
BN models for ecological modelling applications. As noted by the authors of the method-
ology, these applications are exposed to particularly high levels of both statistical and
systemic uncertainty in their target domains. While the KEBN methodology is more gen-
31
Chapter 2: Literature Review
erally applicable to a broader range of BN applications than the previous methodology,
it still makes significant assumptions about the development process. In particular, the
methodology does not provide guidance on the development of BNSs that utilise model
structure learning approaches. These aspects are assumed to be derived through expert
elicitation rather than an automated learning approach. Furthermore, as a knowledge-
driven methodology, the approach does not provide insight into the development of purely
data-driven BNSs – those systems that are developed with limited expert input. A flow
chart illustrating the development methodology is shown in Figure 2.6.
As with the previous development methodology, the KEBN approach relies heavily on
highly iterative development activities. As can be seen from Figure 2.6, the methodol-
ogy is composed of three core processes: Structural Development and Evaluation (SDE),
Parameter Estimation (PE), and Quantitative Evaluation (QE). The SDE process is not
explored in detail within the research, though the authors indicate this is entirely elicited
from experts. The PE processes are aimed at facilitating the integration of information
from both domain experts and any available quantitative data into a single BN model.
This process has an internal iterative cycle of evaluation and development aimed at ad-
dressing the need to continually review parameter estimates obtained from automated
(parameter) learning approaches.
The QE processes in the methodology are once again highly iterative. They address
an important feature of the development of BNSs: the quantitative (generally statistical)
evaluation of BN models. As indicated by the authors’ experiences in developing these
systems, the development of a knowledge-based BNS must accommodate many iterations
between the evaluation of a BN model, and the incremental revision of a BN model’s
parameters or structure. This process is driven by model-focussed analysis and evaluation
techniques as opposed to conventional software analysis techniques. As with the previous
methodology, there is no explicit discussion of the software implementation and evaluation
aspects from a conventional software development perspective. Again, the operational
experience of the authors stresses the disproportionate importance of evaluating the model,
data and knowledge of domain experts when developing a BNS.
Ultimately, both of these methodologies and other items of existing work on defining
structured approaches to BN development are highly limited. As discussed here, research
and guidance that does exist is focussed on specific applications and domains and does not
provide more generic guidance that could accommodate the development of a ‘modern’
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Figure 2.6: The Knowledge Engineering for Bayesian Networks (KEBN) development
cycle, as proposed by Pollino et al [59].
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data-driven BNS. The few guidance documents and development methodologies that do
exist stress the necessity of accommodating highly iterative development cycles, the general
constraints placed on the development of BNSs that arise from limitations in knowledge
and resources that are particularly influential on the development, and finally the analysis
and evaluation activities that will need to be performed by BN developers [5, 6, 59, 65,
66]. No existing methodologies or guidance for BNSs provide the rigour that would be
necessary for the development of mission-critical BNSs. There is no existing guidance
on how decisions on the sufficiency of BNS-specific analysis and evaluation techniques
can be made with respect to the role of a BN model in the functional behaviour of a
mission-critical BNS.
2.3 Safety Standards
The development and assurance of conventional safety-critical software systems is gener-
ally achieved through compliance with one or more safety standards. The safety-critical
systems domain has produced a range of standards and guidance documents that each aim
to tackle the design, implementation and deployment of this class of systems in various
engineering domains. These standards espouse an assortment of development and analy-
sis techniques that are believed to represent ‘best practice’ by engineers within the field a
given standard is relevant to. This section gives a general overview of a subset of systems-
and software-engineering safety standards and guidelines that are particularly pertinent
to the motivating example of this thesis. These standards and guidelines represent a
cross-section of key aerospace safety standards within the UK and provide insights into
existing schools of thought within the safety-critical systems domain. Where applicable,
general criticisms – and criticisms related to the applicability or relevance of aspects of
these standards with respect to AIS/BNSs – are provided.
The Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4754 (Revision A) document is a widely
used and generally well-regarded guidance document that addresses the development of
civil aircraft and systems [67]. It has found extensive use internationally, and in particular
is a de facto standard for aerospace systems developed within Europe and North America.
As a set of guidelines, ARP 4754 is aimed at addressing the lifecycle of system-level
functions, including system requirements, system verification and requirements validation.
It is written to integrate closely with other guidelines focussed on addressing software and
hardware aspects of an aircraft – aspects addressed by DO-178C and DO-254 respectively.
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The guidelines are also designed to be used in conjunction with a further document: ARP
4761. This latter document defines the safety assessment methodologies to be used in the
assurance of the aircraft. Taken together, these four documents are intended to provide
comprehensive guidance on the development and certification of any aircraft or other
airborne systems.
Practically, ARP 4754 provides a mechanism for assigning Development Assurance
Levels (DALs) to system-level functions (in the context of this thesis: UAS-level func-
tions). This includes the assignment of DALs to software systems deployed aboard an UAS
through the application of the safety analysis methodologies outlined in ARP 4761 [68].
The software-specific development, analysis and evaluation of software systems and their
associated lifecycles are handled by DO-178C [69]. For software systems, DO-178C pro-
vides sets of objectives alongside the recommended activities for satisfying these objectives.
As with many other standards, the number of objectives and the analytical rigour required
to meet them is typically proportional to some form of criticality of a given software system
or subsystem to that system’s safety: there are more objectives and an assumed higher
level of rigour associated with the development of systems to higher DALs. By focussing
on compliance with processes and pre-defined objectives, ARP 4754 and DO-178C have
remained popular with industry groups and engineers thanks to their relatively concrete,
well defined requirements. In the context of safety-critical systems, criticality can be
defined as follows:
Criticality – A product of the degree of contribution of a system (or subsystem) to
safety-related functional behaviours and the severity of hazards associated with these
behaviours.
Though popular and widely used, this group of guidance documents has been criticised
by safety practitioners. A frequent criticism originates in precisely the prescriptive nature
of the documents that has contributed to their popularity. While they provide well-
defined processes and requirements, the intent and rationale behind these processes and
requirements can be lost: as Weaver states, development activities may instead focus on
‘the letter of the law’ as opposed to the intended ‘spirit’ of the guidelines [70]. From
an assurance perspective this raises the possibility of the deployment of a system that
has been developed in exact accordance with guidelines but may retain significant and
potentially hazardous latent behaviours due to the narrowness of the verification and
validation activities carried out [70,71,72,73,74].
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A second related criticism arises from concerns over the completeness and relevance of
the processes and requirements laid out in the guidelines [75,76,77]. This becomes partic-
ularly concerning in cases involving the development of new and novel systems that may
integrate new development techniques, technologies or concepts [73, 78, 79]. For example,
DO-178C is intended to capture best practices in software engineering for aerospace sys-
tems at the time of issue and consequently for software systems in use or in development
at this time; there are assumptions implicit in the guidelines with respect to the nature
and scope of these systems, and the relative invariance of these systems and development
practices over time [79,80].
One general criticism of this form revolves around the application of ARP 4754 to
Autonomous Systems (AS) in the aerospace domain and the relation of these systems
to their operational environment [81]. Many AS applications will adopt the reasoning
and interactive behaviours of human operators. In these cases, they can become highly
sensitive to environmental factors that are not typically within the scope of conventional
systems. In its current form ARP 4754 provides little guidance on the role or importance of
environmental modelling activities. To date, it has relied on assumptions that the relevant
aspects of the operational environment of a system are well-defined, well-regulated and
well-understood. As discussed in previous sections, the scope of what is relevant to an
AIS may increase dramatically. This may be particularly true of BNSs that integrate and
reason over a wide range of environmental aspects. Consequently, the current near-absence
of guidance in this field will undermine the effectiveness of the guidelines in assuring this
class of system.
Figure 2.7: A visualisation of the ‘V lifecycle’ model [82].
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These criticisms extend to the consideration of the generality of the structure of system
lifecycles as assumed by both ARP 4754 and DO-178C. Specifically, both documents make
strong assumptions about the development process of a system, the activities that can
be carried out and the stages at which certain assurance information becomes available
to developers. Figure 2.7 shows the so-called ‘V lifecycle’ commonly used to describe
the development activities associated with a safety-critical software system [83]. Both
ARP 4754 and DO-178C make assumptions that the development of a software system
conforms closely to this general process. They assume that a conventional decomposition
of requirements is possible at an early stage and that the development process proceeds in
a roughly linear fashion. A number of authors have noted that for some classes of software
system, this conceptual model of the lifecycle of a system may not be appropriate [81,84,
85]. In the context of BNSs, ‘traditional’ software design and requirements decomposition
techniques will become less relevant and insightful. This is because at some point, the
functional behaviour of an AIS is often best described from a model-centric perspective as
opposed to a software-centric one. This could be regarded as a developmental boundary
for AISs – the point at which conventional function decomposition and analysis approaches
can progress no further (or are otherwise uninformative) and the principal determinant of
functional behaviour becomes the models that drive the system. This has been observed
in other classes of AIS [64,86].
These concerns are further compounded by the relatively slow pace of change in guide-
lines and standards in comparison to the pace of innovation in the broader technology and
engineering space. In some cases, standards and guidelines have existed almost unchanged
for decades despite changes to the technologies and applications they address [73, 80].
Moreover, even after modifications to guidance there is some debate as to the effective-
ness of additional requirements and processes mandated by these modifications [87]. For
example, it has been noted that in the case of earlier issues of DO-178C, the introduction
of additional testing activities may have increased the testing burden of developers while
producing no significant improvement in the effectiveness of this testing. It is assumed
that the same suite of software testing techniques will be capable of exposing hazardous
behaviours across all software systems addressed by the guidance [88,89].
An example of one such technique is coverage testing using Modified Condition/De-
cision Coverage (MC/DC). This is mandated for the highest DALs (i.e. DAL A). This
testing approach is aimed at exploring the code structures of a software system. In many
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contexts, it can be effective at identifying software errors in the system and can often
provide a high degree of confidence in the logical correctness of the system [90]. However,
it has been noted that within conventional systems this form of testing may be of only
limited use in identifying certain behaviours: it can be sensitive to some code structures
and may be no more useful in some contexts than other, less ‘expensive’ analysis ap-
proaches [75,91,92,93]. Moreover, in the context of BNSs, the properties of these systems
may further hamper the effectiveness of MC/DC testing (and other code-focussed testing
approaches) due to the importance of model and data aspects of the BNS in contributing
to the functional behaviours of the system. This will be explored in more detail shortly.
A further group of standards that are particularly relevant to the motivating example
of this thesis are those standards derived from the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) 61508 standard. This standard aims to provide a general functional safety
standard [94]. This generality has made it popular in a number of fields, including the
nuclear, automotive, rail and process industries. A number of standards derived directly
from IEC 61508 are in active use in several domains. One such derived standard – of
particular note to road vehicles – is the automotive industry’s International Organisation
for Standardisation (ISO) 26262 standard [95]. This explicitly states that the autonomous
use of AI in these systems is not recommended. As IEC 61508 lays out a comprehensive
safety lifecycle for electrical, electronic and programmable systems it also makes strong
assumptions about the development process and activities. Similar criticisms have been
levelled at IEC 61508 as have been levelled at ARP 4754 and DO-178C, notably that
systems developed in accordance with this standard may encounter issues related to the
prescriptive nature of the standard, and the lack of explicit rationale that underpins the
defined requirements [70, 75, 76]. There is a general lack of clarity of how the processes
and requirements relate to the system in development [76]. Again, some of the novel de-
velopment activities and behaviours of many AISs have been identified as being poorly
addressed by the standard [96].
While the general landscape of safety engineering is still heavily reliant on relatively
prescriptive safety standards, there is increasing interest in the development of conceptu-
ally distinct, flexible standards to tackle the challenges discussed previously. One example
of this form of standard is the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Defence Standard 00-056
(DS 00-056) [97]. This standard sets out requirements addressing the safety management
of systems operated by the MOD but does not prescribe a set of objectives for how these
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requirements can be satisfied. Instead, it relies on a goal-based approach to assurance.
This is achieved through the development of a safety case that explicitly argues for the
safety of a system and uses evidence to support these arguments [70,98].
This standard is augmented by the recent re-introduction of the MOD’s Defence Stan-
dard 00-055 (DS 00-055) [99]. This standard specifically addresses the development of
‘Programmable Elements’ for safety-critical applications – with particular focus on soft-
ware aspects of safety-critical MOD programmes. It adopts a complementary stance to
DS 00-056 in focussing on providing a goal-based safety framework. Again, the standard
encourages assurance practitioners to explicitly expose the rationale for their assurance
activities and ultimately the safety of their systems.
The MOD has adopted this approach partially for flexibility; it enables developers to
use relevant civilian standards where appropriate (i.e. DO-178C for aerospace systems)
[100]. However, it has also been adopted to encourage more explicit reasoning when
establishing the safety of the system. Goal-based approaches have been criticised by
some as producing more ambiguous safety artefacts and for their often poor integration
with existing development practices [73].22 However, they have also been credited with
mitigating some of the weaknesses of standards such as ARP 4754 and IEC 61508: they can
ensure the reasoning behind assurance activities and development processes is explicit and
relevant to the system under development. They can also reduce the degree of disruption
caused by late-stage design or development changes [73,100].
2.3.1 Safety Analysis Techniques
The successful application of each of these standards is predicated on the effective utilisa-
tion of safety analysis techniques that explore the underlying properties and behaviours of
a system. The safety-critical systems domain has spawned a plethora of such techniques
that are both based upon techniques from the broader systems- and software-engineering
domains, and that have been developed entirely within the safety domain.
Understanding the general approaches to analysing the safety of a system and the
specific techniques that can be applied to these systems is a necessary prerequisite for
the assurance of the safety-critical systems. This section provides a top-level overview of
two of the most common safety analysis techniques currently in use: Fault Tree Analysis
22This issue of poor integration refers to cases in which goal-driven assurance cases are constructed
retrospectively, thereby undermining their potential utility.
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(FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). These two techniques have been
selected because of their ubiquity in the safety domain, and because they frame the two
logical approaches to safety analysis: inductive and deductive analysis. These two terms
can be defined as follows [83]:
Inductive – Any form of analysis which proceeds from a known or hypothesised condition
to possible outcomes.
Deductive – Any form of analysis which proceeds through the investigation of possible
causes of a specific system condition.
The logical process of all safety analysis techniques can be categorised in terms of
these two definitions. While they are presented here as a dichotomy, many widely used
techniques adopt elements of both forms of analysis. Perhaps the most popular technique
that consists of both deductive and inductive aspects is a Hazard and Operability study
(HAZOP).23 In the case of the two techniques selected for discussion in this section, FTA
is can be described as a deductive analysis technique, while FMEA can be described as
an inductive technique. Before continuing into a discussion of these two techniques, the
following terms must be defined [70]:
Error – A discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition,
and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition [101].24
Fault – An imperfection or deficiency in the system which may, under some operational
conditions, contribute to an error.
Failure – The inability of a system or component to fulfil its operational requirements.
Failure Mode – The way in which a system or component may fail.
These definitions will be used throughout this thesis.
2.3.1.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
The aim of FMEA is to provide an inductive methodology for identifying how a system
may fail, and to assess the relative impact of these failures upon the system [83]. This
23A review of HAZOP is beyond the scope of this chapter. A good introduction can be found in Pumfrey’s
work [83].
24An error may not necessarily develop into a failure if it is within acceptable limits
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theoretically enables practitioners to prioritise assurance activities in order to address those
system aspects that require the highest levels of assurance. The analysis uses inductive
reasoning to identify a set of potential failure modes in a system, and then works backwards
from this point in order to attempt to identify possible causes of these failure modes,
and the safety effects these failures may have upon a system (and if applicable, system
operators) [83,102].
In some cases, the severity of the effects of a failure are also captured by the analysis.
In these cases, an FMEA is sometimes referred to as a failure modes, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA).25 When the severity of a failure mode is assessed, it is common for
assurance practitioners to define the severity categories and any associated quantitative
risk profiles according to a given standard or guideline. Indeed, the specific form of an
FMEA and language used in these analyses are often defined by standards and guidelines.
For example, both FMEA and FTA are recommended analysis techniques in ARP 4761
[68]. Within the safety domain, FMEA methodologies are a core tool in a safety engineer’s
repository. They have been credited with providing a means of proactively exploring
a system’s failure modes rather than relying on analysis techniques that may identify
potential failure modes more reactively. They are also used to guide the design process
towards hazardous failure modes and the development of potential mitigation techniques
for these failures. A detailed breakdown of FMEA is beyond the scope of this chapter,
but a more complete review can be found in the work of Pumfrey [83].
However, while the utility of FMEA as a standard safety analysis technique is well
established, there have been a number of criticisms of the technique. One of the most
common criticisms is that FMEA is subjective: it is developed based upon a practitioner’s
internalised model of a system and is generally not driven by empirical observations or
other forms of objective evidence. Consequently, the repeatability of FMEAs is a major
source of criticism of this methodology: different safety engineers may produce divergent
FMEAs [103, 104]. In the most serious cases, this may result in the complete omission of
failure modes, an erroneous assessment of the effects of a failure mode, or some combination
of both [104, 105]. This contributes to a further common criticism of FMEAs: they may
25There is a degree of ambiguity in the usage of the term – the terms FMEA and FMECA are sometimes
used interchangeably by practitioners. Inclusion of severity/risk assessments are typically regarded as the
demarcation between techniques. More generally, the term FMEA is used to describe a range of similar
but distinct techniques, further complicating matters.
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inadvertently distort a safety practitioner’s estimate of risk in a system. This may be
particularly true of systems with unconventional properties.
2.3.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis
In contrast to FMEA, FTA is a deductive technique developed at Bell Labs in the 1960’s
as a by-product of the United States’ ballistic missile programme [106, 107]. The FTA
process begins with the selection of a failure mode (sometimes initially identified using
FMEA) and the use of this failure mode as the ‘top node’ of a Fault Tree (FT). The safety
practitioner then proceeds deductively from this failure mode by identifying causal factors
leading to this ‘top node’. These are typically represented using only “AND/OR” logic
gates. The intent of an FTA is to reveal combinations of events that may lead to the
occurrence of the top-level event (i.e. the failure mode). As the definition suggests, the
conclusions drawn from FTA are logically irrefutable provided the structure of the FT is
correct and complete. Figure 2.8 shows an example of a simple FT capturing a classic
fire-protection system failure [108]. A full review of the construction of a FT and the
symbols used is beyond the scope of this chapter but can be found in the work of Barlow
and Ericson [106,109].
An important feature of FTA is the integration of quantitative information into the FT
in the form of the assignment of event probabilities to each of the events in a given FT (in
the case of the tree shown in Figure 2.8, these are captured by the rectangular symbols in
the tree). This enables safety practitioners to estimate the probability of the occurrence
of an outcome (represented with the circular symbol in Figure 2.8) by evaluating the
probability of a sequence of events occurring over the whole FT. A by-product of this
capability is the ability to evaluate which aspects of a system’s design is most important
to a given outcome [106].
The probabilistic properties of FTs has resulted in the development of techniques
for the translation of FTs into BNs to overcome some of the limitations of the logical
structure of FTs: most notably the constraints imposed by the logical AND/OR gates
most commonly used in their construction [110,111]. Indeed, some research indicates that
the flexibility and robustness of BNs may provide a practical alternative to ‘traditional’
FT-based analysis techniques.
Again, despite its ubiquity and general popularity, FTA has received a number of
criticisms. For example, some studies indicate that the generation may not be as objective
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Figure 2.8: A simple Fault Tree for the classic ‘fire alarm’ problem. [108]
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or repeatable as sometimes thought; for complex systems, independent experts can produce
FTs with dramatically different estimates of failure rates or failure sequences [112]. Indeed,
some practitioners point to FTAs as being potentially misleading as the quantitative nature
of a FT can result in disproportionate confidence being expressed in aspects of a system.
2.3.2 Analysing Bayesian Network-based Systems
While there are many existing safety analysis techniques, it is important to explicitly
consider the applicability and utility of these techniques in the context of a given class
of system. This subsection provides a brief critique of existing safety analysis techniques
in the context of BNSs. For example, there may be limitations in the level of detail
that existing approaches can provide on the root causes of certain BNS-specific failure
modes. An example of this may be in the case of FTAs: these analyses are based upon
highly constrained causal structures that are often appropriate for many failure analysis
problems. However, they cannot capture more complex causal interactions due to the
constraints of their tree-structure.
For example, the causal sequence that produces an error mode in a BN model may
be dependent on interactions between model elements that cannot be well-approximated
using a FT: discrete, binary logic may provide – at best – only a coarse approximation of
the root cause of BN model errors (e.g. error modes may occur as a consequence of the
contributions of arbitrarily many continuous-valued variables). Indeed, the limitations of
FTs in capturing certain causal properties in a system is a contributing factor to the use
of BN models in state-of-the-art failure modelling (such as in the motivating example of
this thesis) and diagnostic systems as opposed to FTs.
Similarly, FMEA-like analyses can provide a proactive exploration of which system
aspects are of particular importance to failure modes in a BNS. As with conventional
systems it can be used to guide preliminary design activities. However, in practice the
methodology will be too high-level to provide detailed insight into the contribution of many
aspects of a BNS to failure modes in this class of system; once again, the ability of this
methodology to facilitate the useful analysis of some aspects of a BNS (particularly model
and data aspects) at anything other than the most coarse-grained analysis is doubtful.
In conclusion, both FTA and FMEA approaches will provide useful insights into a
subset of system aspects and behaviours of a BNS. However, they are likely to encounter
serious limitations in their ability to provide sufficient detail with respect to the specific
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error modes that may be encountered within a BNS. It may still be possible to categorise
BNS error modes using a more general framework. However, such a framework has not
yet been developed. Finally, current analysis techniques cannot provide the level of detail
necessary to evaluate the contribution of certain important BNS error modes to system-
level (i.e. UAS-level) failures: this also requires a new approach.
2.4 Safety-Critical Uses of Artificial Intelligence
For much of their existence, the fields of Artificial Intelligence and safety engineering have
existed largely independently. In some ways, this is surprising. Since its conception and
initial popularisation in the post-war years, AI has been touted as a solution for a plethora
of commercial, military, industrial and private applications. Many of these proposed
applications have clear (and potentially extremely serious) safety concerns associated with
them. Despite this, the published academic literature on the safety concerns and ultimate
assurance of these systems is at best scarce, and in some cases non-existent. This has arisen
due to a combination of the highly application-focussed nature of much safety research
and of the engineering domain more generally, and the fact that (until very recently) the
prospect of large-scale deployments of complex AISs into safety-related roles has been a
remote prospect.
2.4.1 Phases of Safety-Critical Artificial Intelligence Research
This situation – which has persisted for several decades – is changing rapidly. An increasing
number of major commercial and industrial interests have committed to developing new
products and platforms with AI at their centre. This includes many major automotive,
rail and aerospace manufacturers, medical organisations, and governments. The adoption
of AI in almost every sector is currently expected to accelerate. Many of these applications
will take on greater degrees of autonomy than have been previously possible. The fact
that these systems will require new – or heavily augmented – development and assurance
practices is increasingly recognised [21, 64, 72, 84, 86, 113, 114]. To date, research into the
development of safety-critical AISs remains comparatively limited, there have been at least
three significant waves of research into the problem. These can be defined as follows:
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2.4.1.1 Phase I - Expert Systems
Throughout the 1980s, academic research and the commercial application of so-called
‘Expert Systems’ (ESs) boomed [115]. During this period the first body of research into
the safety of AISs began to emerge. This research followed the general trend in the field of
AI and focussed almost exclusively on the assurance of ESs. Unlike modern AISs, many
of this generation of AISs relied on significant human input due to the comparatively
limited ability of ESs to ‘learn’ from data. Instead, these systems relied heavily on logical
conditions (i.e. rules) encoded by human experts. These systems broadly reflected the
early tendency in the AI field to believe that intelligent behaviour could be encoded with
a sufficiently specific set of logical rules – and could be programmed by a human expert
[3, 115]. The decline of research into ESs is generally attributed to the shortcomings of
many of this class of system: they failed to capture the subtleties in many reasoning tasks
and became computationally intractable in real-world applications [2, 3, 116].
During this period, a significant contribution in the field was the work of Culbert et al
on behalf of NASA. This work looked at the development of methodologies to support veri-
fication and validation of rule-based ESs [85,117,118,119]. In one paper, Culbert identifies
an assurance consideration that remains relevant in current AISs: that the enumeration
and refinement of requirements for an ES does not – and frequently cannot – proceed as
in conventional software systems. Culbert states [85]:
“Some expert systems can probably be developed by using conventional software
engineering techniques to create software requirements and design specifications
at the beginning of the design phase. However, the type of knowledge used in
other expert systems doesn’t lend itself to this approach.”
Consequently, Culbert suggests that the development cycle for an ES is perhaps best
represented with some modification of the ‘Boehm’s Spiral’ methodology, similar to that
shown in Figure 2.9. Boehm’s Spiral was developed to highlight and support the continued
iterative development of a software system while maintaining a structured requirements
documentation process [120]. A further observation Culbert makes (with relevance to
modern AISs) is the following:
“Another difficulty in writing complete specifications is that some expert sys-
tems deal with problems where there is no correct, absolute answer, only more
or less adequate answers.”
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This touches on a recurrent theme of the complexity and vagueness of the tasks for
which ESs were often developed to perform – and themes discussed in previous sections.
The difficulty in defining exhaustive and/or meaningful requirements for many of these
tasks is a recurrent challenge in AISs generally [85, 86]. This is a repeated observation
in other work in ESs at the time and is still commented upon in contemporary literature
[2, 21,64,80,81,113].
Figure 2.9: A visualisation of Boehm’s proposed software development process. [120]
Beyond Culbert’s work, other contributions during this time include research into the
evaluation of ESs used in medical applications by Spiegelhalter et al, and early contribu-
tions by Rushby on the ‘Validation and Testing of Knowledge-based Systems’ [121]. Other
contributions were made in domain- or context-specific applications for ESs, though these
were generally little more than position papers [116]. With the general decline of research
and commercial interest in AI in the late 1980s, research into the assurance of ESs similarly
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faded. However, the applications of ESs mirror many proposed (or deployed) contempo-
rary applications of BNSs; and so some of the insights gained from this research remain
relevant.
2.4.1.2 Phase II - The Second ‘AI Winter’
During the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, AI as a field of research became relatively
stagnant.26 While advances were made, the pace of innovation slowed, and interest in the
application of AI to real-world problems waned. However, during this period a number of
comparatively significant advances were made in the assurance of AISs for safety critical
applications. These advances broadly centred on the assurance of Artificial Neural Network
(ANN) for safety-critical roles. In particular, they addressed use-cases of ANNs as adaptive
controllers in safety-critical systems. Several major industrial organisations instigated
programmes to develop (or attempt to develop) systems of this kind [72,122].
Of these programmes, the largest and most insightful contribution was made as part
of an effort by NASA to develop an ‘Intelligent Flight Control System’ (IFCS) using
several ANN architectures and multiple ANN learning algorithms. The IFCS programme
involved the live deployment of an ANN-based AIS aboard a NASA jet – arguably the first
published, overtly safety-critical application of a complex AIS. The IFCS was envisioned
as a system that could dynamically compensate for damage to the flight surfaces of an
aircraft, theoretically enabling a pilot to maintain control of the aircraft in circumstances
which would typically result in the loss of the aircraft and the pilot [64]. In this context,
errors in the outputs of the IFCS would directly affect the control input of a pilot. Errors
in the control inputs of the aircraft could lead to the complete loss of an aircraft. The
IFCS was therefore identified as a safety-critical software system, and therefore subject to
standard certification activities.
The IFCS programme produced a guidance document summarising the experience of
the teams working on the project. This document provides a detailed summary of the
considerations and practical experiences of ANN developers and safety engineers working
on the project, techniques that were used or developed for the IFCS programme and
26The ‘First AI Winter’ is said to have occurred in the 1970s – the early optimism about the feasibility
of the development of useful AI applications began to fade, and commercial and research funding was
cut dramatically. This is often attributed to the overly grandiose claims of the AI pioneers who set
extraordinary (and unattainable) expectations for the both the public and funding bodies.
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key lessons resulting from the development of the system. From this perspective, the
IFCS ‘Methods for the Verification and Validation of Artificial Neural Networks’ document
is perhaps the most complete piece of guidance on the assurance of AISs currently in
existence. While a full review of the document is beyond the scope of this chapter, a
number of important points are worth highlighting. Firstly, the document differs from
conventional software assurance guidance documents by providing comparatively little
detail on the assurance of conventional software aspects. Instead, the document focusses
on the augmentation of existing guidance (in this case IEC 12207) and advocates the
introduction of new evaluation and testing techniques and procedures [64,123].
Amongst these new techniques are a number of approaches that can be considered
to be software-independent: they directly address the architectural properties of a given
ANN and aim to evaluate the dynamics of the ANN model from a purely mathematical
perspective. For example, this includes an analysis of all activation functions used within
an architecture, and the weightings associated with each node within the ANN. The guid-
ance goes further by advocating the use of an FMEA-like analysis of an ANN’s components
(i.e. nodes, edges and activation functions) to analyse how the ANN may produce error
modes. In each case, the emphasis is placed on the ANN in the abstract and is largely
devoid of software-centric implementation considerations. The general sentiment of much
of the guidance is summarised in the following contemporaneous quotation from Lisboa27:
“In emerging computation, the complexity is often not in the software imple-
mentation, but in the interpretation and testing required to evaluate the oper-
ation of the model.”
More generally, the IFCS document advocates the need for additional appendices and
processes within a standard to tackle the iterative development practices associated with
the development of a system utilising an ANN. The document outlines how these processes
should focus specifically on addressing the architectural design and evaluation of the model,
and the unconventional considerations associated with the training and deployment of
an ANN. At a high-level, the guidance reflects the position of Culbert and the early ES
assurance researchers: the development of this class of AIS is an iterative process that relies
heavily on comparatively ad-hoc design decisions and iterative refinement of requirements
27Lisboa did not work on the IFCS project, but has published work on the evaluation and testing of
AISs in safety-related contexts.
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and associated testing. Indeed, in discussing the design and development of the ANN
architecture, the NASA team state:
“... the selection of the number of hidden layers and the number or neurons
within each layer is more of an art than a science. Similarly,the V&V analysis
of these choices is likewise an art form.”
This reinforces the shift – both conceptually and practically – in the development of an
AIS utilising ANNs or other complex, abstract mathematical artefacts common to AISs.
This is also highlighted within other independent outputs from the IFCS programme,
where a failure to grasp the distinctions between conventional software systems and AIS-
specific aspects is claimed to result in:
“’ ... [producing] long development times or project delays, improper [ANN]
configurations, failure to find adequate solutions, etc.”
While the by-products of the NASA IFCS programme are arguably the most signifi-
cant contributions to the field in this period, several other important contributions were
also made. One notable contribution (also cited in the IFCS guidance), is the work of
Kurd et al. In their work, Kurd attempts to address a recurrent challenge with many AIS
approaches: interpretability. Historically, ANN developers (and assurance practitioners)
have considered the analysis of an ANN-based system to be a ‘black box’ problem. To
compensate for this, Kurd proposes a methodology for constraining the functional prop-
erties of the ANN by injecting rules based on available knowledge into the ANN, and then
extracting and refining these rules iteratively. The safety lifecycle developed as part of
this work is shown in Figure 2.10.
This approach has a number of merits, chief amongst which is a coherent process for
the structured, systematic development of a safety-critical ANN-based AIS. However, the
process has a potential weakness: the tendency of safety engineers in software assurance
generally is to impose strict constraints on the software. In conventional software, this
is a well-established practice: a constraint will have well defined, deterministic effects on
the behaviour of a system. However, this may not be true for AISs. The power of mod-
ern AISs comes from their ability to learn from data. Some architectures and training
algorithms exhibit a strong ‘sensitive dependence’ on their initial conditions (architecture
and parameterisation) and training algorithms: their behaviours can be dramatically al-
tered by perturbations in this data or by modifications to their architectures [64,124,125].
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Figure 2.10: A visualisation of Kurd’s proposed safety-critical ANN development lifecycle.
Without care, applying constraints will hamper the ability of the system to learn and may
directly undermine the very property that makes an AIS useful in the first place. An
assurance practitioner may introduce new, more pervasive, error modes into an AIS than
they mitigate.
2.4.1.3 Phase III - Deep Learning
The current wave so-called ‘Deep Learning’ (DL) AISs that have emerged since 2012 have
been used to rapidly solve (or mitigate) a range of long-standing computational problems
within the field of AI [12, 28, 53, 126, 127, 128]. In general, this generation of AISs utilise
ANN architectures that overcome the limitations of earlier generations of AISs through the
utilisation of more powerful learning techniques and novel architectures [129,130,131,132].
Currently, these systems are extremely data-hungry. Their success has been facilitated
by near-simultaneous breakthroughs in the development of learning algorithms for DL-
based Systems (DLSs) and the proliferation of huge quantities of widely-available data
on everything from facial recognition to natural language processing. Their success has
accelerated the demand for their deployment aboard products ranging from smartphones
to cars. For the first time in the history of the field of AI, these systems are on the verge
of becoming both ubiquitous and truly safety-critical.
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Superficially, the assurance of DLSs bears many similarities with the work carried out
by previous work on the assurance of AI. However, in the intervening decade between
this earlier research and current state-of-the-art DLSs, the scope and complexity of the
applications of these systems has grown dramatically. For example, modern DLSs utilise
models many orders of magnitude larger than those in general use when the previous wave
of assurance work was introduced. Furthermore, the architectures and learning algorithms
used by many DLSs rely on extracting richer representations of information from a domain
with no (or limited) direction on the part of developers – this is part of the origin of the
term ‘deep’ in DL. Consequently, some current approaches to assuring DLSs actively
avoid constraining the learning of the system, and instead focus on providing increased
transparency or robustness of the system’s behaviours through novel analysis or training
techniques [113,133,134].
One notable example of such a technique is the work produced by the DeepXplore
team [113]. This work highlights shortcomings of traditional notions of software testing
coverage in exposing potentially hazardous behaviours in DLSs. It advocates the intro-
duction of new notions of coverage for DLSs that address model architecture aspects as
opposed to code structures. The paper introduces an automated tool for exploring the
parameter-space of a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) for computer vision tasks
aboard an autonomous vehicle and highlights the ability of their tool to more comprehen-
sively explore the dynamics of their CNN models. The work bears some similarities to
the earlier work of the IFCS programme in focussing on exploring model-centric aspects
of the system. However, DeepXplore provides a more systematic, quantitative analysis
than that proposed in the IFCS guidance, and therefore more readily accommodates the
additional complexity associated with using a DLS.
Other notable techniques include the utilisation of adversarial testing approaches to
produce learning algorithms that bear some resemblance to conventional fault injection
techniques [133,134]. In these cases, the aim is to improve the performance of the DLS by
injecting ‘faults’ into the data and aiming to have the DLS learn to recognise or mitigate
such faults. A parallel movement within the AI domain has been to develop training
algorithms that enable a model to explain its decision making. Rather than constraining
the learning algorithm as in traditional approaches, these approaches typically modify the
objective of the DLS to include information pertaining to the reasoning of the model. In
some sense, the current efforts to test and evaluate AISs are tending towards more ‘holistic’
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techniques that avoid the historical tendencies of assurance practitioners to attempt to
exert low-level end-to-end control over system behaviours.
2.4.2 Emergent Themes
While each of the three waves of research into the development of safety-critical AISs dealt
with a distinct set of AI technologies and approaches, a number of shared themes emerge
across them. These themes provide some general insights into the challenges facing the
assurance community in developing safety-critical AISs and are relevant to BNSs. In the
case of all three, whilst the language and technical considerations vary, a consistent set of
recurrent assurance concerns are evident. These can be generalised as follows:
• Existing software analysis and testing techniques may fail to identify the source of
many hazardous behaviours.
• Typical approaches to the definition and decomposition of requirements are not (in
general) feasible/useful.
• Conventional software development lifecycles poorly accommodate the development
of safety-critical AISs.
• The complexity of the development and testing of an AIS does not lie in software
implementation challenges.
In the two later waves of research, AISs have become increasingly data-driven and are
powered by more complex or elaborate AI architectures. Given the similarities in the core
technologies and approaches that drive the systems developed as part of these two later
generations of research, a further set of shared themes emerge. These can be generalised
as follows:
• Key aspects of a modern AIS’s functional behaviour are – in a sense – ‘oﬄoaded’
onto black- or grey-box system aspects that can be considered ‘implementation in-
dependent’.
• Analysis and testing techniques that rely on exploration of code structures will not
provide insight into the origin of many of the functional behaviours of an AIS’s.
• Existing safety standards do not adequately address learning and adaption capabil-
ities of AISs.
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The distinction between the second and third phases of safety-critical AI research can
be described in terms of the scope and power of the latest generation of learning algorithms
and their underlying architectures. For example, some ‘historical’ facial recognition tech-
nologies would often include several pieces of pre-processing software for extracting and
transforming faces in images before this was passed to the recognition system. Modern
DLSs learn can be trained to extract and recognise faces in an image – thereby cutting
out the intervening software layers. Technically, this is described as automatic feature
extraction. Furthermore, the architectures of these systems are generally more elaborate,
utilising many more layers of neurons than in ‘traditional‘ ANN architectures. Indeed, in
many cases, each layer of these Deep Learning ANN architectures is composed of different
neuron variants.
For example, it is common practice to ‘stack’ convolutional layers with recurrent layers,
and use these alongside ‘traditional’ layers common to earlier Multi-layer Perceptron-style
(MLP) models. Consequently, DL models can be considered – in a very general sense –
to be less internally homogenous in terms of architecture than previous generations of
ANN-based approaches. They also significantly more internally complex than previous
ANN architectures. Finally, they can provide end-to-end preprocessing, transformation
and prediction capabilities beyond those available in earlier generations of AI techniques.
2.5 Summary of Research Problems
The survey of existing literature presented in this chapter highlights several important
themes with respect to the current state of research into the assurance of BNSs for mission-
critical and safety-critical applications. Fundamentally, there is a pervasive lack of concrete
guidance on how to approach the development of BNSs for these applications. What
guidance there is for AISs is typically targeted at addressing the assurance concerns of
related, non-BNS AISs. Some of the key outstanding problems identified by this literature
survey are:
1. There are no published methodologies for explicitly analysing the assurance implica-
tions of the various data, representational and algorithmic choices made during the
development of a BNS. Specifically, while some published techniques may have utility
in evaluating representational aspects of mission-critical BNSs, there is no existing
guidance on how these techniques may be applied to a mission- or safety-critical
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BNS to address the concerns of assurance practitioners.
2. There are no established techniques for communicating assurance information be-
tween all pertinent stakeholders of a mission-critical BNS. In particular, there is an
absence of any concrete examples of techniques for capturing the full range of con-
cerns that BN developers and assurance practitioners alike may have with respect
to the development of a mission-critical BNS.
3. There is no standard guidance for managing the unconventional design aspects of
BNSs (e.g. non-deterministic aspects of their design) across the entirety of their
developmental and operational lifecycles. For example, there is no guidance on how
to manage the continued validity of many representational properties and algorithmic
behaviours over the course of the extended life of a system.
4. There are no published analyses of the implications of using existing software stan-
dards to certify the behaviours of mission-critical and safety-critical BNSs. There
is no information on the specific shortcomings of these standards with respect to
the development and operation of BNSs and any related considerations assurance
practitioners may need to address in order to certify a BNS for such an application.
5. Whilst there are techniques for performing various types of analyses on BNSs, there
is an absence of literature on how these techniques relate to mission-critical BNSs.
There are no existing safety analysis techniques that are readily capable of accom-
modating the unconventional properties of BNSs. In particular, techniques that
cater for aspects such as the unique role of data and abstract mathematical models
in determining functional behaviour, and the non-deterministic properties of these
systems are notably absent from existing literature. There is also potential for mod-
ifying BNS-specific techniques to integrate safety information directly into existing
BN-focussed analyses.
6. There is no guidance and there are no established techniques for addressing the impli-
cations of the unconventional forms of safety evidence. For example, the properties
of a BNS may manifest failure modes that are non-deterministic, and the corre-
sponding evidence for the mitigation of hazards associated with these failure modes
is often highly statistical in nature. There is also no guidance on how such evidence
could be used to contribute to arguing that a BNs is safe. The nature and impli-
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cations of evidence required to assure such properties of BNSs is often dramatically
different from the evidence generated by existing software analysis techniques.
The following chapters will touch on each of these points and in particular aim to make
contributions to resolving problems related to points 1, 2 and 5.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an overview of the current state of research into BNSs and
safety-critical AISs generally. The discussion throughout this chapter has focussed on
those areas of BNS design and development and safety engineering that are most relevant
to the motivating example of this thesis, though a number of additional concepts have
been introduced to provide context for the position of BNSs within the AI field, and of the
status of safety-critical AI in general. The survey of literature presented here highlights
the near-complete lack of existing guidance on the development of BNSs for safety-critical
roles. Some early work on the assurance of probabilistic expert systems provides perhaps
the closest guidance on this problem, though the systems used vary dramatically in both
technical details and applications. Whilst the field of BN development is largely devoid
of safety research that directly addresses BNSs, some of the more recent work in the
development of safety-critical DLSs shares strong similarities with the aspects of BNS
design and development.
However, the lack of structure within the field of safety-critical AIS development is
concerning. Many teams use language specific to their AI approach and, as highlighted
by NASA’s IFCS programme, failure to effectively communicate the properties and be-
haviours of an AI approach to all relevant stakeholders can have a serious impact on
the effectiveness and safety of the resulting AIS. In the context of mission-critical BNSs,
this highlights the need for standardised approaches to sharing BN-specific system in-
formation between BN developers and assurance practitioners. Moreover, many existing
analysis techniques developed for AI development do not integrate additional contextual
information.
For BNSs, this raises a second key area of research: the extension of existing BN
analysis techniques to accommodate additional safety considerations. Such approaches
are attractive as they do not undermine the development and analysis activities of BN
developers, but rather add a layer of ‘safety-awareness’ into the training or testing of a
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BNS. Finally, there remains the challenge of establishing the adequacy of activities carried
out to address AIS system aspects. As repeatedly indicated in this chapter, many aspects
of AIS development are – at best – relatively ad hoc. Key design decisions are frequently
made on little more than the intuition of an AI developer, and the rigour of testing these
systems is similarly erratic. In the case of BNSs, this indicates the need to consider how
a BNS may be developed in a more rigorous fashion: one that directly establishes why a
given technique (or set of techniques) is relevant and adequate for the assurance of a given
system aspect.
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Chapter 3
Establishing Verification and
Validation Objectives
3.1 Introduction
The assurance of any system is predicated on a comprehensive understanding of the na-
ture and behaviours of that system. As discussed in Chapter 2, this can be challenging in
the case of Artificial Intelligence-based Systems (AISs) generally, and Bayesian Network-
based Systems (BNSs) specifically. To date, literature focussed on the assurance of AISs
has typically considered high-level aspects of AIS assurance. In general, this work does
not provide any concrete, technical insight into how this class of systems can manifest haz-
ardous behaviours. In contrast, the Artificial Intelligence (AI) domain has predominantly
explored the practical and theoretical understanding of the approaches and technologies
it has developed.
Until very recently, both domains have been able to maintain largely independent
spheres of research and commercial interests. This has been possible as a consequence
of the relative technological immaturity and various related limitations of many previous
generations of AI-based technologies, and the (naturally) risk-averse position of the safety
domain. In the former case, there have historically been very few compelling reasons
for the adoption of AISs. Often conventional software systems offered comparable – and
better understood – solutions. In the latter case, the safety domain has tended to adopt
a highly cautious position on AISs, in some cases going as far as to proscribe AISs in
safety-critical applications [94].
Consequently, the existing repertoire of vocabulary, tools and concepts familiar to as-
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surance practitioners is poorly equipped for the detailed technical description and analysis
of AISs. Moreover, there is a similar lack of analysis tools and techniques in the AI do-
main that explicitly address system safety considerations. This is a significant barrier
to ensuring all relevant system stakeholders understand precisely what has been built.
By extension, without this mutual technical understanding, the assurance of this class of
systems may not be possible.
This chapter presents a framework that aims to provide a structured, comprehensive
and mutually intelligible approach for describing BNSs. From an assurance perspective
the development, properties and behaviours of BNs differs markedly from conventional
software in a number of ways. The framework introduced here has been designed to ex-
plicitly capture the ways in which these unconventional aspects may directly or indirectly
influence the functional behaviours of a system. It is intended to provide a shared concep-
tual basis for the description and understanding of BNSs in general, and to expose these
distinctions to safety practitioners for subsequent analysis.
This framework is then built upon to develop a set of generic BNS verification and
validation objectives that have been defined to provide a concrete enumeration of system
properties that must be explicitly addressed by developers and assurance practitioners. A
methodology for generating system-specific objectives is then introduced. The objectives
aim to provide a systematic approach to developing assurance objectives for BNSs, and
a first step towards a comprehensive approach to assuring this class of system. They
have been defined with the intention of providing a means of comprehensively addressing
system aspects that are inadequately addressed by existing software safety standards.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, an overview of how and why a BNS may fail
is introduced, and a consolidation of existing work on error modes in BNSs is provided.
This discussion is then used as the basis for the introduction of a set of system view-
points for BNSs. These viewpoints are subsequently developed into a Reference Model
for Bayesian Network-based Systems (RM-BNS). Next, this reference model is used to de-
velop a set of generic verification and validation objectives. A methodology for generating
system-specific objectives is then introduced.
3.2 System Error Modes
The field of AI is notable for its extraordinary diversity. There are a number of distinct
schools of thought, each with a rapidly developing and ever-expanding set of techniques
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and concepts. What constitutes ‘AI’ can vary between practitioners, and the language
and approaches used reflect this internal variation. In many cases, this diversity of ideas
and language is a direct result of the highly cross-disciplinary nature of the field [1,2,63].
Consequently, technical concepts within the domain can be challenging to grasp – in
part due to the overlapping language and semantics of different fields and research areas.
However, at a high-level, there are a set of general concepts and techniques that unify the
domain. A clear, succinct description of the field is provided by Wilson [135]:
Artificial Intelligence is about algorithms, enabled by constraints, exposed by
representations, that support models targeted at thinking, perception and ac-
tion.
This description is compatible with the area of AI concerned with Probabilistic Graph-
ical Models (PGMs), and by extension, Bayesian Networks (BNs). This statement can be
further condensed by stating that the field of AI (and by extension BNs) is principally
concerned with the intersection of three primary areas: representation, algorithms and
methodology [1, 2, 135]. Each of these areas is focussed on the development of aspects of
AI that may independently introduce erroneous behaviours into a completed AIS.
This section provides a high-level overview of the concerns associated with these three
areas. The aim is to provide a general conceptual understanding of how errors may emerge
in BNSs and what effect these errors may have on a system’s behaviours. It highlights
how these errors differ conceptually from those common to conventional software systems.
The section concludes by providing a summary of existing research into BN error modes
and their corresponding references. A consolidated enumeration of this work has not yet
been presented within literature.
3.2.1 Representation
The selection of an effective approach to representing a given computation problem is a
critical first step in the development of any AIS. Within the AI domain, the area of repre-
sentation is focussed on producing conceptual and (typically) mathematical mechanisms
for capturing a given problem. Common representational approaches include Artificial
Neural Networks (ANNs) and, of course, BNs. Research in this area is motivated by the
need to produce compact, efficient solutions to notoriously complex problems. Indeed,
these representations are often applied to problems that may be intractable for conven-
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tional, explicit, imperative programming approaches.
In some fields, BNs and related approaches and variants are among the most popular
representational frameworks currently in use for this reason. The BN representational
framework lends itself well to complexity and uncertainty inherent in many diagnostic
and causal reasoning tasks [22,60]. Behaviours and knowledge can be learned rather than
manually programmed. This has made it a popular approach for many state-of-the-art
medical applications [2, 56].
Heart Rate
Heart Rate BPHeart Rate SATHeart Rate EKG
Figure 3.1: An example of a fragment of a BN model representing the conditional rela-
tionships of factors effecting a patient’s heart rate [136].
Figure 3.1 shows a fragment of a toy medical BN model of a patient’s heart rate that
illustrates key features of local and global representation considerations.
Each of the nodes in the model represents a Random Variable (RV). In this case,
the Heart Rate RV is modelled as hidden: the model assumes that it cannot be directly
observed. Instead, the patient’s heart rate is modelled as a variable whose state can be
inferred through observations. This more accurately reflects the state of the world: a
medical practitioner invariably relies on a machine’s estimate of a patient’s vital signs,
they do not observe it directly. The BN fragment in Figure 3.1 therefore integrates infor-
mation from three distinct observations in order to provide a more accurate probabilistic
estimate of a patient’s current heart rate. This approach can compensate for errors in
one of the inputs and dynamically weight the estimate of the patient’s vital signs to those
observations that are less uncertain. This can produce adaptive, precise monitoring of
signals that can outperform other approaches. Indeed, for these types of applications BNs
have been shown to provide an optimal estimate of hidden states (such as a patient’s heart
rate) – provided a number of formal mathematical properties hold.
Formally, each edge in the fragment represents the conditional dependence of these
variables upon one another. The properties of BN models are such that each of these RVs
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can be considered as a ‘component’ – or local – model of the global BN model. The local
model can be considered to be the conditional relationships of an individual RV, and the
internal structure of the RV’s distribution. This internal structure may be a simple table-
structured distribution, a decision tree, or an ANN. The global model refers to the BN
model taken together. A discussion of the structural properties of BN models is presented
in in section 2.2.3.
3.2.1.1 Local Representation
The composition and structure of these models – both locally and globally – may di-
rectly influence the functional behaviour of a BNS. For example, consider again the BN
fragment shown in Figure 3.1. Here, the ECG node captures a probabilistic model of
the measurements of an ECG machine. There are a number of important modelling de-
cisions associated with capturing an ECG measurement using this local representation.
Figure 3.2 shows two toy probabilistic models for illustration purposes. Figure 3.2a shows
a continuous probabilistic model of a patient’s heart rate measurements - the measure-
ments of the machine are characterised as being normally distributed. This is a standard,
theoretically well-founded probabilistic model for many measurement problems similar to
this [20]. In contrast, Figure 3.2b shows a discretised version of this distribution, where the
continuous-valued sensor measurements are binned into low, normal and high categories.
(a) A normal distribution fitted to a pa-
tient’s heart rate (HR).
(b) Visualisation of weights in an ANN
trained for handwriting recognition.
Figure 3.2: A discretised normal distribution fitted to a patient’s heart rate (HR).
The selection of the representation of these local models has important consequences
for the capabilities of the global model (i.e. the BN taken as a whole). Error modes
may emerge in a BNS directly or indirectly due to errors associated with local models.
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In the case described here (choosing between representing an ECG sensor as a normally
distributed set of measurements, or a discretised categorical model) there are two principal
consequences of this decision:
1. The structure of the model is constrained if a RV is represented as a normally-
distributed variable; the BN representational framework does not support represent-
ing a normally distributed RV as having discrete child RVs [2, 3].1 This limits the
expressive power of the resulting model. Similar constraints include the inability of
the BN framework to represent recurrent or cyclical relationships within its struc-
ture. Constraints of this kind can result in excessively strong modelling assumptions,
which may in turn compromise the effectiveness of a BN model. Error modes may
emerge as a consequence of these limitations in local models – constraints intro-
duced by local structures may prevent a BN from capturing information necessary
for reasoning and fulfilling its intended functionality.
2. The discretisation of a continuous-valued RV necessarily suffers information loss
during the discretisation process [137]. Concretely, the discretisation of a continuous-
valued RV requires the specification of a finite set of states to represent a distribution
with an infinite number of states. In the example in Figure 3.2b, a developer has
represented a patient’s heart rate as being in either a high, medium or low category.
However, from an assurance perspective, there is the question of whether or not these
categories are sufficient. For example, if an additional category is added (e.g. very
high, very low), a model’s diagnostic performance may change. This is because access
to this additional information may boost its reasoning capabilities – in the same
way a doctor may refine their reasoning if presented with more detailed information.
Without this additional state, the global BN model is ‘blind’ to any information
it may convey to the broader diagnostic problem. However, an excessive number
of categories in this local model may produce the same effect as having too few
categories – the model may actually decrease in performance. Error modes associated
with this can be considered as being manifestations of excessive local bias or variance
1There are workarounds to this problem, with a number of proposals for solving this challenge. However,
they can be regarded as non-standard approaches.
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for a given model.2
The examples shown in Figure 3.2 are toy examples. Practical applications of these
systems often demand the utilisation of high dimensional probability distributions. In
these contexts, intuitive visualisation and analysis of RVs is more challenging. Further-
more, even in comparatively simple cases such as that in the example given, a modern
medical diagnostic BN may be comprised of thousands of such variables. A detailed review
of the modelling decisions taken for each RV may be extremely labour intensive.
3.2.1.2 Global Representation
The discussion so far has focussed on some of the properties of local models in a BN.
However, there are several key decisions associated with the particular variant of the
BN representational framework selected. These decisions play a role in the functional
behaviour of a BNS. Many diagnostic systems are developed as static models. There is
an assumption that the model is time-invariant: the model does not depend on any other
previous time aside from the present [2]. For medical diagnosis, for example, this may well
be a sound assumption. However, it will not be the case universally.
An example of this is the use of BNs for some control and navigation tasks aboard
autonomous vehicles. The state of the road and the location of the vehicle provides
important information about where the vehicle will be and the state of the road at a future
time. The BN framework supports the representation of this class of problem. Dynamic
Bayesian Networks (DBNs) can be used to model temporal dependencies of this kind [2,
2This alludes to the so-called ‘Bias/Variance Tradeoff’. The Bias/Variance Tradeoff is a key concept
in applied statistics, Machine Learning (ML) and AI. It addresses the need to produce models that are
sufficiently coupled to their target application that they produce useful outputs, but that are not so
strongly coupled to their training data that they perform poorly when used in ‘live’ operational contexts.
The aim of a good AIS is to provide a well generalised representation of a problem – one in which the
system can perform well in contexts outside of those in its training data. This means BN developers
will typically select models that manifest lower ‘absolute’ performance on training data in favour of a
model that demonstrates better generality. For example, a medical diagnostic BN model may achieve
99% accuracy on training cases, but may achieve only 75% accuracy in test cases. A second model may
achieve approximately 90% accuracy in both training and test cases. Typicaly, BN developers will select
the latter model: it demonstrates more stable, generalised performance, while the former can be described
as ‘overfitting’ to the training data. Models with high complexity are more susceptible to overfitting;
adding too many states to a model may cause it to demonstrate poor generalisation performance.
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49,138]. However, there are once again important limitations on what these dependencies
may represent. The selection of the specific BN representational framework variant is a
key step in the development of a BNS. Failure to represent temporal dependencies within
a model may produce erroneous model outputs – a model cannot reason about something
it does not ‘know’.
A further consideration for the representation of a problem domain as a BN model is the
utilisation of object-oriented (or template) models. In many applications of BNSs, aspects
of the problem being modelled manifest self-similar properties that lend themselves well to
object-oriented (OO) approaches. These OO approaches facilitate the re-use of structures
– including sets of RVs, BN fragments or complete BN models – within a single larger BN
model.
For example, consider a theoretical use-case of a BNS used to monitor the launch of a
Space-X Falcon Heavy launch vehicle. As with other launch vehicles, the architecture of
this system exhibits a number of self-similar properties: the system is composed of three
similar booster sections and each booster is comprised of nine Merlin 1D engines [139].
From an OO modelling perspective, a BN model of such a system may represent each
engine, and then each booster as objects. This would involve the definition of a single BN
model object or model fragment for each engine. These objects would then be replicated
nine times and integrated within a single BN model of a booster. In turn, this single
booster model could be replicated three times and integrated into a model of the whole
launch vehicle. This enables a more compact representation of the problem.3
These OO approaches minimise the modelling challenge in the case of complex appli-
cations [4, 141]. They reduce the burden of specifying structures and parameters in a BN
model by reusing structures and parameters across the model. This can help reduce issues
arising from the bias/variance trade-off common to AISs. However, these approaches of-
ten rely on strong assumptions about the degree of similarity between the system aspects
modelled. The reasoning for the justification of the use of OO approaches is sometimes
not made explicit. They do not rigorously explore or demonstrate why such assumptions
hold across all objects; face-validity is the most commonly used justification.
As a simple example, while the use of an OO for modelling engines may seem rea-
sonable, a number of problems may present themselves. For example: engines on the
3For a discussion of OOBNs with examples, see [4] and [140].
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central booster achieve a higher altitude before separation than the two other boosters
and may therefore experience a greater range of atmospheric effects as a consequence.
If a BN engine model object does not account for this potential variation, it may have
unexpected effects on the system’s reasoning capabilities. For example, it may assume
an over-simplistic representation of the dynamics experienced by the central booster, and
consequently produce erroneous outputs. This may produce a similar category of error
as that experienced by the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Schiaparelli lander. In this
case, an excessively simple model of the atmospheric dynamics of the vehicle during its
landing resulted in the complete loss of the vehicle - despite the software executing exactly
as intended [142].
A BN model artefact, what it represents, and how it is represented, are primary deter-
minants of the functional behaviour of BNSs. In the same way a single hardware platform
may support many software systems, a single software platform may support many BN
models. In BNSs, the system may not be explicitly programmed by a human developer.
Instead, the BN models used by the software system act as the system’s programming.
This may be without any concrete changes to the underlying software itself (in a traditional
sense).
This is perhaps most intuitively illustrated by considering ANNs as the general con-
cept is transferrable to BNs. Figure 3.3 shows aspects of two ANNs with identical model
architectures that have been trained to provide two distinct functional capabilities. Fig-
ure 3.3a visualises an ANN trained on a facial recognition problem, while Figure 3.3b
shows an ANN trained on a handwriting recognition task. The systems run with identical
code, using identical system resources. The only distinction in this case is the specified
path to training data, and the ultimate parameterisation of the respective ANNs. These
parameters are therefore the primary source of distinction between the two systems.
However, the parameters should not be considered independently of their parent ANNs.
For example, the importance of the parameters in the ANN models are related to the exact
structure of the ANN and the activation functions used by neurons within the model.
Consequently, understanding the functional behaviour of these systems is fundamentally
a problem of understanding the respective model’s dynamics, and these dynamics are - in
principle - independent of any given software implementation. As stated, these concepts
also hold true for BNs.
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(a) Visualisation of weights in an ANN trained for facial
recognition.
(b) Visualisation of weights in an ANN trained for hand-
writing recognition.
Figure 3.3: Visualisations of the ‘hidden’ weights of two identical ANN architectures
trained for two distinct tasks.
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3.2.2 Algorithms
The second principal focus of the AI domain is on the development of algorithms for
the efficient and effective utilisation of the abstract mathematical representations and
modelling techniques for practical applications. Breakthroughs in this area have resulted
in the deployment of AISs using domain representations and techniques that were erstwhile
computationally intractable [126,130]. For BNSs, these algorithms facilitate two primary
capabilities: optimisation and reasoning. Algorithms aimed at optimisation are focussed
on extracting estimates for the structure and/or parameters of a given model. In contrast,
algorithms supporting reasoning capabilities are used to query a model. The output of
these queries can be used to directly inform the behaviour of a BNS, or to otherwise inform
subsequent decision-making or control systems that may be dependent upon it.
3.2.2.1 Optimisation Algorithms
Optimisation algorithms (commonly referred to as learning algorithms) have enabled AISs
to provide solutions to technical challenges that have been beyond the ability of human
developers to program manually. For example, many computer vision, autonomous sys-
tem control and natural language processing tasks are not well-suited to the conventional
explicit, imperative programming of traditional software. For BNs, there are two primary
optimisation considerations: learning a suitable structure and learning an effective set of
model parameters [2, 3]. As the properties of the BN representational framework support
the compartmentalisation of modelling activities, so too does it support the compartmen-
talisation of certain aspects of the optimisation of the model in specific contexts. This can
have important consequences for the emergence of errors in resulting BN models.
In cases in which a complete data set is available, and a BN model is not represented
as having any hidden or latent variables (or any shared parameters) it is typically possible
to locally optimise the parameters of each variable within the model separately. From the
assurance perspective this has the useful property that validity of the local model repre-
sentation and the local model optimisation can be largely considered as distinct activities
from the representation and optimisation of the global model. However, the final validity
of a global BN model should not be established by independently evaluating the validity
of the model’s individual local models. This requires a comprehensive understanding of
the interactions within a BN.
For example, consider again the simple BN model fragment shown in Figure 3.1. In
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order to achieve optimal performance over the global structure of the model, there may
need to be local trade-offs that make aspects of the local model strictly sub-optimal in
isolation. For example, in order to ensure certain properties of the ‘Heart Rate’ variable, it
may be necessary to modify the distributions of the child nodes (i.e. Heart Rate EKG and
Heart Rate SAT). Common modifications include injecting various forms of noise during
the training of a local structure, or setting the distribution of a local structure to some
form prior to training the model.4
In terms of assuring a BN model, the properties of all parameter optimisation algo-
rithms selected for use in the BNS will directly determine many of the properties of the
resulting BN. For example, in some contexts, the optimisation of a model’s parameters may
require the convergence of an optimisation algorithm towards a given solution [9,52]. The
exact convergence properties of these algorithms, and their implications for any resulting
model must be carefully assessed. Errors arising from poorly converged local parameter
estimates can propagate in subsequent reasoning tasks and produce errors elsewhere in a
model [2, 52].
Furthermore, the properties of learning algorithms are often tuned by hyperparam-
eters. These hyperparameters are used to modify the rate of convergence of optimisa-
tion algorithms, or the sensitivity of an algorithm to noise in data ingested by the algo-
rithm [1, 2, 52, 65]. A parameter optimisation algorithm may produce a poor parameter
estimate as a consequence of any combination of the following circumstances: the speci-
fication of erroneous hyperparameters, the inherent behaviour of the algorithm given the
BN model it is applied to, and the properties of the dataset it has ingested [2, 9].
Similar considerations apply to optimising the structure of a BN model. However,
optimising a model’s structure - or structure learning - is further complicated by the limi-
tations of these algorithms and through the structural properties of BNs themselves. There
is a fundamental challenge in structure learning in BNs in establishing a uniquely opti-
mal model structure. Many structure learning algorithms have no way of distinguishing
between certain model structures - two distinct models may be an I-map of the other [2].
Practically, this means it may not be possible to distinguish (from the algorithm’s per-
spective) between two or more distinct model structures [2]. As a consequence of these
properties of structure learning algorithms, the learned model structures may indicate de-
4These activities are forms of ‘regularisation’ and can boost the generality of a model. An introduction
to regularisation in BN models can be found in Koller’s excellent textbook on probabilistic AI [2].
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pendencies that may be interpreted as causal dependencies where none exist. A further
consequence of these properties is the fact that the structure learning algorithm may pro-
duce a model with a non-parsimonious parametric space. The combined effect of these
algorithm behaviours may be to introduce error modes into a BNS by learning erroneous
structures, or by increasing the complexity of a BN model in such a way as to render
selected inference techniques intractable. This latter case may be particularly problematic
for adaptive systems.
3.2.2.2 Reasoning Algorithms
Perhaps the most important reasoning algorithm for the utilisation of BNs in practical
applications has been the development of the Belief Propagation (BP) algorithm [22, 32].
This algorithm made exact inference over many BN models computationally tractable.
Many variants of this algorithm have been developed, with the intent of providing various
computational trade-offs that are appropriate for different applications. For example,
a number of algorithms exchange accuracy for guaranteed performance properties (e.g.
timeliness) of the algorithm [50,51]. Others make common algorithmic exchanges such as
exchanging memory usage for CPU usage [1, 2]. An important property of this class of
reasoning algorithm is the dependence of the algorithm on certain structural properties of
the BN model it is being applied to [1, 2].
For example, areas of high complexity within a BN model may result in (computa-
tional and reasoning) performance changes in the chosen algorithm [60, 143]. In some
cases, this may result in exact inference becoming intractable, as discussed in the previ-
ous section. This has resulted in the development of a range of approximate reasoning
algorithms. These algorithms commonly utilise sampling-based or convergence-based in-
ference approaches to achieve an estimate of the state of the BN model. The selection
of an inference algorithm must therefore be paired with the model it is to be applied
to. In cases in which a model’s complexity is guaranteed to remain within the bounds in
which exact reasoning remains computationally tractable, exact inference will naturally
be preferred by assurance practitioners - errors emerging from this class of algorithm will
fall within the scope of considerations associated with ‘standard’ algorithm concerns (i.e.
complexity, timeliness, logical correctness etc.).
In contrast, the approximate reasoning algorithms may present an additional set of
challenges and a corresponding set of potential error modes. Sampling-based reasoning al-
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gorithms typically rely on systematically drawing samples from the probability distribution
represented by a given BN model. These approaches often provide a statistical guarantee
of convergence of the sampled distribution to the ‘true’ posterior distribution [51]. How-
ever, this convergence is often highly sensitive to the structure of the model and to the
local properties of individual RVs in the model [2,51]. Moreover, the error in the estimate
of the posterior distribution behaves statistically [20, 51]. By extension, this introduces
an additional source of uncertainty in the posterior distribution of the model, and by
extension in a ‘BNS’s output.
A practical effect of the properties of statistical errors arising from these algorithms
may be that a BN model converges poorly to its true posterior, and thereby produces
an erroneous output. In a safety-critical context, this may produce a model that under-
or over-estimates the probability of a given diagnosis, thereby producing an incorrect
diagnosis which may then directly inform subsequent actions of a crew or vehicle. In
contrast, variational (approximate) inference algorithms produces a deterministic estimate
of the true posterior within a well-defined limit. These have proven popular in contexts in
which the stochastic nature of sampling-based algorithms cannot be tolerated [50,51]. In
both cases, error modes arising from the approximate nature of the algorithms themselves
are of central importance and must be addressed in the design of both the BN model and
the BNS more broadly.
3.2.3 Methodology
The final primary focus of the AI domain is the development of methodologies for the
construction and deployment of AISs. These methodologies focus overwhelmingly on the
development of techniques to tackle AI-specific development challenges. Indeed, these
methodologies often overlook conventional software implementation aspects altogether [2,
6,65]. As highlighted in section 2.2.4, this is principally because the weight of development
work lies in the construction and optimisation of models, the acquisition and processing
of data and the evaluation and the development of tailored optimisation and reasoning
algorithms.
For BNs, the range of development methodologies is expanded thanks to the capacity
of BNs to integrate subjective and objective information. Consequently, BN development
methodologies integrate many data acquisition, processing and model construction con-
cepts common across the AI domain with Knowledge Engineering (KE) activities and
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frameworks that support the integration of subjective data artefacts into BN models. A
focus of these KE frameworks is on the effective elicitation of data from experts. It is
frequently reported that data elicited from experts contains errors, including contradic-
tions and serious under- or over-estimates of the probability of certain outcomes. In BNSs
derived from data elicited from experts therefore, the selected KE framework must be
robust to these errors. Failure to identify possible errors of this kind will result in a BN
model that is not representative of the target domain, and by extension highly likely to
produce erroneous behaviour.
While BNSs frequently use some degree of engineer-elicited information in their con-
struction, it is increasingly common to rely partially or entirely on empirically-derived
data: data that has been obtained directly from measurements, operational and mainte-
nance records, and manufacturer statistics. It is often assumed that data of this variety
are necessarily better than that derived from subjective estimates. Indeed, these data are
often more amenable to statistical analysis and evaluation [1, 20, 59]. However, extreme
care must be taken in the selection, processing and utilisation of data in a BN model.
Errors in these aspects of a BNS development methodology will be directly reflected in
the resulting system. Systemic errors, such as biases in the underlying data may produce
a BN model that is similarly biased [2]. Furthermore, care must be taken in KE and em-
pirical data acquisition activities to ensure that the data is representative. Data acquired
during a system’s development and those encountered in operational deployment may be
dramatically different.
For example, consider a BNS developed to provide fault diagnosis capabilities for an
autonomous aerial vehicle. If the BNS is developed using failure profile data obtained dur-
ing flight trials, the same system may be blind to distributional shifts in the failure profile
of the vehicle after the vehicle becomes operational. An example of such a distributional
shift may be in the change in failure profile of certain vehicle components after the sys-
tem is deployed to a new environment or climate. If the development methodology of the
BNS is not robust to accounting for factors such as this, the completed BNS may not be
representative of the target domain despite apparently successful testing and deployment
phases. In such cases, the BNS may begin to diverge from the ‘true’ failure characteristics
of the vehicle it is modelling and produce erroneous outputs. Practically, the BNS may
begin to fail erratically as the vehicle it is modelling ages or is exposed to new environ-
mental factors [21]. This problem may not be unique to BNSs but is heightened by the
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scope and complexity of these systems [144].
3.2.4 Existing Work
This section has provided a conceptual overview of how a BNS may produce erroneous
outputs, and some of the key sources of error modes in this class of system. To date, a
comprehensive overview of existing literature on the error modes of BNSs has not been
collated. Table 3.1 provides a set of references to existing literature that explore many of
the aspects discussed in this section in more detail. In particular, many of the papers listed
provide an insight into analysis and mitigation techniques, as well as detailed examples of
how these error modes may emerge in practice. These error modes highlight two points:
1. The error modes emerge from system aspects that can be considered to be ‘soft-
ware independent’. They arise from abstract mathematical interactions with the
underlying data artefacts used to train the systems;
2. The error modes are associated with development activities and system aspects that
are poorly addressed by existing safety guidance and safety analysis techniques.
There is therefore a need to develop approaches that effectively communicate the dis-
tinctions between BNSs (and AISs generally) and conventional software systems to all
relevant system stakeholders. In particular, these approaches must expose and structure
the communication between BN developers and safety engineers in such a way that safety
implications of BN design and development decisions are transparent to all involved. Fi-
nally, the approach must be comprehensive: it must explicitly capture the interactions
and distinction between conventional software aspects of a BNS and unconventional or
BNS-specific aspects. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to addressing this challenge.
3.3 Viewpoints on Bayesian Network-based Systems
As outlined in the previous section, the properties and behaviours of BNSs produce a
number of error modes as a consequence of the atypical aspects of this class of system. In
order to assure these systems, a comprehensive description of these properties is necessary.
The full range of concerns of all relevant stakeholders must be addressed. In particular
the concerns of both BN developers and safety practitioners must be clear and explicit
for both parties. To-date, the integration of ideas between these two domains has been
74
3.3 Viewpoints on Bayesian Network-based Systems
Table 3.1: A selection of existing work on error modes associated with developing and
using BN-based systems.
Errors References
CPD Discretisation [2, 59,137]
CPD Distributions [2, 44,137,145]
CPD Parameterisation [60,65,143,146]
CPD Bias and Variance [137,145]
Structural Dependencies [1, 141,147]
Variable Omission [2, 3, 65,141]
Model Hyperparameters [2, 44]
Model Complexity [44,146,148]
Limited Data [52,59,65,149]
Incomplete Data [2, 60,65,150,151]
Unrepresentative Data [9, 54,60,65,152]
Data Selection [2, 65]
Global Bias and Variance [2, 3, 9]
Structure Optimisation [2, 44,60,153]
Approximate Inference [2, 51,154]
Exact Inference [3, 155]
essentially non-existent. Without such integration, the assurance of these systems will
not be possible. This section introduces a set of system viewpoints that aim to provide a
mechanism for this integration of concepts and concerns. The viewpoints aim to provide a
structured, comprehensive view of the key assurance considerations for BNSs and explicitly
address the unconventional aspects of this class of system. The following terms are defined
for clarity:
Abstraction - Abstraction is a mechanism and practice to reduce and factor out details
so that one can focus on a few concepts at a time. It is the process of extracting the
underlying essence of a concept, removing any dependence on real-world objects with
which it might originally have been connected, and generalizing it so that it has wider
applications.
Object - An object is an abstract model of an entity in the real world. It contains
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information, and may offer services. A system is composed of interacting objects. An
object is characterized by that which makes it distinct from other objects.
Representation - A representation is (1) some way of organizing, manipulating, pre-
senting, and storing information; and (2) a visual or tangible rendering of something.
Viewpoint - A Viewpoint is a form of abstraction achieved using a selected set of
architectural concepts and structuring rules, in order to focus on particular concerns
within a system. A Viewpoint Specification defines a pattern or template from which
to construct individual Views, and it establishes the rules, techniques, and methods
employed in constructing a View.
View - A View is a representation of a system from the perspective of a set of concerns.
Views are themselves modular and well formed, and each View is intended to correspond
to exactly one Viewpoint. A View may include representations or correspondences to
elements defined in other Viewpoints.
These definitions are drawn from [156]. A more complete definition of a Viewpoint can
be found can be found in IEEE 1471-2000 and is given as follows:
“ A viewpoint establishes the conventions by which a view is created, depicted
and analyzed. In this way, a view conforms to a viewpoint. The viewpoint
determines the languages (including notations, model, or product types) to be
used to describe the view, and any associated modeling methods or analysis
techniques to be applied to these representations of the view. These languages
and techniques are used to yield results relevant to the concerns addressed by the
viewpoint. An architectural description (AD) selects one or more viewpoints
for use. The selection of viewpoints typically will be based on consideration of
the stakeholders to whom the AD is addressed and their concerns.”
Utilising viewpoints to describe a system’s architecture is a well-established approach
in systems engineering. The viewpoints presented here were inspired by the work of
Shames et al on the development of the Reference Architecture for Space Data Systems
(RA-SDS) [156]. This work set out to address the unconventional aspects of engineering a
complex space-borne system with complex communication networks over extreme ranges
(relativistic effects, extreme latency etc.). The viewpoints presented in this chapter have
been developed specifically for BNSs and reflect the design and operational experience in
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existing AISs in safety critical roles, the safety domain generally, and the BN development
domain. They have been designed to be broadly intelligible to all relevant stakeholders,
and to reflect the concerns of these stakeholders. The viewpoints can be summarised as
follows:
Data Viewpoint – The data viewpoint is concerned with all aspects of BNS design,
development and deployment associated with the acquisition, processing (including data
transformations of any kind) and storage of data artefacts that are to be used directly by
a BNS. This viewpoint is particularly focussed at evaluating the properties of all resultant
data artefacts used in the definition, training or evaluation of any BN models in a BNS.
Model Viewpoint – This viewpoint addresses all concerns related to the properties
and behaviours of all BN models developed and deployed within a BNS. This viewpoint is
intended to particularly address assurance considerations associated with the modelling
decisions and assumption, parameterisation and structure of each individual model within
the completed system, as well as the behaviour of all models.
Computational Viewpoint – The computational viewpoint is aimed at targeting
assurance concerns associated with the properties, behaviours and potential limitations
of all optimisation (learning) and reasoning algorithms specific to a BNS, as well as
any unconventional data flow considerations related to the utilisation of hierarchical or
distributed modelling approaches [43,157].
Technology Viewpoint – The technology viewpoint is included to explicitly account
for the reasoning behind the selection of a given modelling or development framework
for a BNS. It is aimed at addressing concerns associated with the initial selection and
acquisition/development of physical and technological infrastructure necessary for the
development and deployment of BNS in an operational environment. It also addresses
the technological risk that will accommodate the utilisation of a BNS.
Operational Viewpoint – This viewpoint aims to address the concerns related to the
BNS-specific considerations associated with the deployment, evolution and maintenance
of a BNS, and the associated role of the operational environment on the behaviour and
performance of the BNS. This includes, where applicable, climate, population demo-
graphics, localisation (language, culture etc.) and operational load to name a subset.
77
Chapter 3: Establishing Verification and Validation Objectives
Implementation Viewpoint – The final viewpoint subsumes all ‘traditional’ concerns
that are typical of a conventional software system. This includes conventional software
and hardware architecture and implementation considerations, including standard func-
tion allocation and existing verification and validation activities.
These viewpoints have been defined with the aim of capturing system aspects that – if
not adequately addressed – may independently result in the introduction of BNS-specific
error modes into a resulting system. However, while each viewpoint is defined indepen-
dently, it is important to note that in practice, there will be significant overlap between the
concerns and activities associated with each of the viewpoints. Interactions between sys-
tem aspects addressed by individual viewpoints may in fact be the most pernicious source
of errors in the development of a BNS. The interactions between a model and the range
of data artefacts used to generate it, or between a model and any reasoning algorithms,
or indeed a combination of aspects of all three, may produce errors that are difficult to
isolate using conventional techniques [64,121].
As a step towards explicitly addressing these interactions, the viewpoints have been
decomposed into a set of distinct views. This once again follows standard practice in the
systems engineering domain. The views represent a specific subset of concerns associated
with each respective viewpoint and provide a reduced scope within which to perform
targeted analyses of system properties. Each view has then been associated with an object
model. These objects provide the basis for the Reference Model for Bayesian Network-
based Systems (RM-BNS) that will be introduced shortly. The definition of each view and
their associated objects is provided in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Data Viewpoint
As Chapter 2 and section 3.2.2.1 discuss, many data artefacts used in the development
of a BNS take on a heightened degree of importance. The role of data in a BNS is
expansive; almost all aspects of the system will be directly configured by some form of
data. Moreover, any system that learns from a given data artefact will reflect (to some
degree) the properties of the underlying data it has ingested [2, 54]. By extension, a
systematically biased data set, or otherwise some data set that does not adequately reflect
the target domain, will produce a biased model.
Moreover, assuming some subset of the training data is ‘held back’ for validation
activities, these systemic errors may persist within the validation set. In cases such as this,
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the system may be consistent with the test cases and consequently produce acceptable
performance. However, the system may manifest poor performance upon operational
deployment if these systemic errors are not present in ‘live’ data. To anthropomorphise:
the system may learn to ‘cheat’ the test cases. There is therefore a need to proceed with
extreme care, first in the initial data selection and acquisition of data artefacts, and then in
subsequent processing and management activities to mitigate the chances of this occurring.
It is also essential that the properties of all individual resultant data artefacts are reviewed
and evaluated, with particular attention being paid to their representativeness, quality and
integrity. This applies to all data artefacts that are used directly by a BNS.
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Table 3.2: The views and objects associated with the Data Viewpoint.
Viewpoint ID View Description Object/s
Data DV-1 Acquisition This acquisition view defines the sources, pro-
cesses and personnel used to obtain all data arte-
facts.
Artefact, Process
Data DV-2 Transformation This view describes all processing (e.g. normali-
sation, discretisation) applied to data artefacts.
Process
Data DV-3 Management The management view describes the databases
and assorted management activities used to
store/archive and transfer data artefacts. It
addresses data-specific aspects of configuration
management (e.g. training and evaluation
datasets).
Artefact, Process
Data DV-4 Data Artefact This view describes the properties of each result-
ing data artefact (e.g. the quality and integrity
of an artefact). It addresses sources of uncer-
tainty in the artefact/s.
Artefact
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These considerations are the basis of the motivation and reasoning behind the decom-
position of the data viewpoint into the four views presented in Table 3.2. The acquisition
view (DV-1) specifically targets the need to evaluate the activities involved in producing
a given artefact. For example, in the context of a BNS for fault diagnosis aboard an
aircraft, this may involve some form of audit of the activities of maintenance crews in
logging the status of an aircraft before and after a flight. Any under- or over-reported
faults may produce systemic biases that may not be detected in model evaluation phases.
The transformation view (DV-2) is aimed at establishing the motivation for and the ap-
propriateness of any transformation applied to the data. In the case of discretisation of
continuous data, if the information loss associated with this process is not articulated to
model developers, or is otherwise inappropriate for a given application, errors arising from
this may be challenging to isolate in subsequent evaluation activities.
The penultimate view, the management view (DV-3), addresses the need to carefully
evaluate all storage and transfer processes associated with an artefact. In particular, this
view targets aspects beyond conventional integrity and quality considerations. Instead,
it is focussed on managing data artefacts in terms of assessing and maintaining the con-
tinued validity of an artefact - in particular the continuous evaluation of assumptions
underpinning all data artefacts used by a BNS.
Finally, the Artefact View (DV-4) is concerned with the properties of all artefacts
directly used to train and evaluate a BNS. As these artefacts are typically a product or
composite of multiple distinct artefacts, this view primarily addresses only those artefacts
used directly by the BNS. In particular, it addresses considerations related to the quantity,
completeness, accuracy and precision of the data used to train the model.5 The consid-
erations associated with underlying data artefacts used in the production of the artefacts
used directly by the system are addressed by the preceding views. In the abstract, each
of these views can be described generally in terms of processes and artefacts. This is the
motivation for the objects outlined in Table 3.2. The notion of objects will be developed
more fully in following sections.
5In this context, considerations relating to the ‘completeness’ of data included should address two cases:
the complete absence of data pertaining to cases or scenarios within the data, and the absence of elements
within the data associated with specific cases or scenarios.
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3.3.2 Model Viewpoint
The role of data in modern software-intensive systems is being recognised by assurance
practitioners. This has led to the development of the Data Safety Guidelines (DSG) and
increasing research in this area [144]. The DSG working group note that an argument may
be made that software is simply data, and that the DSG document is therefore unnecessary.
However, they note:
“... data and software emphasise different facets of risk and they are susceptible
to different mitigation approaches; this means there is also a need to adopt a
data-focussed perspective ...”
Similarly, model aspects of a BNS emphasise different facets of risk to both data and
software aspects, and likewise model aspects may be tackled with alternative mitigation
strategies. The Data Viewpoint aimed to address data-centric aspects of a BNS and is
in some respects conceptually convergent with aspects of the DSG document [144]. In
contrast the model viewpoint stresses the need to explicitly consider the models used
within a BNS as standalone artefacts with properties and behaviours of their own.
Indeed, the need to develop extended documentation and analysis techniques to address
the specific properties of model aspects of AISs has been highlighted in the work of Taylor
et al on safety-critical ANNs [64]. The Model Viewpoint presented here broadly aligns
with the recommendations made in this work. However, it has been designed to target
BNS specific aspects that are distinct from ANN systems, and to treat BN models as
artefacts central to a system’s design, as opposed to a consideration that is ancillary to
the ‘traditional’ software considerations.
The views defined in Table 3.3 reflect this approach. Each of the views has been
defined in a manner that ensures the generality of the view to both local and global
models. Concretely, the views have been defined to be equally applicable in terms of
addressing the concerns of that view when considering a BN model either at the local RV
level, or at a higher BN object model, or indeed at a fully integrated, complete BN model
level. This means that any component of a BN model up to and including the BN model
itself can be described in terms of these views. This property extends to the RM-BNS, as
will be discussed shortly.
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Table 3.3: The views and objects associated with the Model Viewpoint.
Viewpoint ID View Description Object/s
Model MV-1 Structure Concerned with the structure (local and/or
global) of a model.
Model
Model MV-2 Parameterisation Concerned with the properties (e.g. confidence,
quality etc.) of all parameters and hyperparam-
eters used in a model.
Model
Model MV-3 Definition Concerned with aspects of the model associated
with the qualitative aspects of representation,
including the context of the model and the def-
inition of model components.
Model
Model MV-4 Dynamics Concerned with the high-level properties and
dynamics of a model.
Model
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For example, the Structure View (MV-1) addresses those concerns associated with the
structure of a model. In the context of RVs, this view is aimed at addressing the local
structure of the RV: the properties of the distribution used to represent it. The view is also
applicable to the global BN model. At this level, the view is similarly aimed at addressing
the concerns associated with distribution of the model, but in this context, it is considering
the higher-level interactions between all RVs within the model. The Parameterisation View
(MV-2) complements MV-1 by addressing the properties of all parameters in a given model.
Once again, it is applicable to local and global considerations. In the former case, the view
addresses the need to establish statistical confidence and bounds on the parameterisation
of a variable, while in the latter case it addresses the performance implications of a given
parameterisation.
In contrast, the Definition View (MV-3) is defined to target concerns associated with
establishing the scope of individual variables and full BN models, and to ensure precisely
what a given BN model (or RV) represents and when it represents it. It is aimed at
ensuring that a given model represents what it is intended to, and under what conditions
this representation remains valid. Finally, the Dynamics View (MV-4) aims to address
higher-level concerns associated with the evaluation and testing of BN models, and is
concerned with all activities related to these aspects.
In all cases, these system aspects can be considered to be properties related to each
individual BN within the system. Consequently, each of these views can be described in
abstract as some particular property of a given model. The model object is therefore used
to represent these aspects. As before, this will be developed more fully in subsequent
sections. Finally, it is also important to note that attempting to ensure the generality of
these views has been partially motivated by the need to accommodate novel BN archi-
tectures. These architectures may include RVs that are themselves decision trees, ANNs
or any other model that satisfies the constraints of the BN framework. Consequently,
the viewpoint and views have been defined without any inherent assumptions about the
topology or variant of the BN (or RV) selected.
3.3.3 Other Viewpoints
A complete enumeration of all views is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, a
subset of views has been selected for discussion. A full tabulated set of all viewpoints
and their associated views and objects can be found in Appendix A. Table 3.4 shows the
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four selected views. As before, each of these views is targeted at drawing attention to
BNS-specific considerations: there may be parallel or analogous considerations in other
software systems, but these are not the focus of these views.
The first view in table 3.4 is the Optimisation View (CV-1) from the Computational
Viewpoint. This view is aimed at addressing concerns related to all learning capabilities a
system may have, both in off-line and on-line (adaptive) contexts. It targets the properties
and mathematical behaviours of all learning algorithms that may be utilised by a system.
For example, this view addresses the need to consider the robustness of algorithms to noise
in data, whether the algorithm is biased (statistically speaking), and what other limita-
tions the algorithms may have in terms of providing an accurate estimate of a given BN
model’s structure or parameterisation. This latter consideration of a learning algorithm’s
limitations refers particularly to circumstances in which an algorithm may converge poorly
to an estimate of a BN model’s properties; this may occur if certain algorithms encounter
underlying properties of a BN model or available training data.
Next, the Infrastructure View (TV-1) of the Technology Viewpoint addresses a funda-
mental challenge associated with the development of a BNS (and other AISs): the need
to develop and maintain a tailored set of skills, tools and physical infrastructure in order
to subsequently develop a BNS. For many BNS applications, this may include the devel-
opment of new technology test-beds, new data gathering processes and infrastructure and
training of developers, as well as operational and maintenance staff. In terms of the engi-
neering field more generally, the development of a large-scale, complex BNS may require a
similar degree of additional training and infrastructure as was necessary for the transition
towards software-intensive systems that the field has experienced in the past. The Infras-
tructure View is therefore focussed on addressing concerns associated with establishing
that the organisational and technological prerequisites are in place and are adequate for
the BNS being developed. This view then underpins considerations associated with other
viewpoints, particularly the Model and Data Viewpoints.
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Table 3.4: A subset of views from taken from the Computational, Technology, Operational and Implementation viewpoints.
Viewpoint ID View Description Object/s
Computational CV-1 Optimisation This view is concerned with all aspects related
to the optimisation (i.e. learning) algorithms
utilised in both the development and deploy-
ment of a BNS.
Computation
Technology TV-1 Infrastructure This view addresses considerations related to
the selection, development and use of skills,
tools, processes, physical infrastructure and re-
sources necessary for the deployment of a BNS.
Framework
Operational OV-3 Evolution This view targets concerns associated with any
continuous changes that may be present in the
target domain, both in terms of engineered
changes to that domain, and ambient changes,
perhaps due to operational change, natural
degradation due to age, or location.
Process, Scenario
Implementation IV-4 Integration Concerned with those activities necessary for the
transfer of a BNS from a simulated test-bed into
a ‘live’ environment, and to ensure data passed
to it is in alignment with each model’s expecta-
tion.
Activity
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The third view in Table 3.4, the Evolution View (OV-3) of the Operational Viewpoint
is aimed at addressing activities related to ensuring the continued validity of the system
in continuously changing operational environments. This includes changes arising both
as a result of engineered changes (e.g. platform upgrades, configuration changes etc.),
‘entropic’ changes occurring as a consequence of continued use (i.e. age, or other simi-
lar performance degradations or fluctuations), and changes occurring as a result of new
operational environments (e.g. new climate, new operational theatre/context etc.).
Consider the motivating example of this thesis: a BNS providing prognostic health
monitoring support for the mission planning functions aboard an Unmanned Aerial Sys-
tem (UAS). The BNS will be designed to model the physical characteristics of the UAS - in
particular the UAS’s components and their statistical failure profiles. If these components
or their failure profiles change for any reason, and these changes are not monitored and
captured by the BNS, then the BNS’s ‘understanding’ of the characteristics of the UAS
will begin to diverge from the actual characteristics of the UAS. This would be a practical
example of ‘distributional drift’. The Evolution View is therefore focussed on addressing
how existing change management systems and other related operational activities may
be augmented to target and mitigate errors emerging from BNS-specific properties such
as this. Note that it is not addressing how a model may be designed to ensure robust-
ness to these changes, but rather the operational processes that must be developed and
implemented to mitigate these behaviours.
Finally, the Integration View (IV-4) of the Implementation Viewpoint targets those
concerns associated with moving a BNS from a test-bed or idealised development envi-
ronment into a production system and on to an operational environment. This view is
focussed on drawing attention to the need to ensure assumptions made during develop-
ment are valid throughout integration and deployment of the system, and for managing
the integration of all future BNS upgrades aboard target platforms. Like OV-3, this view
is essentially focussed on addressing how existing techniques for managing the migration
of a software system from a development environment into a deployment environment can
be expanded to include considerations specific to a BNS.
Using the same UAS example, this could be ensuring that the operational environment
the system is migrated to aligns exactly with the development environment. This may
include considerations related to the similarity of the ambient operational environment
(again, including climate, operational context etc.). It will include ensuring that the
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target system is sufficiently similar to development test-beds that the model is applicable
to that system. This will require a process for ensuring a BNS is calibrated for the system
it is deployed onto; this will differ between vehicles and operational environments. In some
respects, this view is concerned with tackling concerns related to the ‘overfitting’ of a BNS
to any development test-beds.
3.3.4 Justification of RM-BNS Viewpoints
The primary concern when developing these viewpoints was to provide a comprehensive,
holistic perspective on the important technical issues facing the development of a mission-
critical BNS. Each of the viewpoints was derived from an extensive search of existing
literature on the development and deployment of AI-based systems and BNSs. This search
was made with a particular focus on identifying contributions in literature that were
derived through direct experience of deploying and operating an AI-based system, and
other complex and/or novel software-intensive systems.
Consequently, many of the concerns captured by the viewpoints have previously been
discussed within the AI or safety-critical systems literature at varying levels of detail.
However, at the time of writing, the concerns captured by the viewpoints have not previ-
ously been structured and unified in a manner that addresses the needs of assurance and
AI practitioners alike, and in particular in a manner that directly addresses the particular
concerns associated with the development of a mission-critical BNS.
Practically, the viewpoints aim to standardise and structure these BNS-specific con-
cerns, while also integrating insights and concepts developed over the course of this re-
search project. This includes insights gained from analysing and describing the failure
modes of BNSs. For example, the Data, Model and Computation Viewpoints were defined
to broadly conform with certain existing strategies for framing and communicating more
general AI concepts within literature [2, 54]. However, these viewpoints were defined to
specifically address safety and assurance concerns related to these concepts, and – impor-
tantly – map these concerns directly to published BNS development practices. Table 3.5
enumerates a list of publications and standards that were used to inform the definition of
each of the viewpoints.
These viewpoints were then further refined through the inclusion of assurance concerns
arising from the experiences of Jacklin et al that were gained through the development of
neural-network based flight control systems at NASA [72,159,160]. Insights derived from
88
3.3 Viewpoints on Bayesian Network-based Systems
Table 3.5: A mapping of RM-BNS viewpoints to a selection of corresponding publications
that informed the definition of a given viewpoint.
Viewpoint References
Data [2, 54,60,65,137,144]
Model [2, 3, 16,54,65,141,158]
Computation [2, 72,156]
Technology [6, 141,159]
Operational [72,158,159]
Implementation [72,156,159]
this work were adapted to align with the parallel but often distinct technical considera-
tions associated with the development of BNSs. This work also highlighted the need to
consider broader system aspects related to system maintenance and the ongoing validation
of unconventional AIS components in operational environments [159]. These experience-
derived insights, along with work of Przytula et al and other work on the development of
other techniques developed to describe and model complex, novel systems motivated the
introduction of the Operational, Technology and Implementation viewpoints in particu-
lar [6, 161].
With this comprehensive survey completed, the identified concerns were then struc-
tured to maximise the orthogonality of each of the viewpoints with respect to each other
viewpoint. This was driven by a desire to ensure a separation of key concerns, and to
thereby minimise the coupling of these concerns across viewpoints wherever possible. To
achieve this, concerns were identified and grouped according whether system aspects re-
lated to a particular concern could independently produce system-level failure modes in a
BNS. Practically, this should allow AI and assurance practitioners to reason and commu-
nicate more effectively about the design of a particular BNS. Of course, no system aspects
exist in true isolation, and the implications of this fact will be dealt with in more detail
later in this chapter.
Ultimately, the viewpoints and their respective views represent a distillation of an
extensive search of existing literature across multiple pertinent fields of research on the
development of safety-critical systems; novel software-intensive systems; AI-driven systems
and BNSs themselves. This distilled information was then systematically structured ac-
cording to standard engineering best practices, cross-checked against published experiences
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of developers producing mission-critical AISs and then presented in a format designed to
be transparent and useful to all relevant BNS stakeholders.
3.3.5 Relationship to Existing Safety Standards
The software safety principles that underpin the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Defence
Standard (DEFSTAN) 00-055 highlight the particular issues the viewpoints are aimed at
addressing [162].
Principle 1: Software Safety Requirements shall be defined to address the software
contribution to system hazards.
Principle 2: The intent of the software safety requirements shall be maintained through-
out the requirements decomposition.
Principle 3: Software safety requirements shall be satisfied.
Principle 4: Hazardous behaviour of the software shall be identified and mitigated.
Principle 4+1: The confidence established in addressing the software safety principles
shall be commensurate to the contribution of the software to risk.
For the safety assurance of BNSs, these principles do not change. However, the focus
of the work required to address them does. For example, in guidance such as DO-178C,
there is emphasis on the development of High Level Requirements (HLRs) and the decom-
position of these HLRs into Low Level Requirements (LLRs) [69]. This decomposition and
refinement of requirements is captured in Principle 2. For AISs based on statistical learn-
ing approaches (such as BNSs), the refinement process may proceed in a highly iterative
and uncertain manner [59,64,86]. Moreover, the refinement process will be coupled to the
behaviours the model learns and contains. In the case of BNSs for example, the functional
behaviour of the system is often dependent on factors that may be difficult or impossible
to specify a priori [81,121]. Examples of common difficulties associated with these factors
include the requirements for the necessary quantity and quality of data, aspects of the
model’s structure and associated modelling choices, and by extension details pertaining
to relevant optimisation and reasoning algorithms [64,72,163].
Importantly, the interactions between these aspects can introduce sensitive dependen-
cies in the system. These properties contribute to the emergence of the highly iterative
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and relatively ad-hoc development cycles commonly used in the development of BNSs.
In some cases, they may be inherent manifestations of the aleatoric and epistemological
uncertainty associated with the target problem or with using statistical learning methods.
These observations also highlight additional considerations associated with Principle 4.
The functional behaviour of BNSs is often determined by a complex combination of factors
that are outside the scope of considerations common to conventional software systems. In
particular, the functional behaviour of the system is often strongly coupled to system
aspects encompassed by the proposed Model and Data viewpoints. As discussed, the
Model viewpoint aims to highlight issues surrounding what a given system has learned.
The system may perform well on available test data but may exhibit dramatically different
- and potentially hazardous - behaviours upon deployment. This may be because available
test data was not sufficiently representative of a real-world environment. In a simplistic
sense, it may also be because the trained model represents a problem that is different from
the intended target problem.
A frequently cited (possibly apocryphal) example of both of these issues describes the
case of a US project to develop an ANN-based system for the automatic identification of
camouflaged armoured vehicles [164]. The development team achieved good performance
in their test environment, but poor performance in subsequent third-party testing. Analy-
sis revealed that rather than learn to identify armoured vehicles, their system had learned
to identify the weather conditions in the photographs used to train it. This occurred
because the development team had used photographs in which camouflaged vehicles hap-
pened to be taken on cloudy days, and un-camouflaged vehicles happened to be taken
on clear days. Importantly, the trained ANN model can be described as being consistent
with the data-set: the system had learned a model from the data consistent with the
classification objective given to it, but this model was not representative of the intended
problem. There is also a broader problem of establishing whether – except in the most
trivial circumstances – a specific model/modelling framework can be sufficiently represen-
tative of a target domain. In the case of BNs, the specific variant and structure of a BN
model will provide a hard constraint on the capabilities of the model and therefore any
system/s utilising that model.
Consequently, code coverage-focussed testing such as that advocated by DO-178C is
unlikely to identify hazardous behaviours associated with errors of this kind. The view-
points aim to support the identification and mitigation of hazardous behaviours arising
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from this type of error (and others specific to BNSs). They also indicate the need for
additional data- and model-focussed coverage activities. Without these targeted analy-
ses, establishing a meaningful assessment of the contribution of the system to risk may
be challenging. In this way, the viewpoints also aim to address considerations related to
Principle 4+1. Concretely, the viewpoints address the 4+1 principles as follows:
Principle 1: The viewpoints expose and address BNS-specific aspects that may con-
tribute to system aspects – including those beyond the scope of conventional systems.
Principle 2: The viewpoints enable the comprehensive description of system aspects
using a structured framework that enables relationships between system aspects to be
explored. This will be more rigorously addressed in the following sections.
Principle 3: Software safety requirements shall be satisfied. The satisfaction of soft-
ware safety requirements is predicated on the generation of requirements that can be
tested. The viewpoints represent a first step towards guiding assurance practitioners
towards analysis and testing techniques that can be used to satisfy BNS software safety
requirements.
Principle 4: By supporting the description of BNSs and drawing attention to unconven-
tional system aspects, the viewpoints can be used to drive assurance efforts towards more
expansive analysis and testing activities that address BNS-specific system behaviours.
Principle 4+1: The viewpoints expose the full range of safety-related considerations
for BNSs. They therefore provide a first step towards identifying which system aspects
contribute to system risk. This is itself the first step towards establishing to what degree
a system aspect contributes to hazardous behaviours. By extension, they can be used to
provide a foundation for the discussion of the sufficiency of assurance efforts targeting
system aspects addressed by a given viewpoint in the context of the contribution of
that aspect to system risk. This will be addressed more comprehensively in subsequent
chapters.
Ultimately, current safety standards and guidelines do not provide adequate mecha-
nisms for addressing these AI-specific concerns. In the case of IEC-61508, this is because
systems with AI-based aspects are actively not recommended [94]. In other cases, lan-
guage and guidance is included that covers some of the aspects outlined in the viewpoints,
but this guidance is invariably new and limited. DO-178C falls into this latter category
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with its inclusion of guidance for Data Parameter Items (DPIs). This guidance focusses
on data artefacts physically encoded in the software system. For many BNSs, the bulk of
data used to train (configure) the system is not physically present in the implemented soft-
ware system. Therefore, the contribution of this data to system risk may not be explicitly
addressed.
More recent work has acknowledged the increasingly influential role of data in modern
software systems, and the corresponding shortfalls of existing standards. An example
of this is the aforementioned Data Safety Guidance (DSG) [144]. This guidance aligns
conceptually with some of the aspects outlined by the proposed Data Viewpoint. However,
some of the technology-specific considerations associated with BNSs are naturally beyond
the scope of the document, particularly those associated with the interactions between data
acquisition, processing and management choices and the learning and reasoning behaviours
of implemented BNSs.
Finally, no standards currently tackle concerns associated with the modelling frame-
works and activities that produce the models that drive these systems. Work by NASA
on the use of ANNs for adaptive flight control systems identified the need to consider
additional, independent verification and validation activities in parallel with conventional
software assurance activities. This need is reflected in the AI domain generally, where it
is common practice to evaluate software and model aspects independently, and is directly
relevant to BNs. The Model viewpoint is therefore aimed at addressing those concerns di-
rectly associated with the development and deployment of BNSs that otherwise fall outside
of the scope of existing software- and data-assurance guidance.
3.4 Reference Model for Bayesian Network-based Systems
(RM-BNS)
The viewpoints and their constituent views provide a basis for the structured description
of all key aspects of BNSs. They aim to capture the important conceptual distinctions
specific to BNSs (and in some cases to AISs generally). However, as alluded to in previous
sections, there is an overlap between the spheres of interest of each of the viewpoints,
and by extension their views. The interactions between many aspects that are addressed
independently by distinct viewpoints may lead to emergent behaviours – some of which
may be hazardous. Consequently, while it is possible to address the concerns of each of
93
Chapter 3: Establishing Verification and Validation Objectives
the viewpoints individually, it is essential that these interactions are made explicit and
understood by all relevant system stakeholders. To this end, this section introduces a
reference model for BNSs that aims to achieve this. The reference model builds upon the
language defined by the viewpoints, their views and corresponding objects.
3.4.1 Definition of Objects
The objects associated with viewpoints were defined in accordance with the guidance
provided by the RM-ODP and IEEE 1471-2000 documents. This is defined as:
“An object is an abstract representation of an entity in the real world. It con-
tains information and offers services. A system is composed of interacting
objects. Each viewpoint defines its own objects, their relationships and inter-
actions.”
In accordance with this definition, in the Data Viewpoint the objects are artefacts
and the processes that produce them. In the Model Viewpoint, the objects are abstract
mathematical models that encapsulate both local and global aspects of a BN model. The
objects associated with the Computational Viewpoint are abstract computations: a gen-
eralisation of any optimisation or inference algorithms that may be used in the system. In
the Technology Viewpoint the objects are Frameworks and Infrastructure – abstractions of
developmental approaches and infrastructure/tools selected for the BNS lifecycle. Objects
in the Operational Viewpoint are Scenarios, Capabilities and Environments related to the
deployment of a BNS. Finally, the objects associated with the Implementation Viewpoint
are abstract Functions and Resources that characterise a BNS.
3.4.2 Capturing Interactions in BN-based Systems
Many modern applications of BNs utilise a number of distinct development approaches,
model architectures, training data types and learning and reasoning algorithms within a
single system. The interactions between design decisions and implementation details as-
sociated with these aspects can be a source of error in their own right and can occur as a
consequence of errors directly associated with a given interaction or as a product of sen-
sitive dependencies between system aspects. An approach to capturing these interactions
can provide a degree of transparency to the system and can be used to support subsequent
analysis of a system’s architecture.
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As with the modelling of any complex system, capturing the complexity of these BNSs
requires an approach that maintains an acceptable level of abstraction. This must in turn
facilitate a useful level of generality. Practically, a suitable modelling approach must be
able to capture the diverse and complex architectural properties of BNs without itself
becoming too complex. A number of reference models and reference architectures have
been proposed to tackle precisely the problem outlined here - that of providing a practically
useful, but sufficiently general model of complex, unconventional systems that reflect the
interactions between aspects of these systems [156].
The solution proposed here is based on the concepts outlined in existing research on
the development of reference models for complex systems [156]. The Reference Model
for Bayesian Network-based Systems (RM-BNS) builds on these concepts and provides a
structured, comprehensive approach to modelling BNSs. The building blocks of this model
are the objects introduced previously. These objects directly connect the RM-BNS to the
defined BNS viewpoints. Consequently, this link provides the language for the description
of the concerns associated with objects in a model. A full enumeration of objects is beyond
the scope of this chapter, but is included within the complete set of viewpoints and views
included in Appendix A.
Figure 3.4: The RM-BNS Reference Model.
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The proposed reference model is shown in Figure 3.4.6 The reference model is intended
to clearly and explicitly represent the key interactions between objects in the model, and
consequently between views both within and across individual viewpoints.7 For example,
the reference model can be used to make explicit the interactions between learning and
reasoning algorithms (represented in the abstract as the Computation object), training
and validation data (represented by the Data Artefact object) and each of the BN models
(represented by the Model object) within a given BNS. Similarly, the interactions between
Data Artefacts and Models with conventional software aspects (captured by the Function
object) are made explicit. These interactions are only implicit in the viewpoints, but are
intended to be transparent and intelligible to safety practitioners and BN developers alike.
The utilisation of the RM-BNS for the modelling of an example BNS will be demonstrated
in the case study at the end of this chapter.
3.4.3 Role of RM-BNS
The role of the reference model is envisioned as a tool to support the development of a
structured, comprehensive description of a given BNS. It is not intended to act as a formal
model of a system, and by extension has not been designed to support formal analysis of
a BNS’s properties. Its primary function is to support the development of a transparent,
well understood BNS architecture, and to focus attention on system aspects that may
otherwise be overlooked.
Consequently, this chapter has been focussed on providing an ontology for the descrip-
tion of BNSs in the form of a set of viewpoints and the accompanying reference model
that provide a clear, comprehensive and structured description of key system aspects ei-
ther unique to, or disproportionately important to, BNSs that can be used effectively by
safety practitioners and other system stakeholders with limited exposure to the technical
aspects of a BNS.
Furthermore, this ontology has been designed to support extensibility. This notion of
the extensibility of the ontology specifically refers to the intent to provide a reference model
6This image is included alongside the rest of the core components of the RM-BNS framework in Ap-
pendix A.
7Note that for ‘undeveloped’ parts of a RM-BNS instantiation, a diamond is used to represent aspects
of a model that could have been developed further but were not. This will be demonstrated with examples
in subsequent chapters.
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that is flexible, and can be modified to address any application-specific considerations that
may fall outside of the scope of the ontology as defined. This may occur in circumstances
in which an AIS utilises BN-based components in a hybridised architecture. It may also
occur in the event a BNS is developed as part of a platform using other technologies
outside of the BN or AI domains that may influence a BNS’ behaviour in a novel way.
This could include novel sensors or other hardware technologies. Finally, it is likely that
many BNS applications may not need to consider all aspects of all presented viewpoints.
In these circumstances, it is expected that developers simply omit views where necessary,
though this should be explicitly justified.
3.5 Generic Verification and Validation Objectives
The previous sections have outlined an approach to describing and modelling BNSs in
a comprehensive, structured format. The shortcomings of existing standards have also
been discussed. An approach to the assurance of a BNS must overcome these shortcom-
ings - primarily by directly addressing the BN-specific assurance considerations discussed
throughout this chapter, and by mitigating weaknesses in existing safety standards. This
section therefore introduces an approach to using the viewpoints and reference model to
generate a set of comprehensive verification and validations objectives for BNSs that aim
to achieve this.
3.5.1 Deriving Objectives
The reference model has been designed to provide an ontology that can be used to develop
a general description of all aspects of a BNS. Each of the objects within the reference
model can be used to capture an abstract representation of a given system’s composition
or development processes. Each of these objects can be associated with design choices,
and by extension these design choices can be associated with the introduction of errors
into the BNS. Where appropriate, this fact can be used to generate a set of error modes
for each respective object. The evaluation and enumeration of mitigation strategies for
these error modes can then be used to generate a set of objectives.
When this approach is applied to the reference model shown in Figure 3.4, a set of
generic verification and validation objectives for BNSs can be generated. These objectives
provide a high-level insight into the composition and engineering challenges associated with
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the development of a BNS, while also providing an abstract set of objectives that can be
used to guide early-stage requirements engineering, or other aspects of safety management.
Furthermore, by utilising the RM-BNS as the basis of the generic objectives, it is then
possible to generate system-specific objectives. This can be achieved by producing an
instantiated instance of the reference model that maps onto a target BNS. The instantiated
model can then be used to derive a set of objectives for the given BNS that capture the
properties of the architecture and processes used to develop the BNS. The fact that the
reference model provides a comprehensive basis for describing a BNS can be utilised to
generate a set of objectives that provide coverage of all key system-specific properties.
By extension, instantiations of the reference model - and therefore the system-specific
objectives - can similarly facilitate a comprehensive set of objectives that target BN-
specific assurance considerations that are directly relevant to the system’s architecture
and development strategies.
Furthermore, the ability of the reference model to capture interactions between objects
also supports an understanding of how design decisions and verification and validation
activities associated with individual objectives may overlap. The process for the derivation
of system-specific objectives is explored in more detail in Chapter 6. The scope of this
chapter once again prevents a full enumeration of verification and validation objectives for
BNSs. Instead, an overview of a number of the objectives associated with the Data and
Model Viewpoints is provided, alongside a subset of objectives sampled from the remaining
viewpoints.
3.5.2 Data Viewpoint Objectives
The first objective (DV-3.3) is concerned with addressing safety-related assumptions as-
sociated with the acquisition of data for use in the BNS. A particular example of an
assumption that must be made explicit is that any data gathering activities carried out
by different operators, at varying geographical locations, or on distinct platforms are suffi-
ciently comparable that data taken from these various sources can be combined effectively
and transparently into a single fault database or dataset. In the context of the motivat-
ing example of this thesis, this may involve the acquisition of data from many distinct
aircraft operators, or geographically and environmentally distinct sites. Each operator or
site may have different internal processes or standards for the acquisition or handling of
operational data prior to that data being acquired for use in a BNS. The quality, integrity
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Table 3.6: A subset of generic verification and validation objectives for the Data Viewpoint.
Viewpoint View Object Objective ID
Data Acquisition Process Establish and justify any as-
sumptions made during data ac-
quisition [Process].
DV-3.3
Data Processing Process Establish and justify the neces-
sity of the data transformation
[Process].
DV-2.2
Data Artefact Artefact Establish and justify the in-
tegrity of the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.4
and underlying statistical properties of data acquired from distinct operators may vary;
aircraft operators in different operational theatres or in different geographical regions may
require a more frequent turnaround of aircraft components (which may indicate an increase
incidence of component failures), or deviate from normal procedures due to operational
pressures.
In a medical diagnosis context, further assumptions may be that the location at which
data is gathered - a particular hospital or district - is representative of the population
that the system will be used to treat. For example, if the patient demographics at the
location at which acquisition processes are performed are skewed (perhaps in terms of
socio-economic status, ethnicity or age, as examples), the prevalence of different diseases
and patient outcomes will be expected. As repeatedly discussed in this chapter, a BNS
will learn to represent the underlying distributions in the data it is trained on. A BN can
be designed to be robust to biases such as this - but only if model developers are aware of
the assumptions underpinning the data that has been acquired.
The second objective is aimed at addressing the need to establish and justify all trans-
formations applied to data artefacts. For example, it is common within the AI domain
to apply a range of scaling and decomposition transformation to data prior to that data
being used to train a system. Three common reasons for transforming data in this way
are: to ensure acquired data conform to a target distribution, to reduce the dimension-
ality of the data, and to ensure a degree of homogeneity (in terms of the range of values
elements within a data artefact may take) in the data artefact. Each of these motivations
can improve the overall performance and robustness of the resulting model. They can also
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improve the ability of optimisation algorithms to converge to locally optimal solutions.
However, erroneous or inappropriate application of certain transformations may have the
opposite effect. A further transformation that may be applied ‘silently’ is the discretisation
or rounding of data. These processes may result in the loss of information in the data, and
may once again alter the characteristics of the completed BNS. This objective is therefore
aimed directly at ensuring that each transformation used during the development of a
BNS is adequately justified and is materially necessary for the resulting BNS.
The final objective presented here addresses considerations associated with the proper-
ties of data artefacts used directly by a BNS. It is particularly interested in the evaluation
of data artefacts used in training BN models (or more generally in the definition of any
BN model) in a BNS. The satisfaction of this objective is dependent on the satisfaction of
other objectives, both within the Data viewpoint objectives and in other viewpoints. In
this case, the objective is addressing the integrity of each data artefact used to train or
define a BN model. The definition of data integrity in this context aligns with the DSG
definition of data integrity as [144]:
“The [artefact] is correct, true and unaltered.”
From a BNS perspective, satisfaction of this objective indicates that artefacts used
to subsequently train BN models have not been manipulated and are representative of
the target domain. The manipulation of data is a particular assurance concern for AISs:
injection of synthetic or falsified data into a data artefact used to train an AIS can be
used to influence the functional behaviour of the completed system. Existing examples of
attacks of this kind include making small changes to images (both with editing or ‘real
world’ changes) that can render AISs with AI-based computer vision aspects ‘blind’ to stop
signs or certain objects [133]. From a safety perspective on the motivating example of this
thesis, this is concerning for diagnostic systems as the manipulation of data either used to
train the system, or ingested by the system after deployment may introduce latent errors
in a model that may ‘blind’ the diagnostic system to some system faults. The elimination
of errors arising from these considerations is the primary target of this objective.
3.5.3 Model Viewpoint Objectives
The first objective in Table 3.7 (MV-1.1) is intended to address the need to establish and
justify the selected approach to representing a given model (again, either local structure
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Table 3.7: A subset of generic verification and validation objectives for the Model View-
point.
Viewpoint View Object Objective ID
Model Structure Model Establish and justify the basis for
using the [structural variant] for
the [Model].
MV-1.1
Model Param. Model Establish and justify the accu-
racy of the parameterisation of
[Model].
MV-2.2
Model Dynamics Model Establish and justify confidence
in the dynamics of the [Model].
MV-4.5
of an RV, or global structure of a BN) with a given structure. At the local structure level,
this will focus on the RV variant selected to be included in the model. For example, this
will require establishing which local structure best represents the target variable the struc-
ture is modelling. This will involve establishing whether the variable is best represented
as a discrete distribution (e.g. Bernoulli, Poisson etc.), or as some form of continuous
distribution (e.g. Gaussian, Weibull etc.), and why this structure is adequate for the task
of modelling the target variable.
For example, consider an RV representing a sensor measurement. The statistical profile
of the quantity being measured may be approximately normally distributed, and therefore
a developer may select a conditional normal distribution as the local structure of that
RV. However, the intent of this objective is to establish that this structure is optimal on
the one hand (i.e. to establish the structure variant), and to justify that the structure
is capable of capturing the required behaviours. This latter consideration may result in
the selection of a local structure that in an absolute sense is not the optimal structure in
one sense (e.g. it represents the data most closely), but instead represents the properties
of the data a BN developer requires. This may involve selecting a structure that is a
compromise: it may not be the best approximation to the process being modelled, but
may produce the desired performance (or other property).
These local structure considerations also extend to global structure considerations. As
outlined previously, the selection of local structure variants can have implications for the
global structure of a model. For example, hybrid BN models with continuous and discrete
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RVs are often severely constrained: a local structure captured by a continuous conditional
distribution may not have discrete child RVs. This is one example where attempting to
achieve absolute fidelity to the distributions in training data may produce a model with
reduced performance on some tasks. Beyond these structural constraints, this objective is
also aimed at addressing considerations associated with the selection of dynamic models
(where appropriate), and whether the use of directed models is appropriate given the
target domain being modelled. Ultimately, the variant of the model structure selected will
influence what a BN model (or RV) can represent (i.e. ‘know’), and when it can represent
it. Failure to rigorously justify the selection of a given structure variant may result in
several distinct error modes that may seriously impact functional behaviours of a BNS.
The second objective builds conceptually upon the objectives associated with the struc-
ture view. This objective is aimed at establishing the accuracy of the parameterisation
of the model. The aim of this objective is to ensure a concrete, explicit measure of the
statistical confidence of a given parameter (wherever possible) is provided. This informa-
tion is intended to be used to support other objectives, including MV-4.5. The accuracy
of the parameterisation refers primarily to the need to establish a concrete link between
a model’s parameters and underlying data artefacts used to estimate those parameters.
Provided this link is established, the objective can build upon the objectives of the data
viewpoint to establish that the parameters are indeed an accurate estimate of some ‘real
world’ aspect.
The final objective in Table 3.7, objective MV-4.5, is defined to establish confidence in
a given model holistically: the model is more than a sum of its parts; it cannot be assured
by considering its definition, structure and parameterisation independently. This objective
therefore aims to assess the model as a whole. It builds upon other objectives associated
with this viewpoint to establish and justify confidence in a model by evaluating the overall
behaviour of the model. As with the other viewpoints, this can be considered at two levels
of granularity: at a local level, or at a global level. At a local level, the objective seeks to
assure the behaviour of a local model across the range of inputs it may encounter - that
the model as defined and trained will be robust to anomalies, for example.
Similarly, satisfying this objective at a global level will require that a model is robust
to outliers. However, it is also aimed at ensuring the model is robust to some degree of
errors in inputs, for example, or to ensure that the model does not enter a circumstance
in which its reasoning capabilities are diminished. Ultimately, it is aimed at establishing
102
3.5 Generic Verification and Validation Objectives
and justifying the adequacy of all modelling efforts associated with the objectives in this
viewpoint.
3.5.4 Other Viewpoint Objectives
Table 3.8: A subset of generic verification and validation objectives for the Computational,
Technology, Operational and Implementation Viewpoints.
Viewpoint View Object Objective ID
Computation Optimisation Comp. Establish and justify the neces-
sity of optimisation [Computa-
tion].
CV-1.1
Technology Infrastructure Framework Establish and justify the suf-
ficiency of available tooling
[Framework].
TV-1.2
Operational Evolution Process Establish and justify the [Pro-
cess] for monitoring the validity
of the [System].
OV-3.4
Implementation Allocation Function Establish and justify the chosen
[Function] allocations.
IV-3.1
The Computation Viewpoint’s first optimisation objective (CV-1.1) is focussed on
ensuring that every optimisation approach selected is necessary for the given system.
At the highest level, this is aimed at addressing the need to ensure that optimisation
approaches used within the system are appropriate for the application, and that no simpler
or more transparent approaches could be used in place of the selected approach. For
example, there are a range of structure learning algorithms. If a model can be represented
as a tree-structured BN model, there are structure learning algorithms that have been
proven to be mathematical optimal for this application. If another algorithm is used in
cases such as this, the justification of the necessity of the chosen approach will rely on
defining what specific properties a chosen algorithm has that means a simpler algorithm
was not selected. Similar concepts are also applicable to parameter learning approaches.
The second objective in Table 3.8 (TV-1.2) addresses the need to establish the suffi-
ciency of available software tooling that will be used to design and test BN models and the
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completed BNS. For example, many commercial software packages for BN development
are highly constrained with respect to the available learning and optimisation algorithms
available, and the BN variants they support. These constraints may result in hard con-
straints on the resulting BNS - it may be discovered later in development that a learning
algorithm or structure variant may be necessary that is not supported by available tools.
These constraints may directly contribute to the introduction of error modes into a com-
pleted BNS.
Beyond these considerations, data processing, storage and transfer tools will also be
necessary. These may include tools for BN- or AI-specific data pre-processing tasks. There
will also need to be robust (software and hardware) tools in place to test a BNS. This will
include the development and availability of BNS test-beds. Finally, there is the need to
establish confidence in the quality and integrity of the tools themselves. This objective
therefore seeks to ensure that the tooling used is of sufficient quality and is sufficiently
flexible and robust to meet the demands of the BNS’s lifecycle. This is particularly im-
portant as existing software safety standards do not provide adequate guidance on the
development of tool qualification packs for BNS (and AIS) development. In the case of
BNSs, it will be necessary to develop standardised testbeds for this class of system that
share conceptual parallels with conventional software systems, but aim to address specific
model performance characteristics.
A number of projects are in progress with the aim of developing standardised testbeds
for the validation of autonomous vehicle models within the commercial domain [165].
These projects have begun to develop standardised model test suites, including ‘high-
fidelity’ simulated operational environments based upon recorded data and constrained
‘real world’ testing facilities for live testing and system integration activities. Other in-
dustries will require similar industry- or application-specific testbeds. These testbeds
should focus on the evaluation from at least four perspectives:
1. Numerical simulation and analysis - Standard metrics and evaluation techniques
should be adopted that address the performance and behaviour of models at a low
level. They will need to provide standard performance benchmarks and these ap-
proaches are likely to be highly framework-specific. For example, a testbed developed
for BNSs is likely to be BNS-specific and would not be usable for ANNs. An example
of existing tools that may be developed into more holistic testing frameworks are
the DeepXplore and DeepTest tools [113,166].
104
3.5 Generic Verification and Validation Objectives
2. Simulated testbed environment - Standardised test suites with high-resolution
simulated environments and scenarios. These are likely to be application-specific,
but could be shared across multiple modelling frameworks (i.e. may not be BN-
specific). Examples of existing testbeds include testbeds developed by DeepMind to
evaluate the AlphaGo and GoZero AISs. Proposed examples within the aerospace
and military domains include utilising recorded mission footage and telemetry to
evaluate a model’s performance in previous activities. These could be ‘perturbed’
to produce a broader set of test cases.
3. Constrained testbed environment - Standardised real-world environments for
testing model predictions in the presence of real-world operational noise and uncer-
tainty. A prominent example of this form of testbed is the ‘Castle’ testbed developed
by Waymo for testing autonomous vehicles. This is an ersatz town with extensive
mock-up roadways and obstacles that is designed to simulate a small village. This
simulated village is used by Waymo’s vehicles as ‘structured testing’ environment
that must be ‘passed’ before deployment [165]. These are likely to be industry-
specific. These too can be shared across modelling frameworks.
4. Test deployment - A final set of standardised AIS-specific ‘shakedown’ tests to
confirm assumptions and observations made in earlier developmental phases.
Next, the objective associated with the Operational Viewpoint’s Evolution view (OV-
3.4) addresses the need to establish and justify all operational processes that will be used to
continuously monitor the validity of a BNS after deployment. This objective is intended to
ensure that attention is paid to what processes need to be developed and implemented by
operators to ensure the continued validity of a BNS in whatever operational environment
it is deployed - and by extension to maintain confidence in the safety of a system over its
Finally, the last objective in Table 3.8 is aimed at justifying conventional software or
hardware function allocation decisions. For clarity: this is with respect to any software
or hardware deployed as part of the completed BNS, and not with respect to supporting
tools or development software. The objective aims to ensure that the software architecture
itself is designed to mitigate potential error modes associated with the underlying models
the system uses. For example, the software architecture may be designed to deprecate the
use of BN model outputs for decision making in certain scenarios, or to use supporting
information external to a model wherever possible. The objective essentially aligns with
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conventional safety-focussed function allocation considerations, but is particularly focussed
on establishing the effect of a system’s architecture with respect to BN models.
3.6 Justification of the Completeness of the RM-BNS Ob-
jectives
The RM-BNS objectives have been designed to provide a complete set of verification and
validation objectives for BNSs and should be of practical utility to developers working to-
wards the assurance of a mission critical BNS. The completeness of the generic verification
and validation objectives can be justified from the following perspectives:
1. By building upon the comprehensive nature of the viewpoints introduced previously
and by systematically cross-checking against existing work in other areas of AI, the
objectives can be regarded as being complete by construction;
2. The objectives were generated through the systematic consideration of all BNS error
modes and design concerns that were identified over the course of this research, both
through experimentation and from published literature.
In the case of the first perspective, the generic objectives were derived directly from the
structure and content of the RM-BNS viewpoints. The RM-BNS was designed to provide
a comprehensive framework for the description of BNSs, and the viewpoints, views and
their associated objects and model are the product of a systematic review and the collation
of all research on the development and assurance of AISs and BNSs that was found at the
time of writing.
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, this search process integrated information from the full
breadth of published literature from across work in software engineering, assurance of
complex and novel systems and from within the AI and BN domains. As the generic
objectives were systematically derived directly from this work, their completeness can be
regarded as a by-product of their construction.
Beyond this, a systematic review of all published BN error modes was conducted as
outlined in Section 3.2.4, and a summary of these BN-specific error modes was provided
in Table 3.1. A detailed review of each of the error modes as described in that table was
then conducted, and in all cases at least one of the provided generic objectives was found
to address the specific error modes in the given publication.
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Furthermore, a number of case studies based on published literature were developed
over the course of the work for this thesis (the most comprehensive of which is presented in
Chapter 6), and in all explored cases the objectives provided were found to be complete for
the given case study. However, there may be cases where a given objective is not applicable.
In these cases, the provided set of generic objectives could therefore be considered to be
a superset of the relevant objectives for the specific application. Handling cases such as
this will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
Beyond the generic objectives themselves, these case studies also indicated the utility
and completeness of the system-specific objectives generated for a particular system. The
structure and flexibility of the generic objectives ensured that in all encountered cases
the system-specific objectives covered concerns related to the BNS aspects considered.
Alternatively stated: no cases were encountered that involved concerns that could not
addressed by the derived objectives.
However, while the case studies indicated the effectiveness of the framework for gen-
erating derived objectives, it should be noted that the character of the derived objectives
is different from their generic counterparts. The completeness of any set of derived objec-
tives is predicated on this distinction: the generation of a set of system-specific objectives
requires the participation and input of a practitioner. As with any similar process, this
practitioner will be required to exercise their best judgement throughout.
From this perspective, the process of deriving a set of system-specific objectives from
the generic objectives could be considered analogous to an extremely strong variant of
a guide-word-based generative process. Unlike other such approaches (e.g. HAZOP),
the generic objectives stipulate specifically what aspects of a system must be addressed,
and how these aspects should be captured within derived objectives [83]. An assurance
practitioner will be tightly constrained to consider a BNS in terms of the language and
concepts captured explicitly within the generic objectives.
As previously discussed, these constraints have been systematically defined to com-
prehensively address assurance concerns for BNSs. Consequently, while there is no strict
guarantee that a derived set of objectives will be complete, the objectives and process
introduced here and the derived objectives that result from them will ensure a level of
completeness that would not have been possible through the use of an ad hoc approach.
Furthermore, practitioners are encouraged to cross-check their derived objectives against
the viewpoints and the concerns described in their definition. This should help ensure
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that the focus of a given viewpoint or concern is maintained in any derived objectives.
This should further boost the level of completeness attainable for a given set of derived
objectives.
3.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, BNSs introduce a number of assurance concerns that emerge as a direct
consequence of both their nature and their use-cases; in particular the high degree of
dependence of certain functional behaviours on system aspects that can be considered to
be software-independent artefacts, as well as the aleatoric and epistemological uncertainty
commonly inherent in their use. This chapter has outlined the need to effectively capture
the full scope of concerns associated with this class of system. This includes many error
modes that are either unique to BNSs or conceptually distinct from analogous error modes
found in conventional software systems. This has been one of the lesser contributions of
this chapter: to summarise the conceptual distinctions associated with the development
and deployment of BNSs for assurance practitioners, and to provide a summary of existing
work into analysing and evaluating error modes in BNSs.
Beyond this, the chapter has made two primary contributions. These are:
• Providing a framework for the structured, comprehensive description and modelling
of BNSs that specifically targets key assurance concerns associated with BNs. As-
pects of this framework have been discussed in terms of their relationship to existing
thought in the safety engineering domain, and to existing standards;
• Introducing a set of generic BNS verification and validation objectives for BNSs that
aim to mitigate the inadequacies of existing safety standards in handling BNSs, as
well as an approach to refining these objectives into system-specific objectives when
necessary.
Taken together, the contributions of this chapter aim to provide a step towards de-
veloping a strategy for the assurance of BNSs that address the technical and conceptual
disparities between this class of system and conventional software systems. The framework
presented here (and its associated BNS ontology) can be used (and expanded) to analyse
the composition of BNSs and to ensure assurance practitioners adequately address system
aspects they may overlook.
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Finally, due to the scope of this thesis and the resources available over the course
of research, subsequent chapters will focus primarily on system aspects associated with
the Model Viewpoint. This has been motivated by several practical factors, as well as a
number of salient research considerations.
The two most important motivating factors for this decision were:
1. Of the three viewpoints defined to draw most heavily from concepts in the AI domain
(i.e. the Data, Model and Computation Viewpoints), the Model Viewpoint addresses
a number of considerations that are likely to be seen as the most unconventional and
potentially controversial of the six viewpoints. From this perspective, it was regarded
as the most interesting research direction to pursue. This was further reinforced
by the fact that early in the course of this research project it became apparent
that system aspects that would fall under the Data Viewpoint were increasingly
recognised as serious assurance concerns in more general applications [144].
2. Over the course of this research project, the relative absence of real-world data due to
both the relative scarcity of such data, and the sensitivity of the data that did exist
prevented concrete conclusions and examples pertaining to certain system aspects
addressed by the other five viewpoints from being explored in this thesis.
Beyond these two primary considerations, a further practical benefit of focussing on
the Model Viewpoint in subsequent chapters is the availability of several well-studied BN
models for research use. These provide more concrete examples than may otherwise have
been possible.
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Chapter 4
Model Criticality Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced a structured approach to establishing verification and
validation objectives for Bayesian Network (BN) based systems. The objectives aim to
improve the coverage of verification and validation activities over aspects of BN-based sys-
tems that may be poorly addressed by existing safety guidance. However, the exhaustive
analysis, testing and absolute satisfaction of the proposed objectives will not be practicable
in many use-cases.
Consequently, the objectives need to be prioritised with respect to the relative contri-
bution of all aspects of a BN-based System (BNS) to overall system hazards. Moreover,
the adequacy of efforts associated with the satisfaction of these objectives must be con-
sidered from this perspective. This chapter therefore focusses on establishing a means of
discussing the adequacy of assurance activities related to the objectives outlined in the
RM-BNS Model viewpoint. Specifically, it aims to address the need for a structured,
replicable approach to defining the importance of BN models (and their constituent parts)
that are used by a safety-critical system to support safety-related software functionality.
To achieve this, the chapter introduces a notion of model criticality, and a means
of systematically analysing safety-related BN models. This approach aims to establish
the criticality of both individual, independent models in a system, and aspects of the
internal structure of a BN model. This revolves around the introduction and utilisation of
a combination of safety analyses and automated numerical analysis activities to establish
Model Criticality Indices (MCIs) and Variable Criticality Indices (VCIs) for BN models.
This chapter is structured as follows: an overview of modelling and assurance consid-
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erations associated with the Model Viewpoint are outlined to highlight the motivation for
the establishment of MCIs and VCIs for BN-based systems; a methodology for categoris-
ing the criticality of all independent BN models used in a system is introduced; the notion
of model criticality is then extended to include variables within the model, with the aim
of highlighting structures within a model that influence safety-related model behaviours;
the analysis approaches are then applied to a case study; and finally the limitations and
possible extensions to the approaches are discussed.
4.2 Motivation
The BN framework is a flexible approach to developing Artificial Intelligence-based Sys-
tems (AISs) that supports a number of distinct model architectures and modelling ap-
proaches. These model architectures can integrate other Artificial Intelligence (AI) ap-
proaches, and can be utilised by a BNS in a number of different ways. For example, it is
common for a single BNS to utilise multiple independent BN models to support different
software functions: a system may include a fault diagnostic BN model for each subsystem
aboard a vehicle, or for each group of related diseases in a medical context. Consequently,
a single model may be used to directly support one or more software functions, and
each function may be utilised in one or more BN models. As these BNs may ultimately
constitute a significant proportion of a BNS’s control logic, understanding the relative
influence of individual models, their architectures and their constituent components on
safety-related software functions becomes vital.
Furthermore, the technical and practical limitations of the assurance activities under-
taken in the course of satisfying the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint objectives necessitates
an approach that can be used to establish the proportionality of these activities in a
systematic, rigorous, targeted manner. There are three principal motivating factors for
developing the Model Criticality Analysis approach outlined in this chapter; these are:
• Traceability - The need for a systematic approach to establish which models (and
model components) in a BNS influence safety-related functions.
• Influence - The need to understand the degree of influence of BN models (or model
components) on safety-related functions.
• Proportionality - The need to establish an approach for describing the proportion-
ality of safety-focussed BN analysis techniques.
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This section gives a brief overview of the key aspects of each of these motivations in
the context of BNSs.
4.2.1 Traceability
Systems utilising AI are commonly criticised within the assurance domain for their ‘black
box’ properties. Black boxes are concerning for assurance practitioners: establishing the
traceability of a system’s behaviours to individual functions and requirements is a core
tenet in all systems engineering domains. While a number of techniques have been pro-
posed within the field of AI to mitigate some of the issues associated with using black
box AI approaches, these techniques use language, concepts and ideas that are beyond the
scope of existing standards and assurance practices.
In some AI approaches, groups of structures within a model are responsible for individ-
ual behaviours – individual behaviours may be distributed across a model and may be (to
some degree) emergent properties of the model. This differs from conventional software
systems where errors can often be traced directly to logical errors in individual lines of
code. As a loose analogy, the current activities of assurance practitioners in the analysis
of software systems when applied to AISs are akin to attempting to assure the quality of
a human driver by individually evaluating the neurons in a driver’s brain for biological
defects. In general, this is unlikely to provide any meaningful assurance of the driver’s
quality.
For AISs, typical function decomposition approaches may begin to break down at the
point at which a system’s behaviour may become principally determined by the models
that drive them. At this ‘software-model boundary’, conventional approaches to main-
taining traceability may become less useful or uninformative. An approach to maintaining
traceability must use the language of the AI framework used in the system. In the case of
BNs, this will require that functional behaviours are traced to individual models, model
structures, or internal structures of Random Variables (RVs). Establishing the role of
models (and again, model structures and RVs) in the functional behaviour of a system
may require a bottom-up approach (as opposed to top-down function decomposition). The
dynamics of a complete model must be understood before these assertions can be made.
Maintaining traceability of functional behaviours to system aspects therefore requires
an approach that directly analyses the models in each BN model in a system in order
to establish the assurance implications of each model’s dynamics. This approach must
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be systematic, rigorous and target assurance concerns. There are a number of extant
BN analysis techniques that support the evaluation of BN models, but none provide a
mechanism for integrating assurance considerations into the analyses. The adaption of
existing techniques for the targeted assurance and analysis of a BN model’s dynamics,
and the use of these techniques to support the traceability of behaviours was therefore a
primary motivator for this chapter.
4.2.2 Influence
While the traceability of behaviours was a primary motivation for the development of
the work presented in this chapter, simply providing an approach to tracing behaviours
to model aspects would not have been sufficient: ultimately, an assurance practitioner
must understand the degree of contribution of a system aspect to potentially hazardous
behaviours. This is essential if the confidence in a system aspect is to be proportional to
the hazard contribution of that aspect. This is captured explicitly in the final principle of
the 4+1 software safety principles [162]:
“The confidence established in addressing the software safety principles shall
be commensurate to the contribution of the software to risk.”
This principle can be considered to include the BN model aspects of a BNS; under-
standing a BN model’s (and its components) contribution to system risk is essential. This
requires an understanding of how much individual BN model aspects influence the be-
haviour of a software system. Unlike the problem of traceability of behaviours, this is not
a binary proposition: establishing influence categories for BN model aspects is therefore
necessary.
4.2.3 Proportionality
Establishing the influence of a BN model or model component is then a direct precursor to
establishing the proportionality of analysis and testing techniques used to assure a BNS.
This was the final core motivation for establishing the criticality of BN models and model
components. By developing a robust approach to establishing which models and model
aspects contribute to which software functions, it becomes possible to provide a targeted,
proportional response to model aspects that are of particular concern to assurance practi-
tioners. This is as opposed to treating BN models as black boxes, or otherwise applying a
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blanket approach to the rigour applied to the analysis of BN model aspects. These latter
approaches may produce either intractably large analysis problems, or otherwise fail to
exploit the information contained within a model.
The targeted approach to proportionality as presented here is supported by the fact
that the BN models often have inherent semantic value: they directly represent a physical
process or entity (e.g. a sensor measurement or vehicle component). This is in contrast to
other AI approaches that may be less explicit in what a model has learned or represents.
Furthermore, by directing and prioritising model assurance activities towards aspects of
a model that have the most influence on safety related functionality, the method can be
used to facilitate more efficient, targeted assurance activities. This will be returned to
in Chapter 5, where the criticality analysis and RM-BNS are used to support the notion
of the sufficiency of assurance efforts in the satisfaction of the verification and validation
objectives introduced in the previous chapter.
4.3 Model Criticality
In conventional software systems, software criticality is commonly used to capture the im-
portance of software components to safety-related functions. Software criticality metrics
therefore support the prioritisation of assurance activities and ensure proportionality of
assurance activities. They also support the traceability of hazardous behaviours to soft-
ware components. Conceptually, therefore, the notion of criticality aligns closely with the
stated requirements for an approach to establishing the traceability, influence and priori-
tisation of assurance activities for BNSs. However, in this work, the notion of criticality
is extended to include BN models and model components. Taken together, this is defined
here as ‘model criticality’:
Model Criticality - A product of the degree of contribution of a model to safety-related
functional behaviours and the severity of hazards associated with these behaviours.
As discussed in Chapter 3, BN models can be considered in terms of both local and
global properties. Analyses can target either of these properties and evaluate their respec-
tive behaviours. The notion of model criticality extends to both local and global model
aspects. However, for clarity, the criticality of local models (e.g. RVs) is referred to here
as variable criticality. A given model’s criticality is therefore a combination of both its
global criticality (model criticality) and local criticality (variable criticality). Establishing
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a model’s criticality is therefore based on the definition and assignment of two sets of crit-
icality indices to a given model: Model Criticality Indices (MCIs) and Variable Criticality
Indices (VCIs). The former set of indices capture the criticality of a BN model taken as a
whole, while the latter address the criticality of the constituent parts within a BN model.
4.3.1 Justification for Proposed Structures
Before continuing, it is worth exploring the motivation for the introduction of the struc-
tures proposed in this chapter. The tables and figures in this chapter are aimed at ad-
dressing the fact that not everything within a software system’s architecture is of uniform
criticality (a point recognised by many standards, including IEC-61508), and that this
remains true in the case of BNSs. Effectively capturing and managing the variability of
criticality and the corresponding level of assurance required for a given degree of criticality
across a system is a widely recognised problem within the assurance domain [74, 79, 83].
Concretely, assurance practitioners must establish replicable mechanisms for:
1. The determination and description of the criticality of aspects of a system’s archi-
tecture.
2. The moderation of confidence in aspects of a system’s architecture given its critical-
ity.
Many existing standards attempt to provide such mechanisms. For example, docu-
ments such as ARP-4754A and ISO-26262 introduce the concepts of Development Assur-
ance Levels (DALs) and Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) respectively [67,95].
In both cases, DALs and ASILs can be considered proxy mechanisms for capturing and
moderating assurance based upon the criticality of a given system or system aspect. Other
documents such as MIL-STD-882E more explicitly capture these ideas by introducing
Software Control Categories (SCCs) that are used in conjunction with Software Safety
Criticality Matrices (SSCMs) to determine the Level of Rigour (LOR) required for the
satisfaction of a given objective [167]. Similar constructs can be found across the safety
domain [83,94].
In all cases, the producers of these guidelines and standards are attempting to balance
the faithfulness of a chosen representation against the identifiability of that representation.
For example, it is clear that in reality the criticality of software components would be more
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accurately ‘measured’ on a continuous scale. A truly faithful representation would there-
fore dictate that practitioners utilise continuous scales when describing and moderating
criticality and assurance in a system. Practically, however, such methods are difficult to
define and utilise effectively: identifying measures of criticality is extremely difficult, and
actioning assurance activities based upon this information would typically be unfeasible.
Existing standards therefore adopt a compromise by delineating a finite number of
levels or categories that are used to render the problem tractable. In these cases, there
is an implicit understanding that the given representation (e.g. integrity levels or criti-
cality matrix) is not truly faithful to the problem at hand but that the ability to offer a
practicable solution is an acceptable compromise.
These considerations are precisely the motivation and rationale for the development of
the structures presented in this chapter. It is essential that a mechanism for capturing the
variability of criticality in BN models is provided, as this is a prerequisite for apportioning
the effort to objectives associated with the given system aspect. While the precise struc-
tures could be debated and represented in alternative ways, the aim here is to provide
a practicable, transparent approach for tackling the two key considerations introduced
above. As the common aphorism in statistics says: all models are wrong, but some are
useful.
Finally, it should be noted that while the application of these techniques to conven-
tional software systems is a well-established approach to describing and delineating crit-
icality of components in a given software system, the application of these ideas to novel
systems carries additional risks. In the case of the contributions presented in this chapter,
the definitions, concept and relative utility of the structures has been validated against
architectures and systems explored over the course of this research, and through their
application to a number of case studies.
However, until such a time as rigorous testing, refinement and validation in an active
development environment has been performed, these structures should be carefully consid-
ered in the context of a particular BNS application to ensure their appropriateness for the
given problem. Furthermore, whilst it is possible that the exact definitions of the tables
proposed here will vary over time as the proposed structures are applied and evaluated,
this does not detract from the feasibility of the approach established here, namely that it
is possible and potentially useful to define such structures for BNSs.
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4.3.2 Authority Categories
The models within a BNS can be structured and utilised in a number of ways. Common
approaches include the development of multiple independent BN models to capture specific
aspects of a target domain; a BN model may be used to model and reason about many
different system components, for example an aircraft’s engine, an autonomous vehicle’s
mission planning system, or for data fusion and processing for sensor telemetry. A BN
model capturing all three could be deployed aboard a single platform. This approach
has been popular with commercial and industrial systems [157]. For example, product
troubleshooting software from Microsoft and satellite monitoring systems from NASA have
both used this approach, in the case of the former by representing individual products or
troubleshooting problems with separate BN models, and in the latter by modelling satellite
subsystems as independent BN models [6].
As a simple illustration, Figure 4.1a shows how a single software system may use
multiple BN models to support software functionality. The system architecture shown
in the figure utilises a single inference engine that supports two functions (functions A
and B). Each of the functions provides a distinct operational capability to the system. In
the event failure to provide these functions has safety implications, each of the software
functions becomes safety-related. The contribution of each of the models to the behaviour
of a function is then of interest to safety practitioners. In the event the severity of the
hazards associated with some failure mode of function A are greater than those associated
with function B, the relative interest of assurance practitioners will focus more heavily on
analysing function A. If an error in model A may directly produce a high-severity failure
mode in function A, this model will then also be of more interest to assurance practitioners
- and may therefore be considered to have of greater criticality than model B.
While this approach is common, there are alternative approaches to utilising BNs. One
approach is to utilise multiple independently trained (or developed) BN models in place of
single models. In this case, a system may reason over the outputs of each individual model
- it will use some form of model averaging before the model outputs are used to provide
a ‘final’ output. This approach is conceptually similar to the concept of redundancy
in conventional systems. An example ensemble architecture is shown in Figure 4.1b.
These approaches are sometimes referred to as ensemble modelling approaches [2,168,169].
Ensemble approaches may seem a clear choice for a BNS used in mission-critical contexts.
However, the development of ensembles of BN models may not be practically feasible. The
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(a) A monolithic architecture.
(b) An ensemble architecture.
Figure 4.1: RM-BNS Fragments of Ensemble and Monolithic Architectures.
development of multiple models may require large quantities of data for each individual
model and may require other resources which may be prohibitively expense to obtain (i.e.
time and cost). This is particularly difficult in so-called low data regimes - contexts in
which limited data (and/or expert experience) is available.
There is a further consideration when considering the roles of models in BNSs. This
is how the output from a model is used to support the provision of a given software
function (or set of software functions). For example, in the example shown in Figure 4.1a,
both of the models in the figure are used to directly support the provision of functions
A and B, respectively. This approach would mean that errors in models A or B would
directly inform the behaviour of functions A or B. In contrast, if a BNS required user
input, or was otherwise used in a purely decision support role that informs operator
behaviours, it may be described as indirectly informing safety-related system functionality.
For completeness, there is also the case in which a BN model is independent of safety-
related software functions.
To generalise, the models used within a BNS’s architecture can be defined either as
being used in either monolithic or ensemble configurations. An example of a monolithic
model may be the development of a single BN model to represent a single vehicle, whereas
an ensemble may use multiple BN models that each represent the same vehicle. The role
of these models can also be defined as either being executive, advisory or independent
models. For clarity, these terms are defined here as follows:
Monolithic Models - Models that are used independently of any other model to support
the provision of a set of software functions.
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Ensemble Models - Models that are used collectively to support the provision of the
same set of software functions.
Executive Models - Models that are used directly in the support of the provision of
one or more safety-related software functions.
Advisory Models - Models that are used indirectly in the support of the provision of
one or more safety-related software functions.
Independent Models - Models that are never used to directly or indirectly support
the provision of any safety-related software functions.
Finally, there is the need to consider whether or not the reasoning of a given model
occurs in isolation; there may be additional information available to a BNS that can
support the output of a given BN or ensemble of BNs that is not derived from a model
itself. This may take the form of sensor readings, operator input, or developer-imposed
thresholds, rules or other constraints. More generally, there is a need to consider whether
or not there exists information external to the model or ensemble of models that can be
used to corroborate or validate the model outputs. This can be referred to as a means of
external validation, and can be defined as:
Means of External Validation - Any source of data or input external to the model
that can be used to corroborate or otherwise validate the output of a model.
These definitions provide the basis of the Model Authority Categories (MACs) for
BNSs. The MACs bear conceptual similarities with the Software Control Categories
(SCCs) outlined in MIL-STD 882E [167]. In this case, the SCCs are used to categorise
the degree of control software components have over safety critical functions. In contrast,
a BN model’s MAC assignment is intended to reflect the degree of exposure of a safety-
related software function to a BN model, and by extension any errors that are entirely
attributable to the model utilised in the provision of that function.1 Concretely, a MAC
can be defined as follows:
Model Authority Category - The degree of exposure of a safety related function to a
BN model.
1This refers to any errors that are entirely encompassed by the concerns addressed by the Model
Viewpoint of the RM-BNS: errors that can in principle be considered software and platform independent.
120
4.3 Model Criticality
The definitions of each of the proposed MACs is enumerated in Table 4.1. The defini-
tions have been designed to be exhaustive and sufficiently general to accommodate various
BN architectures.
Table 4.1: Model Authority Categories (MACs)
Cat. Name Description
0 Full Authority [Monolithic and Ensemble] Executive Models without
means of external validation.
1 Partial Authority
(I)
[Monolithic] Executive Models with means of external
validation.
2 Partial Authority
(II)
[Ensemble] Executive Models with means of external
validation.
3 Supporting Au-
thority
[Monolithic and Ensemble] Advisory Models with or
without means of external validation.
4 No Authority Independent Models
4.3.3 Justification for Model Authority Categories
Practically, Table 4.1 was defined to represent a comprehensive taxonomy of possible BNS
architectures from the perspective of the Model Viewpoint: all identified BNS architectures
can be categorised according to this table. Consequently, the table provides a standardised
approach for describing the influence of BN models in BNSs on other system aspects.
However, as discussed in Section 4.3.2, while designed to be comprehensive, the adoption
of a constrained number of categories can obfuscate some technical subtleties.
For example, consider BNSs using BN models in an ensemble configuration. In these
cases, it is common for the outputs of a set of models to be weighted in accordance with
how ‘correct’ that model is given some task. In cases in which one model out of a set is
dramatically more accurate than the others, such weightings may overwhelmingly favour
the predictions of one model out of the set over all others. In circumstances with severely
asymmetric weightings such as this, the categorisation would unequivocally fall under the
Partial Authority II category in Table 4.1, though their degree of influence would suggest
they may be best categorised as Partial Authority I or even Full Authority given the level
of influence of a single model over the system.
Ambiguities around the most appropriate classification or level for a given component
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are common challenges within the assurance domain [74,79]. The resolution of these am-
biguities is invariably a task delegated by existing standards to the development teams
working on a system. This is again true of the contents of Table 4.1: developers should
carefully consider the particular characteristics of their system in the light of the contents
of the table and should adopt their best judgement in the event any discrepancies or am-
biguities are discovered. Indeed, future validation efforts should focus on establishing the
utility of this structure and the category definitions it contains in a real-world development
environment. These efforts should also attempt to refine the proposed definitions in the
light of any ambiguities that are found. For example, the example presented above is gen-
erally a sign of a poorly generalised BN architecture, and should occur highly infrequently
in operational BNSs. However, if circumstances exist in which ‘edge cases’ such as this
are identified, these should be used to improve the contents of Table 4.1.
4.3.4 Model Criticality Index
The MACs provide a first step towards supporting the maintenance of the traceability
of functional behaviours in BNSs by providing a means of assessing and describing the
degree of influence of each individual BN model within a system upon any safety-related
functionality. However, the MACs do not provide a mechanism for addressing the pro-
portionality of efforts beyond identifying the general role of a BN model in the system.
Specifically, they do not integrate any notions of severity into their definitions. The no-
tion of the relative severity of a failure mode is central to the concept of the criticality
of system aspects. The Model Criticality Indices (MCI) provide this mechanism. They
directly relate the authority of a BN model to the worst-case severity of hazards related
to failure modes associated with system functions that may emerge as a consequence of
errors within the given model. This can be summarised as:
Model Criticality Index - The degree of authority of a model with respect to the
maximum severity of hazards arising from failure modes of functions utilising erroneous
outputs from that model.
After assigning a model a MAC, the next step towards defining a model’s MCI is to
establish the severity of hazards associated with the failure of any functions over which the
model exerts a degree of authority. This can be achieved by applying a standard Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to the BNS. A FMEA can provide a robust approach
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to tracing failure modes to software functions within a system. The severity associated
with each failure mode can then be defined as normal for each function. The definitions
of the severity categories are those provided in DO-178C [69]. These are given as:
Catastrophic - Failure may cause a crash. Error or loss of critical function required to
safely fly and land aircraft.
Hazardous - Failure has a large negative impact on safety or performance, or reduces the
ability of the crew to operate the aircraft due to physical distress or a higher workload,
or causes serious or fatal injuries among the passengers.
Major - Failure is significant, but has a lesser impact than a Hazardous failure or sig-
nificantly increases crew workload.
Minor - Failure is noticeable, but has a lesser impact than a Major failure.
No Effect (Negligible) - Failure has no impact on safety, aircraft operation, or crew
workload.
With the severities assigned to failure modes of individual software functions using
FMEA, the MCIs for each model in a BNS can be assigned. This can be achieved by using
an architectural model of the BNS defined using the RM-BNS framework. A RM-BNS
instantiation will directly map individual software functions to any BN models associated
with that function. The severity associated with each individual BN model is established
by selecting the most severe failure mode amongst each of the functions that that model
supports. With this category established, the MCI can be defined using the matrix shown
in Figure 4.2.
4.3.5 Application of MACs and MCIs
The utility of this approach can be illustrated using the architecture fragments shown in
Figure 4.1. Consider the case in which Function A (Figure 4.1a) and Function C (Figure
4.1b) are used to provide some diagnosis capability to a system. In this case, an FMEA
could be performed on the system and may determine that both functions manifest failure
modes that could be assigned a severity rating of Hazardous. The MACs and MCIs
can then be used to distinguish between the criticality of the models used in the two
architectures.
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Cat. Haz. Maj. Min. Neg.
MAC-0 MCI-0 MCI-0 MCI-1 MCI-2 MCI-4
MAC-1 MCI-0 MCI-1 MCI-1 MCI-2 MCI-4
MAC-2 MCI-1 MCI-1 MCI-2 MCI-3 MCI-4
MAC-3 MCI-2 MCI-2 MCI-3 MCI-3 MCI-4
MAC-4 MCI-4 MCI-4 MCI-4 MCI-4 MCI-4
Figure 4.2: The Model Criticality Index (MCI) Matrix
By using Table 4.1, a MAC can be assigned to each of the models shown in the figure.
For example, Model A in Figure 4.1a would fall into the MAC-0 category; the system has
no available method validating the output of the model, and the model is used directly
in the support of Function A. Consequently, Model A would receive a MCI-0 rating. In
contrast, Models C, D and E in Figure 4.1b would receive a preliminary assignment of
MAC-2 due to their use as an ensemble of models. When combined with the severity
category, this would result in each model receiving a MCI-1 assignment. The process
of assigning MACs and MCIs will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In
the event either function has access to additional information, the MCIs may be reduced
further.
4.4 Variable Criticality
The previous section established an approach to defining criticality indices for each BN
model within a BNS. This section addresses the need to extend the further analysis of the
criticality of BN models to local properties of a model. This notion of criticality is referred
to as Variable Criticality and is defined as:
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Variable Criticality - A product of the degree of contribution of local aspects of a
model to safety-related functional behaviours, and the severity of any hazards associated
with these behaviours.
In this case, ‘local aspects’ refers principally to the properties of individual RVs within
a BN model. However, a RV may itself be a complete BN model, or some other complex
local structure [2, 44, 153]. This term is therefore intended to preserve the generality of
the statement to include any additional considerations beyond those of a standard RV.
A first step towards exploring the criticality of variables within a BN model is to
establish which variables directly influence the behaviours of safety-related functionality.
For example, consider a medical diagnosis BN model that is utilised for the provision
of two distinct software functions. One function (function A) provides an indication of a
patient’s vital statistics, while the other (function B) automatically administers pain-relief
drugs - based on the output of the model. The former function may not fall under any
safety-related considerations, while the latter may have severe repercussions in the event
of the failure of that function to behave as intended.
Using the MACs introduced in the previous section, an assurance practitioner may
provide the model a high MCI assignment to reflect this. However, functions A and B may
utilise a disjoints set of output RVs. From this perspective, RVs directly supporting the
provision of function A (RV-A) may appear to have a lower criticality than those directly
supporting function B (RV-B): errors in the states of RV-A may not directly affect the
provision of function B and vice versa. This observation leads to the introduction of a new
class of RV to capture these assurance considerations: the Safety-Related Variable (SRV).
This is defined as:
Safety-Related Variable - Any random variable whose state, value or configuration is
used directly in the provision of a safety-related system function.
The assignment of the SRV classification to individual variables within a BN model
provides an immediate insight into which areas of that model to prioritise for evaluation
and testing. However, as has been indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, the behaviours of a
BN model are heavily dependent on the interactions between RVs within a model. This
requires an approach that augments the straightforward classification of variables as SRVs
by explicitly evaluating interactions in order to identify which other variables influence
the SRVs, and most importantly, to what extent.
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The basis of the analysis of the criticality of variables in BN models is therefore pred-
icated on two steps:
• A safety focussed analysis that extends the analysis performed in the assignment of
MCIs in order to identify SRVs;
• An analysis of the dynamics of a model that integrates safety information in order
to categorise the degree of influence of all variables upon SRVs.
Practically, the first step can be achieved through the utilisation of the RM-BNS to
decompose a ‘model’ object into local models (i.e. RVs). These can then be directly asso-
ciated with individual software functions. This is an extrapolation of the process outlined
in section 4.3.2. The second step requires the development of a systematic approach to
exploring the parametric space of a BN model to characterise the model’s interaction, and
to integrate safety information into this analysis. The proposed methodology supports
the targeted evaluation of individual variables within the model and maintains a degree of
traceability down to the level of RVs. This can then be used to prioritise assurance activi-
ties associated with both the system aspects addressed by the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint,
as well as many of those associated with the RM-BNS Data Viewpoint. The methodology
is based upon the introduction of three key concepts: an augmented sensitivity analy-
sis, Variable Authority Categories (VACs) and Variable Criticality Indices (VCIs). The
methodology is the focus of this section.
4.4.1 Modified Sensitivity Analysis
In the context of BN models, the term Sensitivity Analysis (SA) is used to refer to a
range of techniques for analysing how the dynamics of a BN model change in the presence
of perturbations applied to a model’s structure or parameterisation. Generally, the aim
of these analyses is to quantify how the output of a BN model depends on its inputs.
For example, in a medical application, practitioners may be interested in establishing the
relative importance of a specific subset of symptoms upon a specific disease diagnosis. In
this case, various forms of SA can be used to rank the symptoms in terms of importance,
or to bound the range of values a variable’s parameters may take to guarantee certain
behaviours. Fundamentally, SA provides insight into the interactions between RVs in a BN
model. It therefore forms an ideal basis for the development of an approach to categorise
the criticality of variables based upon the influence of variables upon one another [170].
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There are many forms of SA in active use. For the purposes of the analysis proposed
in this chapter, one of the simplest forms is used as its basis [59]. This is sometimes
referred to as a Sensitivity to Findings Analysis (SA-F). As with other approaches, this
analysis seeks to monitor how the posterior distributions of RVs in a given model change
in the presence of inputs. Specifically, by monitoring the behaviours of individual RVs in
a model through the systematic introduction of evidence, the analysis builds up a picture
of the degree of influence of individual RVs upon one another.
The analysis algorithm can be summarised as follows. First, a target variable is se-
lected; this can be any variable in the model. A set of query variables is identified (this
set may not include the target variable). Inputs are then provided to the query vari-
ables. With the inputs provided, the posterior distribution of the target variable is then
computed, and the change (perturbation) in the distribution is recorded. This process is
repeated systematically for each of the variables in the model. Practically, this process
measures the response of individual variables in a model to inputs elsewhere in the model.
Consequently, the magnitude of changes induced in a (target) variable given a change of
state in another (query) variable can be used to estimate the influence of one variable
upon the other.
With the general methodology of SA-F defined, there remains the problem of selecting a
measure to quantify the degree of influence. Most common SA techniques utilise entropy-
based metrics [59, 65, 171]. For a discrete probability distribution, the entropy can be
defined as:
H(X) = −
∑
i=1
P (xi)logP (xi) (4.1)
Where P (xi) is the i
th state of the discrete RV X. The entropy provides a measure
of the dispersion of a distribution: it is an expression of the degree of uncertainty in a
distribution [3]. In the case of a RV modelled using a discrete distribution, a state of
low entropy would correspond to a case in which a single state has the majority of the
probability mass of the distribution (i.e. one state is close to 1.0). In contrast, a maximally
entropic state would correspond to a distribution for which all states have equal probability
mass (i.e. all states are equally likely). In the form provided in Equation 4.1, the entropy
of only one distribution is computed. A common entropy-based measure for capturing
the changed induced by a second variable is the Mutual Information (MI) metric. This is
expressed as [59]:
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I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) =
∑
i=1
∑
j=1
P (xi|yj)log P (xiyj)
P (xi)P (yi)
(4.2)
Where the first term is the entropy of variable X and the term H(X|Y ) is given
separately as:
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
i=1
P (xi, yj)logP (xi|yj) (4.3)
This represents the conditional entropy of the two RVs X and Y . The conditional
entropy provides a measure of the amount of information required to characterise a random
variable (X) given the state of a second random variable (Y ) is observed [2, 172]. This
term captures the conditional influence of one variable upon another. Using this, the MI
(I) of variables X and Y provides a direct statistical measure of the dependence between
two RVs: it measures the amount of information the two variables share. If the two RVs
are completely independent, Equation 4.2 will evaluate to zero. In all other cases, the MI
will produce a non-zero value. However, in these cases, the value of I can take a range of
non-zero values. This makes it less intuitive as a measure for categorising the dependence
of variables (as is the aim of the modified SA presented here). A Normalised MI (NMI)
measure can be used instead. This is sometimes referred to as the uncertainty coefficient
of two variables [2, 172]. This can be expressed as:
U(X|Y ) = I(X,Y )
H(X)
(4.4)
This measure scales the MI score between the values of 0 and 1. This can naturally
be expressed as a fraction or percentage - this is likely to be a more intuitive measure for
BN developers and assurance practitioners. For clarity, in the context of a discrete RV the
NMI represents the fraction of bits of variable X that can be predicted given knowledge of
the state of variable Y . Importantly, the measure is asymmetric. This enables the SA-F
to capture asymmetric influence within a model (i.e. cases in which variable X may have
more influence on variable Y than Y has on X). This is an essential feature: asymmetric
influence within a BN may have serious assurance implications. For these reasons, the
NMI is used as the selected influence measure.
With both the analysis framework defined and an influence measure selected, the
modified SA analysis can be introduced. There are two principal modifications to the
SA-F algorithm described previously. First, at each step in the algorithm, a single query
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variable is selected, and each state of that variable is iteratively instantiated. For each
state instantiated a vector representing the NMI score for each other variable in the model
is obtained. Each element of this vector captures the influence of the instantiated variable
upon each other variable given the instantiated variable’s current state. Therefore, for
each query variable a set of NMI vectors is acquired. The maximum NMI score for each
variable over each vector is retained.
For example, in the event a query variable has two states, one step in the analysis would
produce two NMI vectors. Each element in each NMI vector represents the influence of
the query variable upon the ith variable in the model. In this case, the ith elements of
each NMI vector can be used to produce a 2-element vector capturing the NMI for each
state of the query vector. The maximum NMI score from this vector is selected. More
commonly, averages of the NMI scores are used as this gives a clearer overall view of the
relative influence of variables within the model. However, the worst-case (i.e. strongest
influence) scenario is typically of interest to assurance practitioners. Therefore, this is the
motivation for using the maximum NMI score: it reflects the most influence a variable
may have upon another. This is the second modification to the algorithm. Concretely,
this can be expressed as retaining:
Score = max(U(X|Y )) (4.5)
This process is repeated iteratively for each variable in the BN model. The result of this
process will be an N×N sensitivity matrix (SM), where N is the number of individual RVs
within the BN model. Each element within this matrix will then represent the maximum
influence of the ith variable upon the jth variable. The diagonal elements of the SM (i.e.
where i = j) will be exactly 1.0. These small modifications to the algorithm can be used
to generate a ‘heat-map’ of influence of variables in a model. This visualisation can be
used to provide an intuitive interpretation of the dynamics of a BN model to assurance
practitioners.
Without further analysis - or the integration of assurance information - Figure 4.3
provides an intuitive overview of the degree of influence (between 0 and 1) that individual
variables have over one another in this BN model. For example, the figure indicates
that the state of the ‘XRAY’ variable strongly influences the ‘LUNG’ variable. In this
context, the ‘XRAY’ variable represents an input derived from the results of a patient’s
x-ray, specifically whether the x-ray indicates any abnormalities in a patient’s lungs. The
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‘LUNG’ variable represents a diagnosis of whether a patient has lung cancer. It also
shows that ‘LUNG’ (i.e. the presence lung cancer) is strongly influenced by the ‘SMOKE’
variable (i.e. whether the patient smokes).
Figure 4.3: Visualisation of Variable Sensitivity in Asia Model
It may be clear to the BN model’s developers that as a crucial diagnosis variable, it
is particularly important to assure the behaviours of the ‘LUNG’ variable. In this case, it
may also be clear that both whether a patient smokes and the results of a lung x-ray are
strong indicators of whether or not the model indicates that a patient has lung cancer –
as shown by Figure 4.3. However, in more complex models, these interactions may not
be obvious and may be highly counter-intuitive [173,174,175]. Furthermore, this method
provides a quantification of the degree of influence, and therefore provides a more concrete
assessment of the interactions and relative importance of variables in the BN.
4.4.2 Justification for Utilising Sensitivity Analysis
From an assurance perspective, SA can be built upon to provide a useful mechanism for
exploring the criticality of BN models and their components. As previously discussed,
the aim of criticality analyses is to systematically identify and categorise components of
a system that are influential to the behaviour of that system and are therefore dispropor-
tionately important to the safe functioning of the system in question.
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Sensitivity analysis provides an analogous mechanism: the aim of sensitivity analysis
is to characterise a BN model such that BN developers can identify which specific model
components are most influential to specific model behaviours. These model behaviours
could be anything from identifying which aspects of a model are most influential with
respect to specific diagnoses or a given range of values of interest that an RV may take.
From this perspective, sensitivity analysis provides the ideal technical basis for extend-
ing the notion of criticality to model aspects of a BNS. By integrating additional assurance
concepts into existing SA techniques and thereby mapping specific behaviours to corre-
sponding severity categories, conventional SA approaches can be adapted to explore the
dynamics of a given BN model in a more assurance-focussed manner. Concretely, SA pro-
vides a technical mechanism for addressing both of the points identified in Section 4.3.1
as key concerns of assurance practitioners. These were mechanisms that enable:
1. The determination and description of the criticality of aspects of a system’s archi-
tecture.
2. The moderation of confidence in aspects of a system’s architecture given its critical-
ity.
Beyond these assurance considerations, a range of SA techniques are widely used and
studied within the BN domain. This has produced a rich and varied body of literature
that could be harnessed to further explore assurance-focussed properties of BN models.
Furthermore, these techniques could be substituted for the technique presented in this
section if the need arose. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. SA-based
criticality analysis techniques are appealing as they can provide flexible, informative anal-
ysis approaches for identifying the influence of safety related variables upon one another,
and is underpinned by rigorous technical, quantitative theory.
4.4.3 Variable Authority Categories
The next step in assigning Variable Criticality Indices is to develop a notion of authority
categories for local structures that is analogous to the MACs introduced in section 4.3.2.
Unlike the MACs, the Variable Authority Categories (VACs) are defined quantitatively.
They directly utilise the results of the modified sensitivity analysis. A VAC is defined as:
• Variable Authority Category - The degree of exposure of one variable to the
state of another variable.
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For each interaction captured in the SM, a VAC is assigned. This assignment reflects
the degree of exposure of the jth variable to the state of the ith variable. The quantitative
threshold used to define the VACs are shown in Table 4.2. The thresholds reflect evenly
distributed quintiles for all possible smax scores. Figure 4.6a shows an augmented version
of the basic heat-map shown in Figure 4.3. This visualisation shows the assigned VACs to
each interaction in the SM.
Table 4.2: Variable Authority Categories (VACs)
Category Name Score (smax)
0 Very High S > 0.8
1 High 0.8 ≥ S > 0.6
2 Medium 0.6 ≥ S > 0.4
3 Low 0.4 ≥ S > 0.2
4 Negligible S < 0.2
4.4.4 Justification for Variable Authority Categories
As discussed in Section 4.3.3, the use of the categories and scores as provided in Table 4.2
is motivated by the fact that the normalised mutual information score is fixed between
the range zero and one. The value of this score can be directly interpreted as providing
information on how coupled two variables are. Consider two variables A and B. Practically,
if the score computed for the case P(A—B) is 0.8, this indicates that knowledge of the
state of variable B increases knowledge of the state of variable A by 80%. Fundamentally,
this would indicate that variable A has a strong correlation to certain states of variable
B. Similarly, all combinations of pairs of variables in a model can be interpreted this way.
It naturally provides the quantified degree of influence of one variable on another. Note
that the method does not distinguish which state in particular is strongly coupled, just
that the variable has a strongly coupled state.
As indicated, the breakdown of the Variable Authority Categories (VACs) in Table 4.2
that are based on these scores was derived by taking the quintiles of the possible normalised
mutual information scores. This was been motivated by the need to provide an intelligible,
constructive approach to categorising the relative influence of variables upon one another
that lends itself to a fully automated methodology. However, as with any technique that
attempts to apply a finite set of categories to an infinite set, information is lost. For
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example, the provided approach will treat a variable with a score of 0.81 (VAC-0) as
equidistant from another variable with a score of 0.61 (VAC-1) and a third variable with
a score of 0.79 (VAC-1).
Despite this, the proposed approach and the given table make a complex, infinitely-
valued problem tractable and intelligible, and therefore its utility should outweigh the
previously discussed risks introduced as a by-product. This is another manifestation of the
considerations outlined in Section 4.3.1: to provide a practicable solution to the problem
of delineating the relative influence of variables upon one another, a compromise such as
this is necessary. Practically, the provided table should therefore provide a useful guide
to the relative safety-related importance of variables within a BN model.
Future work should look at validating the use of the quintiles as they have been defined
here, and in particular should aim to identify any potential systematic weaknesses of the
categories provided in the table, and of their use. This could be achieved through the
evaluation of a more complex real-world system and the analysis of the potential safety
effects of applying the categories to such a system. An analysis of this form should also
evaluate whether evenly distributed quintiles is appropriate for the given system. Such an
analysis was beyond the scope of this thesis.
4.4.5 Variable Criticality Index
Finally, a VCI can be assigned to each interaction. As with the assignment of MCIs, this
requires the introduction of a notion of severity; once again, the definitions of severity
categories (SCs) as defined in DO-178C are used. A severity category is assigned to a
variable as follows:
• All variables that directly support the provision of safety-related functions (SRVs)
are assigned a severity category that is appropriate given the most severe hazard
related to any failure modes to which a given SRV may contribute.
• All remaining variables are assigned the No Effect category (4).
The establishment of the severity of failure modes associated with errors in a model
output used by safety-related functions (i.e. a SRV) can be established in a manner
analogous to that set out in section 4.3.4. By extending the RM-BNS model to represent
variables, failure analyses can explore the contributions of individual RVs to hazardous
system behaviours. The assignments of VCIs are based upon the combination of SCs and
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Cat. Haz. Maj. Min. Neg.
VAC-0 VCI-0 VCI-0 VCI-1 VCI-2 VCI-4
VAC-1 VCI-0 VCI-1 VCI-1 VCI-2 VCI-4
VAC-2 VCI-1 VCI-1 VCI-2 VCI-3 VCI-4
VAC-3 VCI-2 VCI-2 VCI-3 VCI-3 VCI-4
VAC-4 VCI-4 VCI-4 VCI-4 VCI-2 VCI-4
Figure 4.4: The Variable Criticality Index (VCI) Matrix
VACs. The VCI matrix is shown in Figure 4.4. For each interaction between the ith and
jth variables in a model, a VCI is assigned based on the VAC of the interaction and the
SC of the jth variable. This process will generate multiple VCIs for each variable. The
final VCI is established by selecting the most critical VCI assigned to any interactions
associated with that variable.
X Y
Z
Figure 4.5: A Simple BN Model Fragment.
For example, consider the small network shown in Figure 4.5. Variables X and Y have
been assigned SCs of Hazardous and Minor respectively; variable Z is not a SRV and is
therefore assigned the No Effect category. Further analysis assigns a VAC of 1 to the
interaction between variables Z and X (i.e. the influence of Z on X) and a VAC of 2 on
the interaction between variables Z and Y . The former interaction would receive a VCI-1
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assignment, while the latter interaction would receive a VCI-3 assignment. Variable Z
would therefore receive a final assignment of VCI-1.
An example application of the VCI matrix to the Asia Model used previously can
be seen in Figure 4.6b. For the sake of this example, the variables representing disease
diagnosis variables (‘LUNG’, ‘BRONC’, ‘TUB’ and ‘DYSP’) were assumed to be SRVs,
with the ‘LUNG’ variable being assigned a ‘Hazardous’ classification, ‘BRONC’ and ‘TUB’
receiving ‘Major’ classifications and ‘DYSP’ receiving a ‘Minor’ classification. As the figure
shows, this provides an overview of the criticality of each variable with respect to each
other variable. Table 4.3 shows how the VCIs can shift with inclusion of interactions.
The preliminary VCI assignment in Table 4.3 reflects the criticality indices that would
be assigned to each variable without analysing interactions. This in effect assumes all
off-diagonal sensitivity matrix elements are set to zero, and all diagonal elements are set
to one. This can of course be defined without using the modified sensitivity analysis. This
highlights the additional insight assurance practitioners can gain into the safety-related
behaviours of a BN by explicitly addressing the role of a model’s internal dynamics on a
model’s outputs (and therefore SRVs).
Table 4.3: Example VCI Assignments
Variable Preliminary
VCI
VCI
ASIA 4 3
SMOKE 4 2
TUB 2 2
BRONC 2 2
LUNG 0 0
EITHER 4 2
DYSP 4 4
XRAY 4 0
4.4.6 Justification for the Utilisation of Criticality Matrices
The matrices shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.2 were once again adopted with the considerations
presented in Section 4.3.1 in mind as a mechanism for capturing the relationship between
the influence of various model aspects within a BNS and the severity of hazards associated
135
Chapter 4: Model Criticality Analysis
(a) Visualisation of VAC Assignments to Asia Model Variables.
(b) Visualisation of VCI Assignments to Asia Model Variables.
Figure 4.6: Visualisations of VAC and VCI Assignments to the Asia Model.
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with those system aspects. In existing literature, matrices of this form are widely used to
provide a simple, standard mechanism for analogous tasks.
As discussed, the initial concept for the tables and matrices in this chapter was in-
spired by the manner in which Software Control Categories (SCCs) and Software Safety
Criticality Matrices (SSCMs) were defined and structured within the software standard
MIL-STD 882-E. Once again, the aim of adopting structures similar to these in this chap-
ter is to provide a useful, pragmatic solution to the problem of delineating the criticality
of a system aspect and the corresponding assurance required in that aspect.
Practically, Figures 4.4 and 4.2 (and their related tables) can be considered as an il-
lustration of how BNS development practices and concerns can be mapped into existing
practices within the assurance domain, and a way of utilising a standard approach to mit-
igate the epistemic uncertainty associated with the development and categorisation of the
criticality of aspects of any software system in the context of BNSs. Again, practitioners
utilising these structures should be aware that they do not guarantee a solution to a given
problem but should provide useful guidance on how to pragmatically structure and com-
municate discussions around the criticality of BNS-specific system aspects among system
stakeholders.
Future work should once again focus on evaluating and refining Figures 4.4 and 4.2 in
the light of practical experiences of their application to the development of an operational
mission-critical BNS. In particular, evaluation of the progression of MCIs and VCIs within
these figures should be reviewed to ensure they are of utility to practitioners, and that
no violations or important edge cases are identified. Until such a point, practitioners are
advised to consider these structures as guidance and assurance heuristics, and to carefully
consider their use during the development of a BNS.
4.4.7 Application of VACs and VCIs
The process for the assignment of VACs and VCIs to local aspects of a BN model has
been designed to be agnostic to the specific form of sensitivity analysis used, provided the
analysis technique selected satisfies two requirements:
1. The technique provides quantified measures of all pairwise interactions between vari-
ables in a BN model.
2. The technique utilises any asymmetric, normalised measure of the degree of interac-
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tion between variables, and that this measure can be mapped directly onto the VAC
categories shown in Table 4.2.
The modified sensitivity analysis algorithm introduced in this chapter is therefore
intended to provide a minimally viable solution to the analysis of interactions within a
BN model. It was selected as it provides a relatively intuitive, computationally cheap
approach to evaluating interactions within a given BN model; it is an ideal ‘baseline’
algorithm.
However, it has a number of important limitations. Of these limitations, the most
important arises from the fact the algorithm falls into the ‘one-at-a-time’ (OAT) class of
SA techniques. This class of SA does not exhaustively explore the parametric space of BN
models. By analysing pairwise interactions between variables by changing the state of a
single variable at a time, they do not evaluate the pairwise interactions of two variables
in the presence of additional inputs.
For example, OAT analyses can not evaluate circumstances in which the presence of
two inputs results in the creation of new active paths in the model. These active paths can
enable the exchange of information between two or more variables that were previously
d-separated.2 This means that OAT analyses may indicate a reduced degree of pairwise
interactions between two variables, and this may not accurately represent the ‘true’ degree
of interaction between the variables.
From this perspective, OAT analyses (and by extension the modified SA technique
introduced here) can be considered as providing a ‘first-order approximation’ to the inter-
actions within a BN model.
This algorithm can therefore be considered as something of a ‘first-order approxima-
tion’ to the interactions within a BN model. More elaborate analysis methods have been
proposed and implemented in literature. Many of these approaches could be used in place
of the algorithm presented here. The only requirement of any replacement algorithms is
that they quantify the interactions in terms of the NMI score introduced in this section.
2See section 2.2.3.1 for more information on the role of BN model structures in the transmission of
information a network.
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4.5 Methodology
Taken together, the techniques introduced here form the basis of a proposed Model Crit-
icality Analysis (MCA) methodology. This methodology is aimed at providing assurance
practitioners with an intuitive grasp of which model-centric aspects of a BNS are most im-
portant from an assurance perspective. To summarise, the MCA methodology introduced
here is composed of the following seven steps:
1. Create an RM-BNS architecture model for a BNS.
2. Carry out an FMEA-like failure analysis on functional aspects of the system.
3. Assign MACs to each model within the BNS.
4. Apply the MCI matrix to each model within the BNS.
5. Perform a modified sensitivity analysis on each model in the BNS.
6. Assign VACs to each variable within each model in the BNS.
7. Apply the VCI matrix to each model in the BNS.
8. Extract final VCI assignments for each variable in the BNS.
The primary utility of this methodology is intended to be the indication of which
models and aspects of models are the most critical; this information can then be used to
support the subsequent targeted analysis of model-centric aspects of a BNS.
Moreover, by facilitating these analyses, the approach is intended to provide a means
of addressing assurance considerations associated with other viewpoints outlined in the
RM-BNS. In particular, it can be used to support the assurance of some Data Viewpoint
aspects. For example, in many applications, individual variables within a BN model can
be trained independently. Consequently, individual variables may be directly associated
with individual data artefacts. Therefore, the MCA approach can be used to identify
individual data artefacts (or elements of data artefacts) that are particularly important
to the reasoning capability of a BN model.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced a systematic approach to establishing the criticality of each
model used within a BN-based system, and of all variables that comprise each model.
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The motivation for this work was threefold. First, there is a need to ensure that the
traceability of behaviours is maintained in BNSs in cases in which traditional software-
centric approaches may begin to break down. Second, it is essential that unconventional
aspects of BNSs can be directly targeted and prioritised based on their relative importance
to the safety-related functional behaviours of a system. Finally, there must be a mechanism
for ensuring the proportionality of analysis and testing techniques used in the verification
and validation of BNSs.
The Model Criticality Analysis (MCA) approach presented here has provides a solution
to each of these problems for those system aspects addressed by the RM-BNS Model
Viewpoint. The approach provides a targeted means of analysing model-centric aspects
of BNSs to establish the criticality of these aspects to the behaviour of the completed
system. It supports the attribution (though not in a binary sense) of individual model
components to a system’s functional behaviours. By providing a means of prioritising
individual model components, the proportionality of the efforts carried out in the assurance
of those components can then be established.
The primary contributions of this chapter are therefore:
• The introduction and definition of Model Authority Categories (MACs) to system-
atically characterise the relative importance of models.
• The introduction and definition of Model Criticality Indices (MCIs) to capture the
criticality of independent models.
• The introduction and definition of Variable Authority Categories (VACs) to stan-
dardise the description of the influence of variables upon one another.
• A modified sensitivity analysis algorithm for deriving VACs.
• The introduction, definition and methodology for assigning Variable Criticality In-
dices (VCIs) to capture and standardise the description of the relative importance
of variables upon safety-related outputs (SROs).
The following chapter looks at how the RM-BNS and verification and validation objec-
tives of the previous chapter can be used alongside MCA and other existing evaluation and
analysis techniques to develop a framework for describing safety evidence generated during
the development of a BNS, and how the sufficiency of this evidence may be established.
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From Objectives to Evidence
5.1 Introduction
So far, the work presented within this thesis has focussed upon making two principal
contributions: first it has aimed to ensure the full scope of assurance considerations are
understood and accounted for by system developers (Chapter 3); and second, it has pro-
vided an targeted safety analysis technique to help explore the assurance implications of
BN model aspects (Chapter 4). This chapter aims to provide guidance on addressing the
outstanding problem of establishing the sufficiency of the assurance efforts undertaken
during the development of a BNS.
In particular, this chapter focusses primarily on the sufficiency of assurance efforts re-
lated to the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint. This viewpoint has been selected as it represents
the most conceptually divergent of the RM-BNS viewpoints with respect to conventional
software systems: the other RM-BNS Viewpoints have novel BNS-specific concerns as-
sociated with them, but these viewpoints typically have more conceptual overlaps with
conventional software development practices. While the focus of the discussion will be on
system aspects associated with the Model Viewpoint, the concepts introduced in this chap-
ter are relatively general and should therefore be extensible to system aspects associated
with the other RM-BNS viewpoints. The chapter is structured as follows:
• The challenges associated with the development of a BNS are re-introduced to pro-
vide context for subsequent sections. This provides a brief review of relevant concepts
introduced in Chapters 2 and 3.
• The role of evidence in existing safety-critical systems is then reviewed. This pro-
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vides additional context and highlights potential shortcomings in existing standards
and practices. A framework for describing and classifying safety evidence is then
introduced and applied to BNSs.
• Next, the evidence classifications are combined with the RM-BNS verification and
validation objectives to provide an overview of how evidence may be used to satisfy
the objectives, and how evidence may be refined alongside these objectives. This
section provides a mapping of objectives to the techniques that may be used to satisfy
them, and their associated items of evidence. It also builds upon the contributions
of Chapter 4 to indicate how criticality metrics may be mapped onto the RM-BNS
objectives and evidence to further clarify the role and relative importance of specific
items of evidence in a given BNS.
• Finally, the chapter provides a discussion on how the sufficiency of evidence may
be established during the development of a BNS. This section reviews two potential
approaches and evaluates the relative merits of each.
5.2 Assurance Considerations
As discussed in Chapter 2, existing safety standards commonly adopt a prescriptive ap-
proach to safety: a standard will stipulate a set of mandatory development processes
that must be performed if a system is to comply with that standard. These approaches
frequently provide either an enumeration of techniques that must be carried out by a devel-
opment team, or a set of activities (or specific items of evidence) that must be performed
(or provided) in order to satisfy a given set of safety objectives [69]. These techniques
typically make strong assumptions about the nature of the system being developed and
of the utility of the practices they mandate [70].
Many such standards have earned enduring popularity within the various engineer-
ing domains; the well-defined activities and development steps lend themselves to large
projects and organisations – and to the understandably risk-averse mentality of many
such projects and organisations. Indeed, a recurrent criticism of prescriptive approaches
to safety is that these approaches may encourage an uncritical ‘check list’ mentality to
assurance [76,100]. This criticism is rooted in the fact that the rationale for the activities
and evidence mandated by a given standard is commonly only implicit. Many authors have
noted that the underlying assumptions of these standards may not be valid in practice:
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the generality and flexibility of various analysis techniques and best practices is frequently
debated within the assurance domain [74,75,162].
In previous chapters, a number of important conceptual distinctions between BNSs and
more conventional software-intensive systems were introduced. As outlined in Chapter 3,
these conceptual distinctions may erode the validity of some of the assumptions associ-
ated with modern software safety standards [64]. The shift in the importance of aspects
of the system’s design away from traditional software engineering concerns will be partic-
ularly problematic. In Chapter 2 the results of the DeepXplore study into the analysis
of Deep Learning (DL) systems for autonomous vehicles were outlined. In this work, the
researchers highlighted that conventional software testing strategies were inadequate for
the task of assuring the functional behaviour of a DL system. This research indicated that
despite achieving complete code coverage of the DL system, less than 10% of the system’s
model space was explored: there remained nearly 90% of the model’s behaviours that were
unexplored by conventional code-structure focussed testing [113]. As discussed in Chapter
3, in many cases it is the models that drive these systems that should be considered to be
the primary determinant of their functional behaviour.
Moreover, the complexity and scope of many of the applications of AISs introduces
additional assurance considerations: the altered role of the environment and the related
operational context upon the behaviour of an AIS may further erode the validity of some
of the assumptions underpinning existing software engineering best practices. This is
particularly true for those activities and standards that make very strong assumptions
about the relationship of a software system to its operational environment [81].
For example, aviation safety standards may be particularly exposed to these assurance
concerns: they have long assumed that the operational environment is highly regulated
and that the software systems are relatively ‘closed off’ to this environment. Both of these
assumptions will be challenged with modern AISs – many of these systems are (sometimes
dynamically) modelling their environments and receiving feedback from the environments
they operate in. This can create an information challenges associated with the interaction
of an AIS with their operating environments [81,176,177].
Furthermore, the nature of BNSs is such that they actively integrate highly uncertain
information into their design, development and functionality [2]. As discussed in previous
chapters, the lifecycle of a BNS is commonly characterised by highly iterative development
practices and may require a significant degree of empirical and statistical validation – the
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BN models are ultimately probabilistic representations of some aspects of the world and
can often only be validated against the world [1, 2, 22]. Standard approaches of ‘oﬄine’
software testing will be of limited use in identifying or mitigating hazards in many cases.
In this sense the development of a BNS introduces considerations more akin to those
common to hardware engineers, with reliability quoted statistically and verified through
‘physical’ testing. This raises two points:
1. The complexity and scope of modern AI applications coupled with the technical
properties of the AI approaches themselves will generally limit the utility of defining
a concrete set of development activities or prescriptive practices for these systems.
Constraints on the development and implementation of these systems may actually
hinder the capabilities of a BNS and the constraints may compromise the effec-
tiveness (and safety and/or security) of the system. The inclination to apply such
constraints to a BNS or AIS may inadvertently introduce more error modes than
they may mitigate [178].1
2. The non-deterministic properties of these systems will further limit the ability of
safety practitioners in applying conventional software assurance activities during
the development of a BNS. It may not be possible to unequivocally satisfy some pre-
defined set of objectives: the satisfaction of objectives will be more heavily based
upon statistical confidence in the behaviour of a system as opposed to the concrete
Boolean satisfaction of objectives common to conventional software systems. It may
not be possible to know a priori the statistical confidence that is necessary and/or
achievable prior to the development and implementation of the system [2,6].
These points are generally symptomatic of standard BNS development lifecycles as
being more of a ‘dark art’ than a traditional engineering process [2]. The development
of a performant BNS requires an uncommon degree of latitude on the part of the BN
developer in making design decisions for a given system. Many of these design decisions
will only become known as development progresses. This indicates that any guidance on
the assurance of a BNS should focus on providing a flexible framework that accommodates
the iterative and somewhat erratic lifecycle that can typify BNS development activities.
1From a technical perspective, the introduction of additional constraints on a model may introduce
problems with errors arising from high bias and over-regularisation. Chapter 2 discusses some of these
aspects in more detail.
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It is essential that the rationale for the use of specific techniques is made explicit, and the
relevance of any information produced by these techniques is disseminated to all applicable
stakeholders.
5.3 An Evidence Framework for BNSs
Accommodating novel designs or applications is not a problem unique to BNSs. There
are many well-known problems within the safety domain in mapping existing software
safety standards and certification practices to the development of unconventional sys-
tems [179, 180]. There have also been problems with the certification of legacy systems –
those systems that were developed prior to the introduction of a certain standard or set
of assurance practices and therefore cannot easily be brought into retroactive compliance
with a given standard [181]. This has driven interest in establishing standards that avoid
highly prescriptive and inflexible approaches to safety. One approach that has become
increasingly accepted within the safety engineering community is that of evidence-based
safety standards. These approaches provide reduced prescriptive guidance for assurance
activities in favour of emphasising the explicit discussion of the rationale behind the ac-
tivities and safety lifecycle adopted for a given system. Proponents of this approach to
system safety propose two primary benefits:
• The approach supports the direct mapping of safety goals to evidence, enabling
the explicit consideration of the sufficiency of individual items of evidence in the
satisfaction of individual safety goals.
• The approach avoids the late-stage (and costly) re-development work sometimes
associated with failing to meet prescriptive standards.
Practically, these are attractive benefits in the context of developing BNSs. As dis-
cussed throughout this thesis, the development of a BNS includes a number of activities
and design decisions that may prove resistant to the application of conventional software
engineering practices: the BN model design, development and evaluation phases of a BNS’s
lifecycle are often characterised by their highly iterative nature. This can make traditional
requirements decomposition activities both challenging and potentially inefficient. This
also means that the techniques or evaluation activities (and associated evaluation metrics)
that will be used by assurance practitioners may not be known until well into the system’s
development lifecycle [2, 6, 66].
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So called ‘evidence-based’ approaches to assurance may therefore provide a more ap-
propriate means of assuring BNSs: they ensure that the rationale for specific development
and evaluation techniques is made explicit (and by extension avoid mandating the use of
techniques or practices that may be irrelevant or uninformative to a given application).
This more readily accommodates the shifting design decisions and evaluation techniques
employed during the development of a BNS and the more ‘dynamic’ lifecycles of these
systems.
While many industry standards still adopt prescriptive approaches to system safety,
standards are being introduced that encourage or require evidence-based approaches to
assurance. Perhaps the most significant of these is the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD)
Defence Standard 00-056 (DS 00-056). This standard focusses on defining a set of safety
goals that are then refined for a specific system. It does not mandate a set of processes for
the satisfaction of these goals but instead demands that an argument is made to justify
the use of items of evidence in the satisfaction of these goals. Furthermore, DS 00-056
discusses the characteristics of evidence used in the satisfaction of a given safety goal. For
example, it states:
“Explicit, objective evidence [items] are more compelling than those that appeal
to judgement, custom or practice.”
This statement alludes to the implicit underlying hierarchy of evidence: not all items
of safety evidence are created equal [70]. This hierarchy should be extended to evidence
generated for the assurance of a BNS: a BN model walkthrough may not be as compelling
as evidence for the presence of a given behaviour as an extensive analytical evaluation
of a BN model’s dynamics. However, it may not be technically possible or feasible to
produce exhaustive analytical evaluations of a BNS, and so reliance on expert testimony
may be unavoidable or even desirable in some cases. Understanding the interplay of
evidence – what is feasible, available and sufficient – requires a framework for describing
and understanding the relationship of evidence to the capabilities and limitations of the
techniques that generate them, and to the objective the item of evidence addresses.
5.3.1 Evidence Characteristics
Discussing the characteristics of an item of evidence is somewhat unconventional [70,100].
As indicated previously, the role of evidence (and the associated rationale behind a given
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item of evidence) is not commonly discussed in many current software safety standards
[100]. From a safety perspective, the assurance of a BNS will require the generation
of items of safety evidence that are highly novel, abstract and BN-specific. Ensuring
the transparency of the rationale behind the generation of an item of evidence and its
relationship to a given goal or objective is therefore essential. In particular, ensuring that
BN developers and assurance practitioners can effectively communicate about these novel
items of evidence in the context of the safety of a BNS is key.
One approach to achieving this is to adopt a set of evidence characteristics for describ-
ing safety evidence generated for the assurance of a BNS. These can be used to provide a
generic framework for discussing and communicating the rationale and role of evidence in
the context of a given system. A number of evidence characteristics have been proposed
within the safety engineering literature. Rather than develop a new set of evidence char-
acteristics, this chapter instead adopts the evidence characteristics as proposed by Weaver
et al. These are defined as follows:
• Relevance - The extent to which the evidence directly addresses the software safety
goal.
• Coverage - The proportion of the software safety goal which the evidence addresses.
• Independence - The extent to which complementary evidence follow diverse ap-
proaches to fulfilling the requirement for evidence.
Two further characteristics are also adopted from the work of Menon et al. These are:
• Trustworthiness - The likelihood that the evidence is free from errors.
• Replicability - The ease with which the evidence could be replicated.
In the context of Weaver’s work, the former set of characteristics were defined with
respect to the relationship of an item of evidence to a safety goal. In the context of this
chapter, these five characteristics are used to describe role of evidence in the satisfaction of
RM-BNS verification and validation objectives. The satisfaction of an individual objective
may rely upon several distinct items of evidence, each of which addresses a specific aspect
of that objective.
For example, it is common practice within the BN domain to apply a suite of evaluation
techniques to a BN model without providing any explicit rationale for why these techniques
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were used and what specifically has been demonstrated as a result [73, 75]. Furthermore,
few BN evaluation techniques and development frameworks adopt a parallel adversarial
position on the evaluation of a system in order to explicitly consider the weaknesses of
the evaluation techniques used: considerations such as the coverage, replicability and
trustworthiness of evidence is rarely explicitly discussed.
In the context of BNSs, each of these five characteristics should be explicitly associated
with every item of safety evidence generated during the development of a system. While
the definitions provided by Menon and Weaver are sufficiently general to be applied to
evidence generated for BNSs, there are a number of additional considerations relevant
to BNSs. To illustrate this, Table 5.1 re-defines these characteristics in the context of
the RM-BNS objectives, and provides high-level examples of key considerations related to
each characteristic.
Perhaps the two most important considerations shown in Table 5.1 are those related to
the Coverage and Trustworthiness characteristics respectively. These characteristics touch
on two aspects of AI development that are increasingly recognised as key considerations
in the development of safety-critical AI systems. The former characteristic has conceptual
links to the work of the DeepXplore team and others within the AI community. These
teams are developing techniques that adopt new notions of coverage that specifically target
key aspects of AISs [113, 166]. These techniques can be regarded as falling under a new
category of coverage testing: ‘Model Coverage Testing ’. From this perspective, many of
these techniques may also be mapped onto the notion of Coverage as defined here with
respect to the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint objectives: the degree of evidential coverage
may be closely related to the Model Coverage established by BNS developers.
The latter characteristic explicitly addresses common issues with misleading or flawed
evaluation outputs – outputs that may be used as safety evidence in safety-critical BNSs.
An example of the considerations exposed by this characteristic would be that of the Tank
Detection AIS introduced in Chapter 3. This AIS encountered issues with underlying
biases in the data and the development process that produced evidence that provided
false-confidence in the system’s behaviours.
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Table 5.1: Evidence characteristics and example considerations for evidence generating techniques in BNS development.
Characteristic Description Example Considerations
Relevance The extent to which the evidence directly ad-
dresses the RM-BNS objective.
(a) In what specific way does a given technique produce evidence that
addresses a given objective?
(b) Are there any alternative techniques that may produce more relevant
evidence for a given objective?
Coverage The proportion of the RM-BNS objective which
the evidence addresses.
(a) What degree of Model coverage has been established?
(b) What factors influence the evidential coverage of a given technique?
Independence The extent to which complementary items of ev-
idence follow diverse approaches to fulfilling a
given RM-BNS objective.
(a) To what degree is an evaluation technique vulnerable to technical
limitations that are shared with other techniques used to address the
same objective?
(b) What degree of correlation exists between the items of evidence
generated by two or more techniques used to address the same objective?
Trustworthiness The likelihood that the evidence is free from er-
rors.
(a) In what ways can the evaluation technique be ‘fooled’?
(b) In what ways can an item of evidence be misleading?
Replicability The degree to which the evidence could be in-
dependently replicated.
(a) What factors may influence the replicability of the evidence gener-
ated by a given technique?
(b) Are there alternative (more replicable) methods for generating evi-
dence?
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Examples of other considerations related to this characteristic include whether or not
an evaluation technique controls for problems related to ‘reward hacking’, or more generally
the degree to which an evaluation technique is exposed to technical issues related to so-
called ‘class-biases’ or other related problems.2
The remaining three characteristics are also important considerations when generating
safety evidence for BNSs. Of these three, the Replicability characteristic may be the most
challenging aspect for BN developers and assurance practitioners to address. Many of
the problems for which BNSs are used are inherently uncertain, and in many cases the
assurance of these systems is likely to be at least partially dependent on testing activities
that cannot be wholly replicable. This is once again a distinction between conventional
software systems and BNSs. This characteristic is therefore aimed at exposing these
considerations in the context of the safety evidence.
5.3.2 Evidence Classifications
These evidence characteristics have been selected to encourage the recognition and de-
scription of the limitations and implications of BNS evaluation and testing activities in
the production of safety evidence for safety-critical BNSs. By explicitly describing every
item of safety evidence in terms of the evidence characteristics, the role of an item of
evidence and the rationale behind its use in the satisfaction of a given objective should be
more readily exposed to BN developers and assurance practitioners.
However, as outlined in DS 00-056, there is a ‘hierarchy of evidence’ to consider when
assuring a system. This is particularly important when considering a BNS – the context
and application of a BNS will dramatically alter the availability and scope of possible
evaluation techniques and associated items of evidence. Having the ability to explicitly
articulate this hierarchy is therefore the next step in describing the role of evidence in
BNSs. One approach to developing such a hierarchy is to rely on evidence classifications.
There are several existing evidence classification frameworks within the safety domain
[76, 100, 184]. As was the case with the evidence characteristics, this chapter adopts two
of these existing classifications instead of introducing a proprietary BN-specific set of
classifications. These classifications have been selected (and modified where appropriate)
to maximise the relevance of the classifications to BNS safety-evidence. The first set of
2Good discussions of the concepts of ‘reward-hacking’ and ‘class-bias’ can be found in [63,182] and [183].
An overview of the possible safety impact of ‘reward-hacking’ can be found in [21].
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classifications addresses the type of evidence items and is drawn from the classifications
proposed in the SHIP [185]. The classifications are defined as follows:
• Deterministic – Relying upon axioms, logic, and proof.
• Statistical – Relying upon probabilities and statistical analysis. 3
• Qualitative – Relying upon adherence to standards, design codes etc.
These three classifications provide enough information to begin to develop a basic
hierarchy of evidence: evidence produced by Deterministic techniques should be prioritised
over evidence produced by either Statistical or Qualitative methods. Similarly, Statistical
techniques should generally be favoured over Qualitative techniques. However, establishing
the relationship of an item of evidence to a given verification and validation objective is
also necessary to establish context for that evidence.
For example, an analysis of a model’s structure may provide Deterministic evidence
of a particular property. This may suggest that this item of evidence should have prece-
dent over evidence associated with the two other classifications. However, this can mask
important information. The evidence generated by this process may only indirectly ad-
dress a given objective or may require additional evidence to provide supporting context
to the implications of the evidence. In these cases, evidence that more directly addresses
an objective may be prioritised by developers – even if this other evidence is classified
as belonging to one of the other two classes. Three further classifications are therefore
adopted here to capture these additional considerations. The classifications are adopted
from Weaver and are defined as follows [76]:
• Direct – evidence that directly shows the [verification and validation objective] is
fulfilled.4
• Backing – evidence that shows that the direct evidence is soundly based.
3This classification was defined in [185] as the Probabilistic classification. Given the overloaded use of
this term in the context of probabilistic graphical models – and therefore BNSs – it has been renamed here
to ‘Statistical’ evidence. It is felt this also more appropriately captures the nature of many BNS analysis
techniques.
4The definition refers to safety goals. To support the clarity of the content of this chapter, this has
been substituted for the verification and validation objective.
151
Chapter 5: From Objectives to Evidence
• Reinforcement – evidence that shows that direct evidence can be extrapolated to
meet higher integrity requirements than can be met with direct evidence alone.
To distinguish between these two classifications, the former set of classifications will be
referred to as the Evidence Type Classification (ETC), while the latter set of classifications
are referred to as the Evidence Role Classification (ERC). Together, these classifications
can be used to provide a more expressive hierarchy of evidence. In general, those items of
evidence that are both Direct and Deterministic will be the most desirable as they should
be fully replicable and most closely align with the sentiment expressed in DS 00-056.
However, much of the evidence associated with the assurance of the BN Model Viewpoint
will fall into the Statistical classification, and the processes used to generate these items
of evidence will influence their evidence classifications.
5.3.3 Evidence-Generating Processes
There are a plethora of AI- and BN-specific techniques that can be employed during
the development and evaluation of a BNS with a similarly extensive variety of metrics
and considerations associated with their use [2, 65]. Assigning an ETC to an item of
evidence (and by extension to the evidence-generating process that produced it) may
therefore become challenging for assurance practitioners. This section looks at a selection
of evidence-generating techniques commonly used during BNS development and evaluation
and classifies them according to the ETC of the evidence they produce.
5.3.3.1 Statistical Processes
Within the BN domain, the most prevalent form of analysis and evaluation techniques are
those that produce statistical information. In the context of BNSs used for diagnostic and
prognostic applications, two of the most widely used techniques that produce items of ev-
idence that fall into this classification are Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
analysis, and Cross Validation (CV) testing. Both of these techniques can be used to as-
sess and compare the diagnostic performance of a given BN model against other diagnostic
models, or to tune a single model to meet the required performance characteristics.
In the case of the ROC analyses, the aim is to quantify (and typically visualise) the
trade-off of a given model in terms of the rate of occurrence of true-positives with respect
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to false-positives.5 Simpler accuracy metrics may provide misleading indications of the
performance of a system. For example, a model that is designed to diagnose a single disease
may end up diagnosing every patient as having that disease. The accuracy metric for how
often such a model correctly diagnoses the disease in a patient can be 100%. However, the
false-positive rate would be very high, and the corresponding diagnostic power of the BN
would therefore be very low – despite the seemingly impressive headline statistic.
Figure 5.1: A comparison of two Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves used to
evaluate two diagnostic models.
The visualisation of these analyses is generally achieved using a ROC curve. These
curves can be used to evaluate and tune the diagnostic performance of a BN model [186].
Figure 5.1 shows an example curve for two simple BN models. Qualitatively, the closer
the ROC curve is to the top left corner in Figure 5.1, the higher the performance of a
diagnostic model. More technically, the area under the curve (AUC) of each of these ROC
curves provides a single metric for the diagnostic performance of each of these models –
the larger the value the better the model.
5In this context, a true-positive reflects a correct diagnosis, while a false-positive reflects a specific type
of incorrect diagnosis.
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Consequently, given the information in Figure 5.1 a BN developer is likely to favour the
selection and use of Model A over Model B for this task. From an assurance perspective,
these analyses may be used to evaluate safety trade-offs between model architectures. As
is often the case in the safety domain, the safety implications of a false-positive (e.g. ‘drug
administered when not required’) may have radically different implications than a false-
negative in a given context and vice versa. The ROC curves and ROC metrics can be used
to directly address these considerations from a model-centric perspective.
A second prominent analysis technique in the AI domain is so-called Cross Validation
(CV) testing. The aim of these analyses is not to simply assess the diagnostic performance
of a model, but to assess the generality of the model.6 This helps to ensure that a model
is developed in such a way that it is not excessively sensitive to the data used to train it.
A practical example of this may occur in a medical diagnosis setting. For example, a
diagnostic model may become extremely accurate at making diagnoses within the patient
data used to train it. However, it may be extremely poor when applied to patient cases
outside of this data. Models that demonstrate such behaviours are said to have ‘overfit’ to
their training data. A rough analogy to human learning would be the distinction between
‘rote learning’ and learning a deeper understanding of a problem: generally, the former
should be deprecated in favour of the latter. The same is true for BNs and other AI
techniques.
From an assurance perspective, CV testing can be used to provide confidence in the
behavioural characteristics of a BN model outside of the cases used to design and train it.
In general, CV testing can help to ensure the robustness of the representation of a domain
learned by a BN. However, CV testing should not be used alone except in the most trivial
of use-cases (or in the context of this thesis: the lowest criticality models). This is because
CV testing will not identify biases that persist across all available data, certain forms of
human biases in the model development process and generally will not mitigate issues
related to the evolution of a domain over time [63, 187, 188, 189]. It may be possible to
adapt existing CV testing techniques to target safety-related model aspects – perhaps
through the integration of information derived from a Model Criticality Analysis (MCA)
or similar technique. Such a modification may prioritise the generality of safety-related
model aspects over the broader notions of generality currently used in CV testing.
6CV testing is sometimes referred to as out-of-sample testing as it involves exposing a model to ‘unseen’
data instances.
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As the classification suggests, both of these analyses are fundamentally based upon
statistical assessments of the behaviours and properties of a model. They each address
complementary but distinct BNS development considerations. Evidence generated using
these techniques is associated with a degree of inherent aleatoric uncertainty, and the
evidence produced will not generally be in a Boolean format. There will be explicit uncer-
tainty in the utilisation of these techniques for the satisfaction of any goals or objectives
targeting BN model aspects. In many cases, the bulk of the safety evidence generated for
the assurance of a BN model will be derived from evidence generating processes of this
class. Unlike conventional software systems, there is therefore a possibility of generating
meaningful failure rate statistics for BNSs.
5.3.3.2 Deterministic Processes
Processes that are associated with the production of items of evidence that are designated
as Deterministic according to the ETC definitions share some similarities with evaluation
and analysis techniques commonly referred to as ‘Formal Methods’ within the software
engineering domain. Two of the most prominent techniques that produce this class of
evidence are some forms of sensitivity analysis and a group of techniques that could be
described as ‘independence analyses’. Both groups of techniques are based upon exact
mathematical proofs of the properties of BN models.
In the case of sensitivity analyses, there are a range of techniques available to practi-
tioners. Of these, a subset of techniques focus on establishing constraints on parameters
within a BN model. For example, they can be used to guarantee certain parameters within
a BN model fall within a certain range, or provide information on what value other pa-
rameters must take in order to produce certain behaviours in a model [190]. From an
assurance perspective, these techniques can be used to provide evidence that a BN model
cannot produce certain behaviours. However, they should typically be used alongside
other evidence that indicates why the absence of such behaviours is desirable.
The second group of ‘Deterministic Processes’ – independence analyses – broadly fo-
cus on identifying similarities and distinctions between one or more BN models, and on
providing mathematical proof of the independence properties of these models. For ex-
ample, they can be used to demonstrate that a group of BN models share independence
relationships such that one model may be a more complex super-set of the variables in a
second model. They may also be used to show that a variable within a model can never
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interact with other variables within that model, and can provide the precise mathemat-
ical states in which this holds true. For assurance practitioners, this could be used to
demonstrate unequivocally that Safety-Related Variables within a model are always con-
ditionally independent of a set of variables for which limited safety evidence is available.
Practically, this may mean that structures within a BN model are compartmentalised into
those that are strictly safety-related, and those that are not, and the mathematical con-
texts in which these two parts of the model may interact are precisely defined and used
to justify modelling decisions related to the structure and parameterisation of a model.
5.3.3.3 Qualitative Processes
Finally, there are two prominent examples of qualitative evaluation activities commonly
used during the development of a BNS. A popular approach to the evaluation of BN
models in some applications is to perform a model walkthrough with one or more domain
experts. A BN model is often transparent to non-BN developers: in many contexts, experts
may interpret the structure and parameterisation of a model with guidance from the BN
development team. In this approach, an expert can assess the degree to which a BN model
conforms to their knowledge of the domain being modelled. As in other domains, using
multiple independent walkthroughs should be favoured in order to mitigate the risk of
oversights, biases or other errors on the part of the assessing expert [61,64,121]. However,
this is not always a straightforward task, especially for larger BN models [61].
Therefore, an alternative approach has been to develop tools that enable a BN model
to ‘explain’ its reasoning given a test case. This can be used to produce an explanation
of a model’s properties and behaviours in natural language [191]. This can eliminate the
need for a detailed review of underlying mathematical constructs in some contexts and
can enable a higher-level review of how a model aligns with expert knowledge: it can be
used to produce sets of explanations that can be divided between multiple experts, which
in turn can reduce the burden when assessing large models [61,191].
A second evaluation technique comes from the Expert Systems (ES) domain. Knowl-
edge Base Reviews (KBRs) are frequently advocated as an essential part of the devel-
opment of an ES [85, 192, 193]. In the context of a modern BNS, the aim of a KBR is
to provide a detailed review of all data artefacts available pertaining to the ES being
developed. Part of the motivation for this is the reduction of the epistemic uncertainty
associated with capturing the reasoning of experts within a software system. In particu-
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lar, ES developers aim to identify potential gaps in the knowledge of the experts used to
develop the ES. This can include inconsistencies in expert opinion or data artefacts, as
well as identifying more general epistemic uncertainties relating to potential practical or
fundamental limitations o knowledge or data relating to a given domain.
In the utilisation of BNs for ES roles, the experience of the ES developers remains
relevant. Detailed qualitative evaluations of data artefacts can be used to provide evidence
of many properties of a data artefact, including the integrity and scope of the artefact.
With respect to the structure and parameterisation, KBRs can provide evidence that a
model has captured the intended domain. Without the careful selection of data artefacts,
a BN model may be trained on a data set that does not adequately reflect the domain
being modelled. The KBR is aimed at mitigating these issues.
5.3.3.4 Mapping Evidence Classifications to Techniques
These processes represent a subset of the techniques available to BN developers. As
with any fast-growing research field, techniques are regularly adopted and modified. The
evidence classes (and evidence characteristics) were introduced as a general framework for
classifying and describing evidence generated by all of these techniques. The adoption of
the framework for the development of mission-critical BNSs could also further strengthen
the systematisation of the development of these systems. A complete enumeration of these
techniques is beyond the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, such an enumeration would
rapidly become obsolete given the pace of change and innovation within the AI domain.
Instead, Table 5.2 shows a mapping of some of the most common analysis and eval-
uation techniques applied to BNS models to their corresponding ETC. The aim here is
to provide a reference point for BN developers and assurance practitioners when describ-
ing and classifying other techniques, or modifications to existing techniques within the
table. The table does not list the ERC assignments for these processes. These can only be
meaningfully defined in the context of a given safety goal or objective that a given item
of evidence is used to address.
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Table 5.2: Technique-Evidence Mapping for Model Viewpoint
Process Classification (ETC) Evidence Items
Model Walkthroughs Qualitative Structure Review, Parameter Review, Independent Elicitation & Corrobora-
tion
Architectural Walkthroughs Qualitative Model Assumptions Review, Model Design Review, Architectural Assump-
tions Review, Model Structure Review
Uncertainty Analyses (Quali-
tative)
Qualitative Knowledge-base Review, Qualitative Risk Analysis, Data Acquisition/Man-
agement Audits
Developmental Reviews Qualitative Model Development Review, Operational Review, Developer Qualification Re-
view
Uncertainty Analyses (Statis-
tical)
Statistical Bayesian Credible Intervals, Confidence Intervals, Volatility Analyses
Quality-of-Fit Analyses Statistical Fisher-F test, Student-T test, Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, Chi-squared test, Box-
Cox test, Confusion Matrices, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Generality Tests Statistical k-Fold Cross Validation, Leave-one-out Cross Validation, AIC, BIC
Generative Analyses Statistical Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) test-case generation analysis (Implicated
Variables, Covariance Metrics [161])
Structural Analyses Deterministic Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC),
Barren Nodes, d-separation, I-map
Sensitivity Analyses Deterministic Sensitivity to Findings, Sensitivity to Parameters, Parameter Bounds Check-
ing
Robustness Testing Deterministic Model Fault Injection Performance Metrics, Adversarial Model Testing, Pa-
rameter Bounds Checking
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5.4 Relationship of RM-BNS Objectives to Evidence
In Chapter 3, a set of verification and validation objectives for BNSs was introduced.
These objectives represent generic objectives for the assurance of a BNS. As outlined in
that chapter, they require refinement to specific objectives over the course of a BNS’s
development. Each objective addresses an assurance-related aspect of a BNS’s design and
development. For each objective, multiple BN analysis and evaluation techniques may be
utilised to address it. By relating the RM-BNS objectives to BN analysis and evaluation
techniques in this way, a generic mapping of objectives and evidence can be constructed.
To illustrate the concept of this mapping process, Table 5.3 shows an example mapping
of the objectives to the techniques and associated items of evidence. The table maps a
number of generic RM-BNS objectives to corresponding generic techniques and evidence.
As with the objectives themselves, pre-emptively refining the specific variant of a technique
or the metric that will be used as an item of evidence from a technique should not be
attempted without consideration for the specific context of a given BNS and BN model,
and should therefore not occur prior to the instantiation of a system-specific RM-BNS
model.
Attempting to refine the mapping in Table 5.3 without this system-specific contextual
information may prove to be misleading and inefficient. This is because the operational,
developmental or technical context of a given BNS or BN model may preclude the use of
any number of techniques for certain objectives: the exact implications of these contexts
is unlikely to be known until development is well underway. For example, consider the
mapping for objective MV-1.1:
“Establish and justify the basis for using structural variant for the [Model].”
In Table 5.3, this objective is mapped to four general groups of evidence items that
could be used to support the satisfaction of this objective. These items may be produced
by a range of techniques and may be used in various combinations as determined by the
system-specific instantiation of an objective. As indicated, it may also be the case that for
a system-specific objective, only a subset of techniques – and therefore items of evidence
– will be available to BN developers.
It is important to note that the difficulty in generating evidence items given these
techniques can vary dramatically: some items of evidence require a qualitative review by
an expert, while others demand computationally intensive simulations and evaluations.
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This of course raises the question: why not simply generate an item of evidence that is
easiest to generate? As alluded to previously, BN developers and assurance practitioners
must evaluate the confidence in the items of evidence generated by a technique. This
will involve assessing the adoption of a technique based on the evidence classification
(i.e. ETC, ERC) assigned to the evidence generated by that technique is assigned, as
well as considering the criticality of the system aspect addressed by the objective an
item of evidence is used to address. Assurance practitioners should not hold an objective
addressing a highly critical system aspect as satisfied based upon the opinion of a system
expert.
In general, assurance practitioners should favour Direct, Deterministic evidence in the
first instance. However, as indicated in the previous section, many items of evidence
generated during BN development will fall into the Statistical classification. Techniques
that generate this evidence should be considered after Deterministic evidence, but prior
to Qualitative evidence. Typically, it will be necessary to adopt multiple items of evidence
to ensure comprehensive evidential coverage of an objective [70]. The selection of evidence
should be performed in conjunction with the assessment of criticality. Example heuristics
for utilising evidence based upon MCA-derived criticality metrics will be introduced in
subsequent sections.
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Table 5.3: Objective-Evidence Mapping for Model Viewpoint (Structure View)
Identifier Objective Process Evidence Item
MV-1.1 Establish and justify the basis for using
the structural variant for the [Model].
Model Walkthrough Structure Review
Uncertainty Analysis
(Qualitative)
Knowledge-base Review, Qualitative Risk Analysis
Quality-of-Fit Analysis Fisher-F test, Student-T test, Kolmogrov-Smirnov test,
Chi-squared test, Box-Cox test, Confusion Matrices, Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
Structural Analyses Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC), Barren Nodes, d-separation, I-map
MV-1.2 Establish and justify the any assump-
tions in the structure of the [Model].
Model Walkthrough Structure Review
Uncertainty Analysis
(Qualitative)
Knowledge-base Review, Operational Context Review
Quality-of-Fit Analysis Statistical Test Scores (e.g. Fisher-F, Student-T,
Kolmogrov-Smirnov, Chi-squared)
Structural Analyses AIC, BIC, Barren Nodes, d-separation, I-map
Architecture Walkthrough System Design Review, Architectural Assumptions Re-
view, Model Independence relations
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Table 5.3: Objective-Evidence Mapping for Model Viewpoint (Structure View, continued)
Identifier Objective Process Evidence Item
Development Reviews Model Development Review, Developer Qualification Re-
view
MV-1.3 Establish and justify the implemented
structure of the [Model].
Model Walkthrough Structure Review
Sensitivity Analysis Sensitivity to Findings, Sensitivity to Parameters
Dependency Analysis I-map, d-separation
Dev. Process Analyses Model Assumptions Review, Developer Qualification Re-
view, Modelling Setup Review
Structural Complexity
Analyses
Information Criterion Metrics (e.g. Akaike, Bayesian),
Model Complexity Score (e.g. Fisher-F score)
MV-1.4 Establish and justify confidence in the
structure of the [Model].
Model Walkthrough Structure Review
Architecture Walkthrough System Design Review, Architectural Assumptions Re-
view, Model Independence relations
Dev. Process Analyses Model Assumptions Review, Developer Qualification Re-
view, Modelling Setup Review
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To illustrate this point, consider the following two example BNSs:
System A - A BNS developed to reason about the population dynamics and ecological
properties of a region (similar to the work of Pollino et al) [59].
System B - A BNS developed for information-discovery that models biological and
chemical interactions in drug-discovery tasks, and that utilises a number of ‘hidden’
nodes within its structure to improve certain model performance attributes [40].
In the case of the first application (System A), it is typical for developers to have access
to only very limited quantities of data: the development of BNs for ecological modelling
applications is often mired in challenges associated with the absence of data on certain
ecological variables. Information on the populations of certain fauna or flora, or other
environmental data is often scarce [59]. In these cases, developers may be limited only
to items of evidence derived from Qualitative processes. An example of a system-specific
version of objective MV-1.1 could be generated for the model outlined in the work of
Pollino et al, and would be defined as follows:
Establish and justify the basis for using a multivariate normal distribution for
the ‘Current Diversity of Fish Population’ Random Variable.
In this work, this variable was highlighted as a variable for which no quantitative
information was available during development. It is therefore likely that expert evalu-
ations – model walkthroughs – would constitute the majority of the evidence available
for the satisfaction of this specific objective. This evidence would be classified as direct,
qualitative evidence. This indicates that it may be particularly necessary to evaluate the
trustworthiness of a given item of evidence in circumstances such as this, and to focus on
establishing the diversity of expert opinion on the BN aspect. It also raises the consid-
eration of whether or not an assurance practitioner should tolerate the inclusion of this
model aspect in the first instance.
The second example BNS (System B) may present the opposite problem: the model
generated entirely through parameter and structure learning approaches that minimise the
ability of a human expert to pass judgement on the nature of the model in question. A
variable within this model may have no semantic value and may be used only as a purely
abstract mathematical modelling tool. For example, an example system-specific version
of objective MV-1.1 for this application could be defined as follows:
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Establish and justify the basis for using a NoisyOR distribution for the ‘Latent
Variable A’ Random Variable.
In this circumstance, evidence derived from model walkthroughs may be impossible
to produce, or otherwise uninformative; empirical testing, statistical analysis and math-
ematical proofs may therefore be the only route open to generating evidence to satisfy
this objective. From an assurance perspective, both of these circumstances have relative
advantages and disadvantages. In cases such as System A, assurance practitioners can
gain a transparent understanding of a BN model from an expert’s perspective. However,
this will lack the mathematical rigour and statistical insights that are generally desirable
for BNSs, and these items of evidence are likely to be exposed to the standard human
biases and errors that commonly accompany expert elicitation activities [61, 116]. In the
case of System B, the availability of data can ensure a stronger mathematical basis for
the testing of the system’s BN models, though the implications of the output of these
techniques may be hard to translate into meaningful assurance insights.
5.4.1 Refining Objectives and Evidence
In the context of developing a mission-critical BNS, BN developers must therefore carefully
consider what techniques and items of evidence are available to their specific system, and
the implications of this information for the assurance of that system. In general, the
diversity of applications and development contexts in which BNSs have been – and will
continue to be – developed limits the availability or relevance of specific techniques and
evidence for a given objective. In general, only a subset of possible techniques and their
corresponding items of evidence will be used in the satisfaction of any given system-specific
objective. A lower-level objective-evidence mapping is therefore unlikely to be meaningful
until the development of a BNS is well underway.
Establishing this subset of techniques and associated items of evidence requires the
refinement of the mapping in Table 5.3 in parallel with the refinement of the RM-BNS
objectives as outlined in Chapter 3 and the development of the BNS more broadly. The
general process for this refinement is shown in Figure 5.2. Assurance practitioners will
begin with the generic RM-BNS objectives provided in Chapter 3 and the framework
outlined in this chapter. They will then iteratively refine this mapping over the course of
the development of the BNS.
The previous section indicated how two example systems (Systems A and B) could be
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Figure 5.2: The objective-evidence refinement process.
associated with system-specific instantiations of the same objective (MV-1.1), and how
the techniques associated with each of these instantiations may vary. By considering the
context and technical basis of these objectives, BN developers and assurance practitioners
can then identify specific technique variants and items of evidence that may be used to
satisfy them. This can produce a refined mapping of objectives to their associated evidence
items and techniques.
Table 5.4 shows an example of a refined, system-specific objective-evidence mapping
for objective MV-1.1 in the context of Systems A and B. From an assurance practitioner’s
perspective, this mapping provides insight into what evidence is available, and by compar-
ing the mapping to the technique-evidence mapping in Table 5.2 (specifically the evidence
classifications), an understanding of how compelling this evidence may be can be ob-
tained. The quality and integrity of the evidence can be described and assessed, but the
sufficiency of this evidence must still be addressed. This can be achieved by understanding
the criticality of a given objective.
5.4.2 Integrating Criticality Metrics
In Chapter 4, the Model Criticality Analysis (MCA) approach to analysing BN model
aspects was introduced. This approach can be used to provide an assessment of the
criticality of BN models and their components. As the metrics produced by MCA are
associated directly with individual models and model aspects, these metrics can be mapped
across to system-specific instantiations of the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint objectives. By
extension, these metrics can be used to generate an objective-evidence mapping.
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Table 5.4: Refined objective-evidence mapping.
Objective
ID
Objective Processes Evidence Item
... ... ... ...
MV-1.1-A Establish and justify the basis for
using a multivariate normal distri-
bution for the ‘Current Diversity of
Fish Population’ Random Variable.
Independent Walkthroughs of Ecological Model
of Fish Populations (Global) definition and
scope, Independent Walkthroughs of definition
and scope of ‘Current Diversity of Fish Popula-
tion’ variable.
Expert Opinion
... ... ... ...
MV-1.1-B Establish and justify the basis for
using a NoisyOR distribution for the
‘Latent Variable A’ Random Vari-
able.
Empirical testing of the Drug Discovery model
(global), statistical analysis of ‘Latent Variable
A’, Structural analysis of the NoisyOR distribu-
tion for ‘Latent Variable A’, parameter bounds
checking for ‘Latent Variable A’.
Statistical Metrics, Em-
pirical Results, Mathe-
matical Proof
... ... ... ...
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For example, MCA could be used to assess the previously introduced BNS ‘System A’.
This would produce a Model Criticality Index (MCI) for the BN in System A, and a set
of Variable Criticality Indices (VCIs) for each variable in the BN model. Each of these
indices could then be mapped directly onto the RM-BNS objectives associated with the
model aspect. Consider again the ‘Current Diversity of Fish Population’ Random Variable
in System A’s BN model. The application of the MCA methodology to System A’s BN
models will assign this variable a VCI. This VCI can then be assigned to all system-specific
RM-BNS objectives that directly address this variable. Given the additional information
from the MCA, this could be used to produce a mapping such as that shown in Table 5.5.
The consideration of additional criticality metrics for other system aspects associated
with the remaining RM-BNS Viewpoints is beyond the scope of this chapter. However,
there many existing approaches to establishing the criticality of software systems. For
example, methodologies for establishing the criticality of software components are pro-
posed in the defence standard MIL-STD-882E [167]. Other techniques for establishing the
criticality of broader system aspects are provided or discussed in [94, 194] and [195, 196].
The Data Safety Guidance document also provides approaches to establishing notions of
risk for data items [144]. Extensions to this guidance may enable its integration with the
techniques presented here.
These techniques can be used to produce criticality metrics that can be mapped to other
RM-BNS objectives, and by extension the associated evidence and evidence classifications.
Figure 5.3 shows an updated representation of the refinement process for the objective-
evidence mapping that includes the criticality analyses introduced here.
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Table 5.5: Refined objective-evidence mapping with integrated criticality metrics.
RM-BNS
Object
Objective
ID
Objective Criticality Process Evidence Item Type
(ETC)
Role
(ERC)
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Current
Diversity
of Fish
Population
(RV)
MV-1.1-A Establish and justify
the basis for using a
multivariate normal
distribution for the
‘Current Diversity
of Fish Population’
Random Variable.
VCI-4 Model
Walk-
through
Two independently
elicited expert opinions
on the use of the given
statistical model to
represent the variable.
Qualitative Direct
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
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Figure 5.3: The objective-evidence refinement process with integrated criticality metrics.
5.5 Establishing the Sufficiency of BNS Assurance Efforts
Achieving ‘absolute safety’ for a given system is impossible. Assurance practitioners focus
on establishing the safety of a system in terms of confidence in the safety of a system’s
behaviour. This is typically predicated upon establishing the sufficiency of the activities
and processes carried out during the development of a system. As discussed in Chapter
2, strategies aimed at establishing confidence in a system can broadly be divided into two
principal groups: those strategies that derive confidence from compliance with a given
safety standard, and those that derive confidence through the development of argument-
based assurance documents. In the context of BNSs, there are no existing standards that
adequately address the considerations necessary to assure them – though as discussed
there is extensive guidance on establishing confidence in the more conventional software
aspects of a BNS. Similarly, while an argument-driven approach to assurance could (in
principle) be more flexible, the absence of existing guidance on what safety practitioners
should look for (and why), and techniques for the safety-focussed analysis and evaluation
of BNSs, also renders these approaches potentially problematic.
The intention of this thesis has been to outline a structured framework for the descrip-
tion of BNSs, and an approach to addressing the BNS-specific assurance considerations
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associated with these systems. The objectives introduced in Chapter 3 and the safety-
focussed analysis technique introduced in Chapter 4 have been integrated in this chapter
alongside an evidence classification framework based on best-practices in existing work.
The resulting framework is aimed at providing the basic components for an approach to
building up a comprehensive picture of the state of confidence in a BNS. Within the scope
of the work presented here, the criticality of the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint aspects of a
given BNS can be established and mapped to system-specific objectives.
In the software safety domain, the sufficiency of assurance efforts is often established
with respect to some pre-defined set of goals or objectives. Commonly, the number and
associated rigour of the objectives varies according to the risk associated with the operation
of a given system. In the case of BNSs, the sufficiency of assurance efforts will be predicated
on at least two factors: the variability of the objectives themselves, and the approach
adopted to the satisfaction of the RM-BNS objectives.
5.5.1 Variability of RM-BNS Objectives
The properties of the techniques used to analyse and evaluate a BNS are atypical of con-
ventional software analysis and testing techniques. Perhaps the most important distinction
between BNS testing techniques and conventional software testing techniques is the heavy
reliance on Statistical evidence produced during BNS testing. This has important conse-
quences for the satisfaction of objectives dependent upon these techniques. For example,
consider again the objective MV-1.1:
“Establish and justify the basis for using [structural variant] for the [Model].”
At a high-level, the motivation for this objective is to establish the necessity for a given
Model, and the appropriateness of the selected structural variant. The satisfaction of this
objective will regularly be predicated on providing compelling Statistical evidence of the
properties of a given Model structure. For example, the ROC analysis outlined in section
5.3.3.1 could be used to compare the selected structure against alternative structures. This
could be used alongside some form of CV testing to justify the selection of a given variant.
However, from a technical perspective, the satisfaction of the objective based upon
evidence produced by these two techniques will not be a Boolean proposition: the depth
of analysis and evaluation activities that may be performed to address an objective will
often be variable. For example, in the case of CV testing, there are a number of ‘levers’
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that an assurance practitioner may control: they may choose to change the number of
‘folds’ in a dataset, the cross-validation variant, the measure-of-fit, or the target threshold
for model performance, to name a few.7
Practically, CV testing will produce statistical evidence for the performance of a BN
model. The confidence associated with this measure will vary as a product of these ‘levers’:
more folds, different measures-of-fit or different model performance targets will modify
the degree of confidence gained from this technique. However, it is rarely possible to
define an objectively optimal CV testing configuration: for any given model there are
generally an extremely large number of potential CV techniques or configurations available
to developers. Consequently, the sufficiency of CV testing should only be established in
the context of a given objective, the criticality of that objective and the rationale behind
the use of the given CV testing variant or configuration.
These considerations are not limited to the techniques listed above. Many BN anal-
ysis and evaluation techniques require the exploration of extremely large parameter- or
state-spaces or otherwise may have no objectively optimal test configuration. A simple
example of such a method is the sensitivity analysis technique outlined in Chapter 4. For
large models, the application of this technique will become computationally intractable.
The question of depth is then a key consideration – it may not be possible to render the
outcomes of a BNS test down to a yes-no answer without masking important assurance
information. Another example is the selection of confidence intervals as outlined in the
previous section of this chapter. Again, the optimal analysis will be heavily dependent
on the system begin developed. This is a recurrent problem for many aspects of BNSs,
particularly those associated with the Model, Data and Computational Viewpoints. Con-
sequently, many of the RM-BNS objectives associated with these viewpoints are potentially
exposed to a high degree of variability in the efforts required to satisfy a given objective.
5.5.2 Reducing Objective Variability
One approach to eliminating or reducing this variability would be to introduce fixed target
metrics within (or associated with) the RM-BNS objectives. Many existing standards have
pre-defined quantitative targets for systems developed in compliance with that standard
7In this context, the number of folds in a CV test refers to the number of sets of unseen data a model
is tested over. Each of these folds is a subset of the dataset. A detailed review of CV testing for Machine
Learning (ML) can be found in [63].
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[69,94]. In the case of BNs and the RM-BNS objectives, it is technically possible to generate
such metrics. However, the temptation to set pre-defined quantitative targets should
generally be avoided for BNSs (and AISs more broadly). Conventional software systems
are often developed in a top-down, sequential process with designs that can be largely
defined at the outset. The development of a BNS is typically more of an iterative process
of discovery and refinement. It is rarely possible to define meaningful quantitative targets
for many aspects – particularly lower-level aspects – of a BNS prior to the development
of the system.
Awareness of the specific properties, behaviours and context of a BNS is essential if any
degree of confidence is to be derived from setting the objectives – or in this case, a given
metric. Furthermore, in cases where it is possible to produce meaningful target metrics
a priori, the wisdom of doing so is debated [77, 197]. From an assurance perspective,
the ‘dark art’ aspects of many AI development practices demands that the metrics and
evaluation techniques should be closely and explicitly coupled to the specific developmental
and operational context of the BNS. In some ways, this could be considered to be an AI-
centric manifestation of Goodhart’s Law:
“When a measure becomes an objective, it ceases to be a good measure.”
For example, an obvious target metric may be to define a minimum level of statistical
confidence for BN model aspects for varying levels of model criticality. However, the
dynamics of a specific BN model may render such metrics highly inefficient: the topology
of the model may make it highly insensitive to statistical error, thereby making the target
values excessively conservative [171]. Alternatively, the model’s topology may make it
extremely sensitive to certain forms of statistical error, which may in turn make the
target values too lenient [190]. There are documented cases of these issues in the BN
literature [2, 190]. This applies to multiple aspects of an AIS development lifecycle. This
has been noted in parallel contexts in Google’s work on AI safety [21]. The satisfaction of
a given objective with respect to a metric should therefore only be determined when the
full context of a model is known.
5.5.3 Varying Objectives
Beyond the variability of the objectives themselves, there remains the challenge of adopting
an approach that demonstrates the overall satisfaction of the RM-BNS objectives. Many
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industry standards adopt a similar approach to establishing the sufficiency of assurance
activities: they offer a set of objectives for a given class of system and vary the quantity
of objectives in accordance with the criticality of the system in question.
For example, DO-178C mandates that developers satisfy 71 objectives for systems
developed to the highest Development Assurance Level (DAL), while requiring that only
26 objectives must be satisfied for the lowest safety-related (i.e. system aspect with safety
effect) DAL. The independence of these objectives also varies across the levels.8
In the case of DO-178C, the DALs can be seen to address Principle 4+1 of the Software
Safety Principles and therefore offer one approach to solving the problem of establishing
sufficiency in assurance efforts for a given system. This suggests the first conceptual
approach to establishing the sufficiency of assurance activities in the context of BNSs:
the number of assurance objectives may be varied in accordance with the criticality of the
system aspect associated with that objective. This can be achieved through the satisfaction
of only a subset of the RM-BNS objectives as determined by the criticality of the BNS
aspect addressed by a given objective. For example, at the lowest levels of criticality a
small subset of objectives may be satisfied, while at the highest levels of criticality all
objectives should be satisfied.
Support for this approach was considered when the RM-BNS objectives were defined.
They have been defined to address aspects of a BNS such that the objectives can be con-
sidered become progressively higher-level and build upon preceding objectives. Consider
objective MV-1.1:
MV-1.1 - Establish and justify the basis for using the structural variant for the [Model].
This objective is defined to address low-level considerations that are likely to arise
early in a BNS’s development. It addresses the utilisation of a given model or variable in
the abstract, potentially before a model has been constructed. Using the language of the
work of Przytula et al (as outlined in section 2.2.4), this objective targets the modelling
activities carried out as part of development Stages 2 and 3 (Subsystem Definition and
Subsystem Modelling, respectively). In these stages individual variables are selected and
defined by developers. The probabilistic structure of the variable is also commonly defined
8In this context, ‘independence’ refers to the independence of the software verification and validation
activities from the development teams. It is assumed that this separation ensures the ‘objectivity’ of these
processes.
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at this point (i.e. prior to integration with the complete BN model). From an assurance
perspective, it is defined to explicitly capture and document lower-level modelling decisions
that may influence confidence in a model at later stages of development.
However, for low-criticality system aspects, it may not be necessary to satisfy this ob-
jective. For such systems, these low-level assurance activities may be deemed superfluous
– provided the BN model/s still perform well overall on higher-level tasks. This is the aim
of objective MV-1.4:
MV-1.4 - Establish and justify confidence in the [structural variant] of the [Model].
This objective addresses the need to establish overall confidence in a system aspect: in
this case the structure of a model. The three preceding objectives are aimed at ensuring
development steps, design decisions and evaluation activities that specifically address those
system aspects are explicitly documented and reviewed, and this leads naturally into the
final objective. By satisfying only MV-1.4, developers would leave activities and decisions
associated with the other objectives implicit, undocumented or simply unperformed, but
could still demonstrate that confidence in a structure has been achieved by appealing to
higher-level model performance metrics and other evaluation approaches.
Such an approach would bring the objectives into approximate alignment with the
evaluation activities of a high-standard existing BN development programme [6,52]. These
programmes typically look to model-level evaluation metrics and design decisions and do
not generally tackle the model’s performance and characteristics on a more granular level.
This seems appropriate for models associated with the lowest levels of criticality. In
contrast, the higher levels of criticality demand a more granular, rigorous enumeration of
design decisions, model evaluation and integration activities. Technical verification and
validation of a BNS at these levels is atypical within the existing literature. These aspects
are tackled by objectives addressing lower-level considerations (in this example typified by
objectives MV-1.1 to MV-1.3).
For example, considering only the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint, it would be possible
to use this general approach to map objectives to model criticality metrics. An example
of how this could be achieved is shown in Table 5.6. A summary of the total number
of objectives is shown in Table 5.7. As with DO-178C, at the highest levels of critical-
ity, all objectives should be satisfied, and the total number of objectives then declines
alongside the criticality. This should be extended to include similar notions of verification
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Table 5.6: A suggested breakdown of how the number of compulsory Model Viewpoint
RM-BNS Objectives may be varied as a function of the criticality of a system aspect.
Crit. (MCI/VCI) View Objectives (MV) No. Objectives
0 Structure 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 4
Parameters 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 4
Definition 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 4
Dynamics 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 5
1 Structure 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 3
Parameters 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 3
Definition 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 3
Dynamics 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 4
2 Structure 1.3, 1.4 2
Parameters 2.3, 2.4 2
Definition 3.3, 3.4 2
Dynamics 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 3
3 Structure 1.4 1
Parameters 2.4 1
Definition 3.4 1
Dynamics 4.4, 4.5 2
5 Structure None 0
Parameters None 0
Definition None 0
Dynamics 4.5 1
Table 5.7: Total number of suggested compulsory Model Viewpoint RM-BNS Objectives.
Criticality Viewpoint No. Objectives
0 Model 17
1 Model 13
2 Model 9
3 Model 5
4 Model 1
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and validation independence as set out in DO-178C: at the highest levels of criticality a
significant proportion of the RM-BNS objectives should be satisfied with independence
from the development team. As with the rest of this chapter, while the discussion here
has focussed on the Model Viewpoint RM-BNS objectives, the approach can be applied
to all objectives across all viewpoints.
5.5.4 Varying Evidence
A second possible approach to establishing the sufficiency of assurance activities for BNSs
is to adopt a strategy in which the confidence in the evidence used to satisfy an objective
varies. Adherents of this approach would therefore explicitly address every RM-BNS
objective for a given system but would vary the quality and/or quantity of evidence used
to satisfy a given objective as a product of the criticality of the system aspect the objective
addresses. An approach that explicitly varies the evidence with respect to the criticality
of an objective would be in closer conceptual alignment with standards such as DS 00-056
in which the emphasis is placed upon assurance practitioners to justify the sufficiency of
their assurance efforts with direct reference to the system at hand and the techniques
used [97].
The contributions of this chapter could be used to facilitate this approach: the pro-
posed evidence classifications and objective-evidence mappings could be used to provide
a structured basis for rationalising the sufficiency of the evidence addressing a given ob-
jective. Assurance practitioners can target those models and model components directly
according to the respective criticality of those aspects, and describe the role and type
of evidence in this context. Using the previous approach (varying the number and inde-
pendence of objectives), assurance practitioners may choose to omit this objective from
consideration for low-criticality system aspects. However, as discussed throughout this
chapter, it is important that the rationale for the use of a given technique with respect to
a given objective is made explicit. By instead varying the confidence in the evidence used
to satisfy an objective, assurance practitioners can provide explicit, end-to-end rationale
for the design, evaluation and testing decisions made during the development of a BNS.
While this confidence in the evidence used to satisfy system-specific objectives will
vary across each BNS, it will ensure that each system aspect addressed by the RM-BNS
objectives is explicitly considered by assurance practitioners. This should encourage a
more critical evaluation of the use of evidence in the development of a BNS and avoid
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the ‘masking’ of uncertainty and decision making that may become a problem with the
previous approach.
From a practical perspective, this would produce a situation in which the confidence
in the evidence used to satisfy a given objective is proportional to the criticality of the
objective the evidence addresses: an objective pertaining to low criticality system aspects
may require little evidence, or evidence with significant aleatoric or epistemological un-
certainty, while the same objective addressing a higher-criticality system aspect would
demand more evidence and less uncertainty in that evidence.
A further practical benefit of this approach may also be its ability to adapt to the highly
dynamic, iterative lifecycles common to BNSs. Specifically, in the event the criticality of
a system aspect changes in the presence of modifications to a model’s design, or the role
of data in the system, for example, this approach would allow assurance practitioners to
revisit and modify the existing evidence rather than be forced to adopt new evaluation
techniques and develop new evidence. An approach that varies the confidence in the
available evidence could be seen to encourage the utilisation of a single test-harness for
a given BNS, but in which the rigour and depth of the analyses of system aspects varies
proportionally with the criticality of the system aspect being evaluated.
5.5.5 Satisfying RM-BNS Objectives
To illustrate how these concepts may be applied to a BNS, consider the following example.
Within the BN literature, ‘common wisdom’ suggests that small errors in the parameter-
isation of a model do not seriously influence the output of the model, and therefore BN
developers need not focus much effort on evaluating the accuracy of individual parame-
ters within a BN model [171]. However, others have noted that while this may generally
be true, small variations in the parameters of a model can produce dramatic variations
in the outputs of a model [198]. The RM-BNS Objective MV-2.2 is aimed at explicitly
addressing this issue:
“MV-2.2 – Establish and justify the accuracy of the parameterisation of [Model].”
From an assurance perspective, the satisfaction of this objective will provide assurance
practitioners with confidence that the dynamics of a given BN model are robust to errors in
the parameterisation of the system aspect addressed by the objective. To achieve this, BN
developers and assurance practitioners will typically rely on a range of statistical analyses,
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mathematical proofs and expert-elicited information.
Condition Diagnosis P (C)
Treatment Capability P (T |C)
Figure 5.4: A fragment of System C’s medical diagnosis BN model.
Consider a third BNS: System C. System C provides diagnosis and prognosis capa-
bilities for critically ill patients and can administer drugs to patients if certain medical
conditions are detected and diagnosed. Figure 5.4 shows an example fragment from a BN
model that is used to drive the system. The figure shows two variables: The Condition
Diagnosis and Treatment Capability RVs. The latter variable represents an output from
this model that is used to inform System C to administer drugs to a patient, while the
former represents an internal diagnosis variable that identifies specific medical conditions.
The system-specific refinement of MV-2.2 for the Condition Diagnosis CPD would then
be defined as follows:
“MV-2.2-C – Establish and justify the accuracy of the parameterisation of the
Condition Diagnosis RV.”
This objective can be mapped directly to a criticality metric using the MCA technique
introduced in Chapter 4. The aim of assurance practitioners will then be to satisfy this
objective such that the confidence established is proportional to the criticality of the system
aspect. In the context of the model in Figure 5.4 and the above objective, the primary
aim of this objective is to address the need for assurance practitioners to demonstrate that
errors in the parameterisation of the Condition Diagnosis RV do not affect the output of
the Treatment Capability RV.
5.5.5.1 Evaluating Statistical Confidence
One strategy that BN developers and assurance practitioners may adopt to tackle this
challenge may be to analyse the statistical confidence in the parameters learned by the
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model. Consider a simple scenario in which BN developers have access to one hundred
patient records pertaining to a particular condition. Of these records, 33 are diagnosed as
having the condition, and 67 are not. A simple BN parameter-learning algorithm would
then assign the probability of a patient having the condition as a 33% chance, and of the
patient not having the condition as a 67% chance.
However, this is an estimate of the frequency of the occurrence of the condition. It
is drawn from a small sample of individuals, and other samples may produce different
estimates. For cases such as this, it is therefore useful to evaluate the statistical confidence
in the learned parameter and estimate upper and lower bounds on the plausible values
of the parameter. A common approach for estimating these bounds is to compute the
so-called Wilson Confidence Intervals [199]. These bounds are given by:
p0 +
t
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1 + t
±
√
p0q0t+
t2
4
1 + t
(5.1)
Where p0 is the rate of occurrence of some observation, q0 is the rate of the non-
occurence of some observation, and t is defined as:
t =
z2
n
(5.2)
Where z is the probit function for a specific confidence interval, and n is the total
number of overall observations. This establishes bounds on either side of a parameter
estimate.
These confidence intervals can be set based upon the tolerances of assurance practition-
ers and the BNS in question. A standard confidence interval is the 95% interval, though
other common choices include 75%, 90%, 99% and 99.9% respectively. This interval can
be considered as defining the range within which the ‘true’ value of a parameter is likely to
exist – the wider the interval the greater the statistical confidence that a parameter falls
within that range. Table 5.8 shows these confidence intervals computed for the Condition
Diagnosis RV parameter estimate using Equation 5.1.
It is also common to vary these intervals, and assurance practitioners may choose to
do so based on the development context of a given model and the differing criticality
assignments associated with the particular parameter estimate.9 Specifically, this can be
9A discussion on the use and interpretation of confidence intervals in statistics is beyond the scope of
this chapter, though a good introduction can be found in [20].
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extended to the concept of criticality – higher criticality system aspects would be associated
with higher statistical confidence. An example mapping of confidence intervals to MCA
criticality metrics is also shown in Table 5.8. However, in practice the precise confidence
intervals used should be carefully considered in the context of the BNS in development
and only selected based upon the specifics of the system as discussed in section 5.5.2.
Table 5.8: Example mapping of Variable Criticality Indices (VCI) to statistical confidence
intervals for System C’s model fragment.
VCI Interval Parameter Lower Limit Upper Limit
4 75.0% 67.0% 61.4% 72.1%
3 90.0% 67.0% 59.0% 74.2%
2 95.0% 67.0% 57.3% 75.4%
1 99.0% 67.0% 54.2% 77.7%
0 99.9% 67.0% 50.5% 80.1%
In the case of System C, this approach could be adopted to select the 95% confidence
intervals for the parameters of the Condition Diagnosis CPD. As can be seen in Table 5.8,
this would produce a lower confidence bound of 57% and an upper confidence bound of
75%. This can be considered as indicating that there is high statistical confidence that
the ‘true’ value of this parameter falls within the range 57-75%. This could be used to
provide Direct, Statistical evidence of establishing the accuracy of the parameters, thereby
partially fulfilling the objective.
However, there remains the need to justify this level of accuracy. One approach to
addressing this second aspect of the objective could be to utilise the confidence intervals
to evaluate how the dynamics of the model change over this range of plausible values, and
whether the model outputs are sensitive to these changes. If they are, this may indicate
assurance practitioners may need to take more measurements and gather more records
to improve the statistical confidence in these parameter estimates, or perhaps modify the
model itself to ensure its robustness to these errors.10
10This example is of course for an extremely simple BN model, and therefore other techniques may be
necessary to hold this objective as satisfied for more complex models.
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5.5.5.2 Analysing Parameter Bounds
A technique that could be used for this purpose was introduced by Chan et al [190].
This approach allows BN developers to evaluate the dynamics of a BN model in order
to establish the robustness of the outputs of a model to variations in parameters within
the model. The previous statistical analysis can be utilised to guide this analysis. By
demonstrating that a model (or in this case: model output) is insensitive to changes in
the parameter over the range identified previously, practitioners could justify that the
accuracy of the parameters obtained is sufficient for the system.
Figure 5.5: An example of the output from Chan’s parameter bound analysis technique.
An example output from Chan’s technique is shown in Figure 5.5. The figure shows
how the degree to which the value of a parameter (p) in the Condition Diagnosis RV can
be allowed to change (δ) as a function of the value of that parameter while maintaining
the desired output properties for the model (in this case the Treatment Capability RV ).
The inner ‘envelope’ guarantees that the output will remain above a specified lower bound,
while the outer ‘envelope’ guarantees the output will remain below a specified upper bound.
Concretely, the figure can be used to indicate the range of possible changes to the
parameters of the Condition Diagnosis RV that will not affect the output of the model.
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Technically, Figure 5.5 allows practitioners to deduce that for the Condition Diagnosis
RV parameters to modify the Treatment Capability RV outputs, the value of the Condi-
tion Diagnosis RV parameters must lie either below 50% or above 81%. This is Direct,
Deterministic evidence for the satisfaction of this objective.
When this information is combined with the statistical analysis introduced earlier, an
assurance practitioner can establish that the 95% confidence intervals for the parameter
lie well within this range. Indeed, the 99.9% confidence intervals also lie within this range,
suggesting that the evidence for the accuracy of the parameterisation of the variable would
be acceptable even at high criticality levels.
Practically, this can indicate to an assurance practitioner that the Treatment Capa-
bility RV SRV outputs of the model would not change over the entire range of plausible
parameter values for the Condition Diagnosis RV. This directly justifies the established
accuracy of the parameterisation of the Condition Diagnosis RV and may thereby satisfy
the objective. Taken together, these two techniques can provide complete evidential cov-
erage of the objective in this specific context. In other circumstances, one or both of these
techniques may not be practicable, or may not provide complete coverage of the objective.
5.6 Conclusion
The primary aim of this chapter has been to provide guidance on the considerations
and strategies an assurance practitioner must consider when developing and evaluating a
mission-critical BNS. The highly iterative design and development activities and statistical
properties of these systems introduce a number of novel assurance concerns that must be
carefully considered and addressed by assurance practitioners.
In particular, this chapter has focussed on establishing a framework for describing and
classifying evidence used in the assurance of a BNS. This framework draws upon existing
work in the safety domain to build a single framework that can facilitate the description
of any safety evidence generated during the development of a BNS.
The chapter then proceeded to outline the utilisation of this framework in the context
of the RM-BNS objectives. Specifically, it used the proposed evidence framework to show
how individual items of evidence may be mapped explicitly to individual system-specific
objectives, and that through consideration of the characteristics and classifications of this
evidence, assurance practitioners can begin to address the sufficiency of the evidence.
The final section focussed on potential strategies for demonstrating the sufficiency of
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BNS assurance efforts. Both strategies essentially focussed on providing a mechanism for
addressing the 4+1 software safety principle by varying either the number of objectives
(in a manner similar to DO-178C) or varying the confidence in the evidence used to satisfy
the objectives (more akin to DS 00-056).
The contributions of this chapter are therefore as follows:
• It has provided a framework for characterising and classifying evidence generated
for the assurance of a BNS.
• It has introduced an approach to mapping individual objectives to items of evidence
and criticality metrics built upon this framework.
• It has outlined an approach to the refinement of objective-evidence mappings over
the course of the development of a BNS.
• It has provided guidance on approaches that may be used in establishing the suffi-
ciency of assurance efforts undertaken during the development of a BNS.
183

Chapter 6
Evaluation
6.1 Introduction
The Thesis Hypothesis as introduced in Chapter 1 was given as follows:
It is possible to provide targeted assurance for BN-based Systems through the
analysis and evaluation of underlying probabilistic models, data artefacts and
computational techniques that have the potential to affect confidence in the
safety of a system.
This hypothesis was defined with the principal aim of addressing the assurance con-
cerns associated with the motivating use-case of this project: the utilisation of an ad-
vanced Bayesian Network-based Prognostic Health Monitoring (PHM) system aboard an
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) in mission-critical applications. While this has been the
motivation behind this project, the concepts, language and techniques presented in this
thesis have been generalised wherever possible to accommodate a broader range of possible
Bayesian Network-based System (BNS) variants and architectures than are likely to be
encountered in this specific application. In accordance with this hypothesis, the principal
contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• A generic, comprehensive framework for describing and modelling BNSs that also
aims to facilitate the communication of the many unconventional aspects of these
systems to both BN developers and safety practitioners;
• A set of generic verification and validation objectives that provide a flexible, com-
prehensive framework for the verification and validation of BNSs, and expose safety
considerations that are poorly addressed in existing standards;
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• A systematic, generic approach to establishing the criticality of model-centric aspects
of BNSs that integrates safety information with BN model analysis techniques; and
• Guidance on establishing the sufficiency of BNS assurance efforts through the ex-
tension of existing assurance concepts to the techniques and concepts introduced
throughout the thesis.
Due in part to the sensitive nature of the use-case of this thesis, the application of
these techniques to a ‘real-world’ system has not been possible over the course of the
project. This chapter utilises a combination of public-domain resources to construct a
case study that outlines the application of the techniques and concepts introduced in this
thesis and supports the evaluation of these contributions in the context of this research
project. Insights drawn from this case study are then extended to evaluate the scope and
utility of the contributions of this thesis in the context of ‘real-world’ BNSs, and in the
context of the safety domain more generally.
The chapter is structured as follows: a case study is provided that applies the concepts
and methodologies introduced in previous chapters to an example system based upon
existing systems within the BN literature; the contributions of the thesis are then evaluated
in the context of this case study with respect to the thesis hypothesis; the contributions
are then further evaluated with respect to the scope of the thesis and its motivating
example; and finally, the contributions will be evaluated against existing standards and
BN development practices to explore what has been gained through the contributions of
this thesis.
6.2 Case Study
This section looks to the existing BN literature to introduce a BNS that represents an
amalgamation of existing concepts, architectures and models that showcase the utility
and application of the contributions of this thesis in a more tangible setting.
6.2.1 System Definition and Methodology
Several candidate systems and development approaches were reviewed for use in this case
study. The system presented here represents an combination of multiple distinct BNSs and
corresponding BN models that are drawn from a range of domains [6,59,200]. The system
has been defined to represent a BNS that is used for medical diagnosis and prognosis
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alongside the delivery of a limited set of medical treatments – principally the adminis-
tration of drugs to patients. It is assumed that this latter aspect of the system includes
direct responsibility for the unsupervised administration of drugs to a patient, and that
incorrect use of these drugs could have serious consequences for the health of a patient.
There is a precedent for this type of device [201]. There are existing software-intensive
medical devices that use software to moderate the administration of drugs to patients. A
typical example of a safety-critical software-based medical device is a system dedicated
to automatically dispensing insulin to diabetic patients [201, 202]. The system devised
for this case study is intended to reflect an extrapolation of this form of software to one
that utilises BN models in place of conventional control logic when treating patients.
Practically, such a system could support the diagnosis and treatment of a more diverse
set of medical conditions and scenarios.
For the purposes of this case study, the system is defined to enable the provision of
only two forms of treatment: the administration of anaesthetic/pain management drugs,
and the administration of drugs to combat anaphylactic shock. Both of these treatments
represent plausible treatments given the scope of the BN models upon which the system
is based [136]. The example system will be referred to throughout the case study as the
Autonomous Monitoring and Treatment System (AMTS).
6.2.1.1 Source Material
The AMTS system architecture is based upon architectures drawn from public-domain
research and documentation. The systems upon which the AMTS is based were selected
based upon three criteria:
• The system must have been deployed in a ‘live’ operational environment.
• The system must not be a ‘toy’ research system – it must be sufficiently complex
that it illustrates the application of the methods introduced in this thesis.
• The system must have a direct application to a complex diagnosis or decision making
problem.
The system architecture presented here is based principally on two system architec-
tures. The first is that outlined in the work of Przytula et al on the development of
diagnostic support systems for satellites [6]. The second draws upon the work of Velikova
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et al who looked into the development of a medical prognosis system for use in medical
applications, specifically in monitoring pregnancy disorders [35]. As discussed in Chapter
2, the former work outlines an approach to developing the architecture of BNSs in fault
diagnosis roles that involves the utilisation of multiple distinct BN models to support the
diagnosis of specific subsystems. The latter work outlines an approach to using more novel
model architectures for patient prognostics and provides an overview of the integration of
a BNS into a broader treatment platform.
Finally, due to the constraints of this chapter, only a single BN model is discussed and
analysed in detail. The model selected is the widely-used Alarm ICU model developed
by Beinlich et al that was introduced in Chapter 3. As discussed in that chapter, this
model was used to support the monitoring of patients in a hospital’s Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) ward [136]. From a technical perspective, this model was selected as it represents
a good ‘baseline’ BN model: it consists of only discrete, table-structured CPDs and it is
a low-to-medium complexity model.1 From a practical perspective, it was selected as the
model is publicly available, and reflects a complex, near-safety-critical diagnosis problem
and is relatively ubiquitous in the BN domain. A graphical representation of the ICU
model is shown in Figure 6.1. A copy of the exact structure and parameterisation used is
presented in Appendix B.
1This model is commonly used for benchmarking various BN learning, inference and modelling ap-
proaches for precisely this reason: it is a practically useful model with sufficient complexity to test algo-
rithms and approaches, but also sufficiently transparent to support meaningful analysis.
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Figure 6.1: A visualisation of the Alarm ICU network and its local CPD structures. [136]
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6.2.1.2 Assumptions and Scope
The limitations in the scope and detail of the materials used to define the AMTS archi-
tecture force a number of assumptions to be made. The most significant of these are as
follows:
• Models in the AMTS were trained on complete data using a simple (Bayesian) Max-
imum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for parameter learning;
• These model structures were obtained through expert elicitation only, and no structure-
learning algorithms were utilised [136];
• There are no adaptive/on-line learning aspects of the system;
• All models contain only discrete, table-structured CPDs (i.e. they are of the same
form as Beinlich’s ICU model);
• All models in the system are ‘pure’ BNs: there are no undirected or hybrid models,
only Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) [2];
• All models used in the system are static – there are no time-dependent models in
the system;
• The system uses only exact inference algorithms (some form of Junction Tree algo-
rithm);2 and
• The system functions without direct oversight from a medical practitioner.
Operationally, the AMTS is defined as providing three primary functions: an alarm
system for summoning medical practitioners; a BN-controlled drug administration system
and an ‘enhanced’ patient health monitoring function (e.g. an AI-enhanced User-Interface
that provides additional information on a patient’s health – much like current Electrocar-
diograms (ECGs) but with additional analysis and prognosis capabilities). These three
functions are carried out fully autonomously by the system. To achieve this, the AMTS
utilises four distinct BN models in the provision of these functions. These models are as
follows:
2This is a relatively strong assumption. Many practical applications of BNSs use some form of Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) or variational inference. For a technical introduction to approximate algo-
rithms, see [51].
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• Two models are used to reason over a diagnostic model of patients. These mod-
els provide redundant signals on whether to summon medical practitioners. These
models will be referred to as Alert Model A and B respectively.
• A model for reasoning about a patient’s health status. For the purposes of this
case study, this model is Beinlich’s ICU model. This model will be referred to as
the Diagnosis Model. This model informs whether or not a patient should receive
treatment from the AMTS.
• A model for integrating, processing and enhancing input data from medical devices
and providing this to medical practitioners when required. This will be referred to
as the Data Fusion Model.
6.2.2 System Description and Modelling
The first step in the application of the ideas presented in this thesis is the generation
of a RM-BNS architecture model that captures the components of a given BNS and the
corresponding interactions between these components. The definition of model objects
proceeds according to the methodology outlined in Chapter 3. Figure 6.2 shows an example
of a fragment of a RM-BNS architecture generated for the AMTS. The model shown in
the figure is a high-level representation of the system. Even at such a comparatively high
level of abstraction, the model captures a number of important interactions within the
system.
For example, consider the ‘ICU Ward’ Environment object. As discussed in Chapters
2 and 3, BNSs are exposed to their environments in a manner atypical of conventional
software systems. This exposure can produce errors in a system’s functionality related to
distributional drift in the model, systemic biases, or other errors in the data. The fragment
in Figure 6.2 highlights the impact of the environment upon data acquisition activities and
which data artefacts are produced by these activities.3 For example, the fragment shows
that all four BN models are exposed to the environment, how they are exposed, and that
three of those models are directly influenced by a single data acquisition activity.
3Note that the diamond symbols discussed in Chapter 3 are used here to denote ‘undeveloped’ aspects
of the model. In this case, they are simply used for conciseness.
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Figure 6.2: A high-level representation of (a fragment) of the AMTS architecture represented in the RM-BNS framework.
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This suggests the system may be vulnerable to a data-centric equivalent of a common-
cause failure. Examples of how such data-centric failures could occur may include stress-
related errors on the part of medical practitioners in the acquisition process4, or changes
in operational processes on the ICU ward that effect the data acquisition process for the
BNS. If the BN model is ‘unaware’ of these changes or potential errors (i.e. it has not
been designed to accommodate changes or mitigate errors), the system will continue to
function – from a conventional software perspective – normally. However, its diagnostic
accuracy may gradually decline and this may erode safety margins. In this sense a BNS
is likely to be less ‘brittle’ than a conventional software system, but this may also mask
more subtle errors in the system’s functionality. The RM-BNS fragment in Figure 6.2
explictily captures the interactions and dependencies between these aspects precisely so
BN developers and assurance practitioners can discuss and analyse the implications of
these interactions.
To cast these concepts in terms of the motivating example of this thesis, differences
in the habits or practices of maintenance teams on different shifts or across different
geographical regions may produce data of varying degrees of integrity or with different
underlying patterns or properties [64, 116, 121]. This may include producing data that
is in some way biased towards the environment in which they are working, or other op-
erational differences between teams. For example, significant variations in temperature,
precipitation, humidity or altitude may produce different failure profiles for an autonomous
vehicle. A disproportionate or uncharacteristic failure rate may skew a BN model towards
erroneous behaviour if it is not identified by practitioners and/or mitigated by the BN
model’s design.5 Chapters 2 and 3 provide a more detailed overview of the potential effect
of environmental changes on BNSs.
A second consideration indicated by Figure 6.2 is the degree of exposure of the system
to expert-elicited data; the corresponding role of the ‘Knowledge Engineering’ framework
selected to produce this data; the interactions between inference algorithms, model frame-
4This may include cutting corners with medical measurements and observations.
5This may include uncharacteristically low failure rates, perhaps associated with data gathered early
in a vehicle’s lifecycle, during testing or other similar, idealised scenarios.
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works, models and input data6; the utilisation and role of specific BN models in the
provision of specific software functions; and, more generally, the role of computational as-
pects of the system in producing and facilitating the utilisation of these models. From an
assurance perspective, this introduces a degree of traceability into the architecture of the
AMTS: an assurance practitioner can see – at a high-level in this case – the interactions
between system aspects and potentially also the relative importance of those aspects on
certain system behaviours and capabilities.
For subsequent analysis and objective-generation activities, lower-level representations
generated using the RM-BNS will be necessary. Figure 6.3 shows an example RM-BNS
fragment for the system aspects associated directly with the Drug Administration func-
tion and Patient Treatment capability. This fragment exposes a further set of interactions
that may also be of interest to assurance practitioners. For example, the fragment high-
lights more precisely how the Diagnosis Model is used by the system. It indicates the
dependence of this model on specific data sources, and once again highlights the role of
the environment in the optimisation and structure of the model, and ultimately in the
provision of the Patient Treatment capability. Furthermore, the fragment highlights the
importance of the Diagnosis Model and Parameter Optimisation objects in the provision
of the Drug Administration software function. Qualitatively, these two functions are asso-
ciated with far more interactions with other objects than any other objects in the model.
This highlights the centrality of these system aspects in the architecture of the AMTS.
6This can be seen in the fragment with the interactions between the Data Fusion Model, the Exact
Inference object and the EKG Inputs object. In this case, the model makes explicit the dependency of
the Exact Inference algorithm upon (the structure of) the Data Fusion Model and the EKG Data. For a
discussion of the role of models and data in BN inference algorithms, see [1, 2, 60].
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Figure 6.3: A lower-level RM-BNS fragment capturing system aspects associated only with the Diagnosis Model.
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Finally, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, BN models can be considered to be models
composed of a set of smaller models in a factorised representation. The RM-BNS approach
is intended to reflect this. In Figure 6.3, a sub-model has been broken out from the
Diagnosis Model object. In this case, this object is generically titled ‘Variable’, and the
RM-BNS fragment indicates that the parent model is composed of ‘1 to n’ ‘Variable’
objects. Subsequent modelling activities should break this down further such that each
variable within a BN model is explicitly represented as a ‘Model’ object in the RM-BNS
architecture model. The resulting RM-BNS instantiation may then explicitly represent
the internal structure of the BN model and expose this to qualitative analysis.
6.2.3 Definition of System-Specific Objectives
With an initial RM-BNS model generated, it is possible to begin generating system-specific
objectives for the AMTS. A full enumeration of system-specific objectives is beyond the
scope of this chapter, however. Instead, a selection of objectives have been provided for
discussion. These objectives have been generated in accordance with the methodology
set out in Chapter 3, and were generated specifically for the RM-BNS fragment shown
in Figure 6.3 and deal with only Model and Data Viewpoint system aspects.7 Table 6.1
shows the set of selected objectives.
These four objectives represent a small cross-section of a full set of objectives that
would be generated for the AMTS: each object in the architectural model would have a
set of objectives generated that addresses it. However, these four objectives have been
selected as they highlight a number of important considerations that must be brought to
the attention of assurance practitioners. For example, consider objective DV-2.2 in Table
6.1:
Establish and justify the necessity of the discretisation pre-processing technique
applied to the Patient Record data.
This objective addresses the need to ensure that all pre-processing activities that apply
transformations to the Patient Records are absolutely necessary. A practical example of
such an approach could be as simple as translating a patient’s heart rate from a continuous-
valued variable (e.g. a heart rate in the range of 40-200 beats-per-minute) into a discrete-
7The generic RM-BNS objectives can be found in Appendix A.
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valued variable (e.g. low, medium or high).8 As discussed in previous chapters, this
approach is associated with information loss, and can potentially influence the performance
of a BN model.
For example, in the case that a patient’s heart rate is categorised as either low, medium
or high, an assurance practitioner should be interested in why this scheme was selected –
there may be performance or safety implications (both positive and negative) if a fourth
category (e.g. very high) were to be introduced. This may allow a model to learn more
subtle relationships, perhaps that ‘very high’ heart rates are much more likely than ‘high’
heart rates to indicate a certain disorder. However, it may also reduce the performance of
the system by making a model excessively sensitive to the peculiarities of the data used
to train it.9
In the context of this objective, assurance practitioners will need to demonstrate the
practical utility of the discretisation scheme selected, and that the presence of this pre-
processing step has desirable assurance implications (e.g. discretisation improves the per-
formance of the system on safety-related tasks, and/or improves the interpretability of the
system from a medical practitioner’s perspective). Assurance practitioners will need to
explicitly consider the effect of the information loss associated with the application of any
discretisation approach to a continuous-valued dataset.10
8This process is often called binning. There is an extensive body of literature on strategies to perform
various types of discretisation on data sets [52,54,61,203].
9This is another specific example of the bias/variance trade-off. See Chapters 2 and 3 for more infor-
mation, or [137,145] for a review of local bias/variance considerations.
10Two of the most commonly used transformations that are applied to data used in BNSs are data dis-
cretisation and dimensionality scaling. The objective discussed here addresses the former transformation.
The latter transformation is concerned with ensuring a form of consistency across data. In this context,
‘dimensionality’ refers specifically to the units of a measurement. Failure to maintain consistent dimen-
sionality within a BN model may lead to erroneous reasoning by the model. Such errors in reasoning may
be difficult to identify as BN models are often robust to errors in inputs of this kind. System developers
may therefore satisfy this objective by demonstrating the need to use the scaling process to avoid a BN-
specific manifestation of the dimensionality error that led to the infamous loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter
(MCO) [204]. The nature of the assurance activities used to satisfy any two system-specific objectives that
are derived from the same generic objective may therefore vary significantly. However, in this context, the
objective is designed to address both cases equally.
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Table 6.1: System-Specific Objectives for the AMTS example.
Viewpoint View RM-BNS Object Objective ID
Data Artefact Medical Database Establish and justify the integrity of the Med-
ical Database data artefact.
DV-1.2
Data Processing Data Discretisation Establish and justify the necessity of the dis-
cretisation pre-processing technique applied
to the Patient Record data.
DV-2.2
Model Structure Diagnostic Model Establish and justify the basis for using a
static Discrete Bayesian Network for the Di-
agnostic Model network.
MV-1.1
(Global)
Model Structure Anaphylaxis Vari-
able
Establish and justify the basis for using a
categorical distribution for the ‘Anaphylaxis’
Random Variable.11
MV-1.1
(Local)
11This objective represents a further decomposition of the Variable ‘Model’ object shown in Figure 6.3 into a specific Random Variable object.
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Objective DV-1.2 addresses a second important data-centric consideration:
Establish and justify the integrity of the Medical Database data artefact.
As discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5, the ‘raw material’ of a BNS is the data used in its
construction. Data directly (or indirectly) influences the behaviour of BN models. This
includes data that is not explicitly encoded within a deployed BNS. For example, it is un-
likely that the AMTS would be deployed with direct access to the Medical Database used
to train it. However, a latent representation of this data would persist in the parameterisa-
tion of the BN models within the AMTS. To establish confidence in this parameterisation,
therefore, it is essential that the integrity of all data artefacts used in the design, construc-
tion, and training of a BNS are rigorously assessed.
This is the intent of this objective: to address the need to establish that the integrity
of the Medical Database is assured – including in the event the database is not physically
deployed as a part of the final system. The objective highlights the need to broaden the
scope of what is considered to be a part of a software-intensive system in the context
of BNS (and AIS generally). In the context of DO-178C, this is a subtle but important
distinction from the provisions made in that guidance for ‘Data Parameter Items’ [69].
The remaining two objectives in Table 6.1 address model-centric system aspects. For
example, consider objective MV-1.1 (Global):
Establish and justify the basis for using a static Discrete Bayesian Network for
the Diagnostic Model network.
This objective addresses the need to tackle the theoretical and practical motivation
for using a static, discrete BN for the AMTS Diagnosis Model. It aims to ensure that
a BN framework variant is selected with explicit consideration of the appropriateness of
that BN variant for a specific problem. It is not uncommon for BN developers to select
a BN variant without explicitly justifying why the variant was chosen. The selection of
an inappropriate BN variant may prevent developers from capturing behaviours that may
prove to be important in a given application, or from representing certain aspects of the
domain being modelled [2]. This may constrain the completed BNS or produce undesired
behaviours in the resulting system.
Conceptually, the objective also addresses a facet of the typical question of validity
levelled at conventional software systems:
200
6.2 Case Study
Has the right system been built?
For BNSs, this should be expanded to address a related but distinct question [64,159]:
Does the system need a BN model?
This objective (and objective MV-3.1) has been defined with this consideration in
mind.12 Specifically, it helps to address the question:
Does the system need the specific BN variant?
This aligns with a similar notion of validity discussed in the context of utilising Arti-
ficial Neural Networks (ANNs) in NASA’s Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) pro-
gramme [72]. Concretely, the objective addresses the problem of whether or not a given
application requires a given BN variant to achieve the desired functionality. This includes
evaluating whether or not alternative techniques or variants could be used to fulfil the
same role.
The satisfaction of this objective will require BN developers to explicitly discuss the
rationale behind the use of a specific BN variant – and therefore model – in their system.
From a practical perspective, this objective is focussed on ensuring that no simpler ap-
proaches exist to solving the same problem. For example, a BN development team may
use an elaborate, complex BN model for a given task when a simple Naive Bayes model
(or something simpler still) would suffice for the task at hand. These simpler solutions
may avoid the assurance challenges of more complex BNSs altogether.
The final objective in Table 6.1 addresses a similar, lower-level assurance consideration:
Establish and justify the basis for using a categorical distribution for the ‘Ana-
phylaxis’ Random Variable.
The objective is aimed at addressing the need for the inclusion of the variable-level
structure of the ‘Anaphylaxis’ variable within the Diagnosis Model, and for choosing to
use a given structure to represent an entity in the target domain. In this context, this
objective could be seen to complement objective DV-2.2: it ensures that considerations
related to potential sources of information loss are made explicit and considered from a
model-centric perspective (while DV-2.2 addresses them from a data-centric perspective).
12MV-3.1 (Generic): Establish and justify the definition of the model.
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It addresses the problem of selecting which distributional structure to represent a variable
with: there may be modelling considerations that motivate the use of a discrete distribu-
tion to represent a continuous variable, such as reducing the complexity of a model, or
improving its interpretability. A BN developer may choose a distribution to represent a
variable that is known to be a crude approximation in the case of a variable, but generalises
better to out-of-sample data than a more ‘faithful’ structure.
6.2.4 Model Criticality Analysis
While the objectives shown in Table 6.1 address the Diagnosis Model in particular, in
practice similar objectives would be generated for each other model in the system, along-
side each model’s constituent ‘component’ models (i.e. variables). From an assurance
perspective, each model may play a distinct role in the functional behaviours of the sys-
tem. Consequently, the effort and rigour required to satisfy the objectives associated with
models influencing safety-related behaviours will differ from those models that do not.
6.2.4.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
The first step of the Model Criticality Analysis (MCA) process is to perform a failure
analysis on any functional components of a BNS that utilise BN models. These components
could be influenced by errors in the BN models – and ultimately in the data artefacts used
to build these models. For this case study, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
is used to illustrate how the MCA interfaces with existing safety analysis techniques. The
FMEA was performed on three Functions defined in the system architecture model shown
in Figure 6.2; these are the Drug Administration, Health Monitoring and Practitioner
Alert functions.
The process of applying the FMEA proceeds as normal, with the selection of a function
and the exploration of any associated failure modes, the effects of these failure modes and
an enumeration of potential causes of these failure modes.13 The results generated from
the FMEA are shown in Table 6.2. For brevity, only a subset of those causes directly
associated with errors in models have been listed in the analysis.
The FMEA indicates that the same model may be a contributing factor to failure
modes associated with differing severity categories, and that distinct BN models may be
13An extensive review of failure analysis techniques can be found in the work of Pumfrey [83].
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associated with failure modes with widely varying severity assignments within the same
software system. For example, errors in the Data Fusion model may produce failure
modes in the AMTS, but as this model is used only by software functions that provide
advisory information (i.e. it does not execute any actions that directly affect the health of
a patient), the severity of these failure modes is classified by the FMEA as negligible. In
contrast, the case study assumes that the Drug Treatment function administers potentially
dangerous drugs directly to patients without the possibility of human intervention. The
FMEA highlights that the system may administer multiple different drugs to treat distinct
symptoms. For example, consider the failure mode:
Failure to command administration of drug (Epinephrine) when required.
This failure mode is ranked as the most severe failure mode directly associated with
a BN model in the AMTS. Practically, this would reflect a case where a patient is suffer-
ing from (potentially fatal) anaphylactic shock and would require an immediate dose of
epinephrine as treatment. Failure to diagnose this state in a patient due to an error in the
Diagnosis Model may directly lead to this outcome. Without further analysis, this could
be attributed to an error in the state of the output variable associated with this diagnosis
(i.e. the Anaphylaxis variable). However, the analysis sheds little light on precisely how
this error may emerge. The following failure mode is also directly associated with a similar
error in the Diagnosis Model :
Failure to command administration of drug (Morphine) when required.
In this case, the severity of the failure mode is lower. This highlights that the severity
of failure modes associated with errors within individual models - and more importantly
- individual variables, can vary significantly. As stated in previous chapters, the causes
of these errors can not necessarily be identified through conventional analysis techniques:
they may be the result of interactions between disparate parts of a BN model that may only
be discovered through exploration of a model’s structure and parameter-space [65,170,205].
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Table 6.2: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) excerpts for an example applied to the RM-BNS architecture.
Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Severity Cause
Drug Administration:
Treat Onset of Ana-
phylaxis (Software
Component)
Failure to command
administration of drug
(Epinephrine) when
required.
BNS does not inform
drug management
systems to administer
drug (Epinephrine).
System does not ad-
minister patient with
primary treatment for
Anaphylactic Shock.
Very high risk of pa-
tient death or serious
physical damage.
Catastrophic ...
c) Erroneous patient diagnosis (fail-
ure to recognise onset of Anaphylac-
tic Shock) due to Diagnosis Model
error (error in state of Anaphy-
laxis Variable). d) Erroneous pa-
tient diagnosis (failure to recognise
onset of Anaphylactic Shock) due to
algorithmic error (inference engine).
...
Command to admin-
ister dose of drug
(Epinephrine) when
not required.
BNS informs drug
management subsys-
tems to administer
epinephrine.
System administers
dose of drug to patient.
High risk of patient
death (induced heart
attack, organ failure),
serious discomfort and
physical damage.
Hazardous
... c) Erroneous patient diagno-
sis (diagnoses Anaphylactic Shock
when not present) due to Diagno-
sis Model error (error in state of
Anaphylaxis Variable).
...
204
6.2
C
ase
S
tu
d
y
Table 6.2: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) excerpts for an example applied to the RM-BNS architecture (continued).
Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Severity Cause
Drug Administration:
Treat Discomfort
(Software Component)
Failure to command
administration of drug
(Morphine) when re-
quired.
BNS fails to inform
drug management
systems to administer
drug (Morphine).
System does not ad-
minister patient with
treatment for moder-
ate to severe discom-
fort. Risk of severe pa-
tient discomfort.
Minor ...
b) Erroneous patient diagnosis (fail-
ure to recognise need for addi-
tional anaesthetic) due to Diag-
nosis Model error (error in state
of Insufficient Anaesthetic Vari-
able).
...
Command to admin-
ister drug (Morphine)
when not required.
BNS informs drug
management systems
to administer drug
(Morphine) to patient.
System administers
drug (Morphine) dose
to patient. Risk of
patient overdose, lead-
ing to serious physical
damage or death.
Hazardous ...
b) Erroneous patient diagnosis (er-
roneously diagnosing the need for
additional anaesthetic) due to Di-
agnosis Model error (error in state
of Insufficient Anaesthetic Vari-
able). ...
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Table 6.2: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) excerpts for an example applied to the RM-BNS architecture (continued).
Function Failure Mode Local Effect System Effect Severity Cause
Health Monitoring
(Software Component)
Failure to accurately
indicate current Pa-
tient Health Status.
BNS does not reflect
current status of pa-
tient.
System does not pro-
vide accurate informa-
tion to medical prac-
titioners on health of
patient. Very low risk
of erroneous treatment
by medical practition-
ers.
Negligible ...
d) Erroneous patient health indica-
tors due to Data Fusion Model
error.
...
Practitioner Alert
(Software Component)
Failure to Alert Practi-
tioner when required.
BNS does not signal
system to raise alarm.
System fails to sum-
mon medical prac-
titioner to patient.
Risk of serious phys-
ical damage and/or
discomfort.
Hazardous ...
b) Erroneous alert recommendation
due to Diagnosis Model error.
c) Erroneous alert recommendation
due to errors in Alert Model (A)
and Alert Model (B).
...
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6.2.4.2 Assigning Model Authority Categories
The Model Authority Categories (MACs) and Model Criticality Indices (MCIs) provide a
mechanism for describing the safety role of each model in a system at a lower level. The
FMEA is used to provide the severity categories for the MCIs, while a RM-BNS system ar-
chitecture model (similar to that provided in Figure 6.2) provides the necessary details for
the assignment of MACs. For example, the MAC categories assigned to both Alert Models
and the Diagnosis Model directly reflect the architecture. The initial MAC and MCI as-
signments are shown in Table 6.3. All three models are utilised directly by safety-related
system functions, though the Alert Models would receive only a MAC-2 assignment, and
the Diagnosis Model would receive a MAC-0 assignment. This arises as a consequence of
the Diagnosis Model being used in a monolithic architecture. In contrast, the Alert Models
are used in an ensemble architecture; this configuration ensures a degree of redundancy in
how each model’s outputs are used.14 Ensemble configurations may reduce the potential
for model-centric common-cause error modes and single point of failure error modes, the
latter of which is the principal weakness of monolithic configurations.
The MCIs are then defined based upon the MAC assignment and the severity categories
provided by the FMEA. The severity category used to define the MCIs is drawn from the
most severe category of failure mode identified by the FMEA. Both Alert Models receive an
MCI-1 assignment. This reflects the additional risk associated with the use of these models
given the most severe category assigned to a failure mode associated directly with these
models is defined as Hazardous. Similarly, the Data Fusion Model reflects the criticality of
a model that despite indirectly influencing the state of a patient (captured in its MAC-3
assignment), the low severity of failure modes associated with this model produces the
lowest category of MCI: MCI-4.
14The definitions of ensemble and monolithic models can be found in section 4.3.2.
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Table 6.3: Model Authority Categories (MACs) and Model Criticality Indices (MCIs) for the AMTS system.
Model Description Authority Criticality
Data Fusion Model for synthesising data from all available input
sources to provide additional insight into patient health
and status (e.g. predicting vital signs, drug levels).
MAC-3 Support-
ing
MCI-4
Diagnosis Model Model for diagnosing patients with the following health
statuses: Left Ventricular Failure; Pulmonary Embolism;
Anaphylactic Shock; Insufficient Anaesthesia; Tracheal
Intubation Status; Damaged Tubing (Equipment error);
Hypovolemia; Disconnected Devices (Equipment error).
MAC-0 Full MCI-0
Alert Model (A) Model (A) for alerting medical practitioners in the event
of patient discomfort or requirement of treatment outside
of AMTS’s scope.
MAC-2 Partial
(II)
MCI-1
Alert Model (B) Model (B) for alerting medical practitioners in the event
of patient discomfort or requirement of treatment outside
of AMTS’s scope.
MAC-2 Partial
(II)
MCI-1
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6.2.4.3 Assigning Variable Criticality Indices
The MCIs provide a mechanism for ensuring the proportionality of efforts to satisfy those
system-specific objectives that directly address the global aspects of a model: the overall
dynamics and properties of a model are the focus of the MCIs.15 They reflect the level of
required integrity and rigour of all processes associated with exploring these properties.
However, the MCI assignments are not intended to address the same notions of integrity
and rigour associated with local aspects of a model; this is the aim of the Variable Authority
Categories (VACs) and Variable Criticality Indices (VCIs).
Table 6.4: Severity assignments for variables in the Medical Diagnostic model.
Variable Type Identifier Severity
Anaphylaxis Safety Related ANAPHYLAXIS 0 - Catastrophic
Damaged Tubing Safety Related KINKEDTUBE 3 - Minor
Tracheal Intubation Safety Related INTUBATION 2- Major
Pulmonary Embolism Safety Related PULMEMBOLUS 0 - Catastrophic
Insufficient Anaesthesia Safety Related INSUFFANESTH 3 - Minor
Disconnected Device Non-Safety Re-
lated
DISCONNECT 4 - Negligible
Hypovolemic Shock Safety Related HYPOVOLEMIA 1 - Hazardous
Left Ventricular Failure Safety Related LVFAILURE 0 - Catastrophic
Assigning VACs begins by identifying a set of Safety-Related Variables (SRVs). These
are variables drawn from a given BN model that are utilised directly by a software function.
The SRVs will therefore be a subset of variables that will be a subset of a model’s output
variables. Importantly, a model may contain outputs that are never utilised in support of
safety-related software functions. The intent of the VACs and VCIs is therefore to provide
a higher degree of resolution on which parts of a BN model are influential with respect to
15Though not attempted in this thesis, the MCIs were defined with the aim of providing a general
framework for categorising AI models, including models other than BNs. Without change, the MCI and
MAC classifications could theoretically be applied to the description of other AISs.
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the SRVs.
From an assurance perspective, some variables within a model will be more important
than others. As outlined in Chapter 4, the VCIs aim to help ensure that effort is directed
towards those aspects of a system that most require them, and therefore avoid a ‘blanket’
approach to analysing a BN model indiscriminately. This is partially motivated by an
aim to ensure the efficiency of any assurance activities used to evaluate a BN model and
its components. However, it is also motivated by potential computational limitations:
indiscriminate, exhaustive application of some evaluation techniques may not simply be
inefficient, but also computationally intractable. Therefore, the VCIs aim to provide
information on which aspects of a model are most important to the model’s behaviours.
This then facilitates the targeted application of these evaluation techniques (and moderates
the scope and rigour of these techniques) to the aspects of a model that are of most interest
to assurance practitioners.
The identification of SRVs can be achieved using the outputs of the FMEA, or through
extensions of this analysis that specifically consider the role of model outputs in the func-
tional behaviours of the system. The FMEA produced for this case study includes limited
information on the role of variables, but this is sufficient to support the assignment of
VACs. Table 6.4 shows all output variables for the Diagnosis Model, alongside their
model identifiers (corresponding to the abbreviations used in the implementation of the
model), the category of the variable (i.e. either an SRV or Non-SRV), and the severity of
failure modes associated with each variable as identified by the FMEA.16
With the SRVs identified, Variable Criticality Analysis (VCA) may be performed.
The VCA technique was applied to the Diagnostic Model, and the resulting VCI matrix
is shown in Figure 6.4. The visualisation highlights the pairwise interactions within the
model and the relative degree of influence of these interactions upon one another. These
interactions are the basis of the VAC and VCI assignments. However, the visualisation
can also be used to highlight clusters of variables that interact with one another. While
the utility of this observation was not explored in detail in Chapter 4 and is beyond the
scope of this case study, it is worth noting that information such as this may be useful
to assurance practitioners in ensuring the targeted assurance and fine-tuning of a given
BN model. Furthermore, the algorithm introduced in Chapter 4 does not provide an
16Non-SRV indicates a variable that receives a severity rating of zero.
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exhaustive exploration of the state-space of a BN model, and therefore the absence of any
strong interactions (represented as light-coloured areas in the visualisation) between two
variables does not necessarily imply that no strong interactions could exist in some model
topologies.
Table 6.5 shows a subset of the final VCIs for the Diagnosis Model. The ‘Preliminary
Criticality’ assignments reflect the VCIs the variables would have received if interactions
between variables were not accounted for.17 This provides a measure of what has been
gained by performing the analysis: by using the technique, an assurance practitioner can
establish a clearer understanding of which aspects of the model influence safety-related
system functionality, and the degree of contribution of individual variables to the state of
the SRVs (i.e. the output of the model).
For example, the results of the VCA for the Patient History variable highlight this
point. The interaction between the ‘Patient History’ variable and the Left Ventricular
Failure variable is assigned a VAC-3 classification and VCI-2 index respectively. This
indicates that the former variable has a Low VAC over the latter variable. However, when
this category is considered in the context of the severity of a failure mode associated with an
error in the Left Ventricular Failure variable, the criticality of the Patient History variable
is then higher. This information can be used by assurance practitioners to proportionally
address assurance objectives associated with this variable.
The MCA methodology has been designed to provide insight when used as a standalone
technique. It can provide assurance practitioners with safety-related insights into the
dynamics of a BN model. For example, Figure 6.4 clearly highlights a number of strongly
interacting groups of variables within the model. Many of these are ranked as low criticality
model aspects, though some (such as ‘LVEDVOLUME’ and ‘STROKEVOLUME’) are
high criticality and appear to be highly influential upon one another. By highlighting
this assurance insight, assurance practitioners can begin to target development activities
related to these variables to better understand the implications of these interactions.
17This reflects the state of information available to assurance practitioners prior to using the VCA
technique.
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Figure 6.4: Visualisation of Variable Criticality Index (VCI) assignments for the Medical Diagnostic model.
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Table 6.5: Criticality assignments for a selection of variables for the Diagnostic Model.
Variable Identifier Preliminary
Crit.
Criticality
Anaphylaxis ANAPHYLAXIS VCI-0 VCI-0
Pulmonary Capillary
Wedge Pressure
PCWP VCI-4 VCI-0
Patient History HISTORY VCI-4 VCI-2
Lung Ventilation VENTLUNG VCI-4 VCI-3
Disconnect DISCONNECT VCI-4 VCI-4
The analysis for this section was performed using an inference engine developed and
implemented over the course of this project. The MCA algorithm introduced in Chapter
4 was built upon this engine, and the results shown in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.5 represent
outputs from this tool.
While MCA may be used as a standalone approach, it was design with the intent of
supporting the assurance of BNS Model Viewpoint Aspects more broadly. This involves
utilising the results of the MCA (and by extension, VCA) to enable the sufficiency of
assurance efforts to be established. This is the subject of the remaining sections of this
case study.
6.2.5 Mapping Objectives to Evidence Classifications
It is essential that the relationship and rationale linking objectives and their associated
items of evidence is now made explicit. This can be achieved using the framework and
concepts introduced in Chapter 5. Table 6.6 gives (an incomplete) set of evidence items
and evidence classifications for the RM-BNS Model Viewpoint objectives introduced earlier
in this case study generated using this framework. Consider the objective MV-1.1-A.
The table enumerates five distinct items of evidence that may be used to justify the
satisfaction of this objective. This is not an exhaustive list. However, for this single
objective, the evidence classes define a hierarchy within the evidence items that aligns
with the sentiments of standards such as Defence Standard (DS) 00-056. As discussed in
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Chapter 5, this standard states:
“Explicit, objective evidence [items] are more compelling than those that appeal
to judgement, custom or practice.”
For example, with respect to Table 6.6, Evidence Items (a) and (b) represent items
arguably most in keeping with the sentiment of DS 00-056. These are ‘objective’ analyses
that provide concrete statistical metrics for characterising the properties of the Diagno-
sis Model. In contrast, the remaining three objectives appeal to various forms of expert
judgement. However, within these remaining three evidence items, the role of those items
of evidence is made explicit and a hierarchy of these items is exposed. From an assurance
perspective therefore, the evidence classifications (and characteristics) provide the foun-
dation for an assessment of how compelling a given set of evidence items are with respect
to a given objective.
This is also important as the scope and importance of evidence items will vary across
system aspects and across specific objectives. For example, Table 6.6 also provides a
subset of evidence items that may be used to satisfy the second objective (MV-1.1-B).
As discussed in section previously, this objective represents an instantiation of objective
MV-1.1 for a specific local model structure aspect of the Diagnosis Model.
Consequently, the technical analyses applied to this variable may well be narrower in
scope and focus more on local considerations. By extension, additional distinct evidence
items may be used in the satisfaction of this objective (MV-1.1-B) in comparison to that
of the previous objective (MV-1.1-A). The evidence classifications once again support
the development of an evidence hierarchy which can be used as the first step towards
establishing the sufficiency of efforts to satisfy the given objective.
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Table 6.6: A mapping of AMTS System-Specific Objectives to Evidence Items and Evidence Classifications.
View ID Objective Evidence Item Class (ERC) Class (ETC)
Structure MV-1.1-A Establish and justify the ba-
sis for using a static Discrete
Bayesian Network for the ‘Di-
agnosis Model’ network.
(a) Statistical Analyses showing
that the domain (ICU ward/pa-
tients) can be modelled effectively
as a time-independent (static) prob-
lem.
Direct Statistical
(b) Statistical Analyses showing
that the use of a discrete distribu-
tion is appropriate for the problem.
Direct Statistical
(c) Expert opinion that the do-
main can be modelled as a time-
independent (static) problem.
Direct Qualitative
(d) A review of the available
‘Knowledge Base’ indicating that
there are no underlying scenarios
that may invalidate the ‘static’ and
‘discrete’ properties of the ‘Diag-
nostic Model’.
Backing Qualitative
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Table 6.6: A mapping of AMTS System-Specific Objectives to Evidence Items and Evidence Classifications (continued).
View ID Objective Evidence Item Class (ERC) Class (ETC)
(e) Expert justification that the do-
main should be modelled using a
time-independent (static) BN in-
stead of alternative modelling ap-
proaches.
Reinforcement Qualitative
... ... ... ... ...
Structure MV-1.1-B Establish and justify the basis
for using a categorical distri-
bution for the ‘Anaphylaxis’
Random Variable.
(a) Statistical Analyses showing
that the ‘Anaphylaxis’ RV can be
modelled as a discrete categorical
RV.
Direct Statistical
(b) Expert opinion that modelling
the ‘Anaphylaxis’ as a discrete
categorical RV is appropriate for the
domain aspect (the state of the pa-
tient) being modelled.
Direct Qualitative
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Table 6.6: A mapping of AMTS System-Specific Objectives to Evidence Items and Evidence Classifications (continued).
View ID Objective Evidence Item Class (ERC) Class (ETC)
(c) Statistical Analyses showing
that using a discrete categorical
RV would not negatively affect the
performance of the ‘Diagnostic
Model’.
Backing Statistical
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As with the MCA technique, while the evidence classification framework introduced in
Chapter 5 can be used alone, it was defined with the intent of being used alongside the rest
of the contributions of this thesis. Specifically, whether or not a set of items of evidence
are sufficient for the satisfaction of a given objective is dependent on the criticality of the
system aspect addressed by that objective. As discussed in Chapter 5, this requires the
integration of criticality metrics with the evidence classification framework.
6.2.6 Mapping Objectives to Criticality Metrics
With a framework for describing and communicating the role and nature of evidence in
place, and the evidence items for the AMTS system aspects classified, the next step is to
integrate criticality metrics to provide a clearer view of the safety implications of Model
Viewpoint system aspects and consider how compelling the available evidence for a given
objective is in the context of this information.
For the purposes of this case study, the outputs of the MCA are used to provide
criticality metrics for each Model object within the RM-BNS system architecture model
(such as that shown in Figure 6.3). Each of these objects will have a set of object-specific
RM-BNS objectives associated with it. This enables the criticality of a system aspect to
be mapped directly onto the objectives associated with that aspect. An example of such
a mapping is shown in Table 6.7.
While the MCA technique is used for this case study, alternative techniques could of
course be used to establish the criticality of other system aspects. Indeed, while there
are a number of potential techniques for establishing the criticality of system aspects
outside of the Model Viewpoint aspects addressed by the MCA technique, the selection
and application of such techniques to the RM-BNS objectives has been beyond the scope
of the project.
The mapping shown in Table 6.7 highlights a number of important considerations for
assurance practitioners. For example, objective MV-1.1-B addresses aforementioned assur-
ance concerns associated with the ‘Anaphylaxis’ RV. The MCA carried out in section 6.2.4
assigned this variable a VCI-0 classification. From an assurance perspective, therefore, the
assurance of the properties and behaviours of this variable is particularly important for
the AMTS. In contrast, the objective MV-1.1-C addresses the ‘Disconnected Device’ RV.
This RV received a VCI-4 assignment in the MCA. Consequently, what may be regarded
as sufficient for the satisfaction of each of these objectives may vary: the standard of
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evidence required for the satisfaction of MV-1.1-C may be lower than that required for
the satisfaction of MV-1.1-B.
6.2.7 Proportionality and Sufficiency
At this point in the case study, the following insights have been established:
• An understanding of the interactions between aspects of the AMTS (using the RM-
BNS architecture model).
• A set of system-specific assurance objectives.
• An in-depth understanding of the assurance implications of the dynamics of the
‘Diagnosis Model’.
• An understanding of the criticality of individual (model-centric) system-specific ob-
jectives and the items of evidence associated with them.
Together, these insights can be used to support the discussion of the sufficiency of
assurance efforts undertaken in the development of the AMTS. At a granular level, the
case study has identified how important a limited set of system aspects are to the safety
of the AMTS and described and classified the evidence available to satisfy the objectives
associated with these aspects. There are two principal approaches that could be adopted
by assurance practitioners in establishing the proportionality and sufficiency of efforts to
satisfy any given objective/s.
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Table 6.7: An Objective-Criticality Mapping for aspects of the AMTS.
View ID Criticality Objective Evidence Item Evidence Classes
Structure MV-1.1-A MCI-0 Establish and justify the basis for using a
static Discrete Bayesian Network for the
‘Diagnosis Model’ network.
... ...
MV-1.1-B VCI-0 Establish and justify the basis for using a
categorical distribution for the ‘Anaphy-
laxis’ Random Variable.
... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
MV-1.1-C VCI-4 Establish and justify the basis for using a
categorical distribution for the ‘Discon-
nected Device’ Random Variable.
... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
MV-1.1-D VCI-2 Establish and justify the basis for using a
categorical distribution for the ‘Tracheal
Intubation’ Random Variable.
... ...
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6.2.7.1 Varying Objectives
The first approach outlined in Chapter 5 that may be adopted by assurance practitioners is
an approach similar to that taken in DO-178C: to vary the number of objectives associated
with different system aspects in accordance with the criticality of a given BNS. One way
of implementing this approach could be to vary the number of RM-BNS objectives that
must be satisfied given the criticality of a system aspect addressed by that objective.
For example, in the context of the ‘Anaphylaxis’ variable in Table 6.7, an assurance
practitioner should seek to satisfy every RM-BNS objective associated with that system
aspect. In contrast, it may be reasonable to satisfy only a relatively small subset of
objectives for the ‘Disconnected Device’ system aspect.
As outlined in Chapter 5, a systematic way of implementing such an approach may be
to utilise the inherent structure of the RM-BNS objectives: the objectives associated with
each object in the RM-BNS framework are ordered such that lower indexed objectives
are the most granular objectives (typically dealing with specific technical system aspects),
while the higher indexed objectives are associated with more generic notions of assurance
for a given system aspect. The objectives have been defined to draw attention to system
aspects that may be overlooked by BN developers and assurance practitioners, and to
encourage stakeholders to explicitly discuss and justify the rationale behind key modelling
decisions.
Table 6.8: Varying the number of objectives for a BNS system aspect in proportion to the
criticality of the aspect.
Object Identifier Criticality No. Objectives
Model ANAPHYLAXIS VCI-0 17
Model HISTORY VCI-2 9
Model DISCONNECT VCI-4 1
Table 6.8 shows how the number of variables may be varied given the criticality of
the RVs introduced in section 6.2.4 in accordance with the suggestion outlined in Chapter
5. For example, the ‘Anaphylaxis’ RV would require the satisfaction of all 17 objectives
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targeting that system aspect as it was assigned the highest criticality category. In contrast
the ‘Patient History’ RV would require the satisfaction of only 9 objectives as it received
a moderate criticality assignment. Practically, this corresponds to all but the first two
objectives in each of the four Model Viewpoint Views.
Those variables with the lowest criticality assignments – such as ‘Device Disconnect’
– may only need to demonstrate the satisfaction of a single objective. These objectives
correspond to the highest-level objectives of each View. This would waive the need for
developers to explicitly justify the design decision associated with the other objectives,
and instead fall back to a higher-level (lower-confidence) stance on the assurance of the
system aspect. In all cases, the satisfaction of an objective would require the presentation
of equally compelling evidence.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5, there is scope for introducing additional considera-
tions related to the independence of these objectives. This would involve some number of
objectives being satisfied by independent development teams to – theoretically – ensure
the objectivity of the evidence used to satisfy an objective.
6.2.7.2 Varying Evidence
Alternatively, assurance practitioners may choose to adopt an approach that instead varies
the quantity and quality of assurance evidence for a given system aspect. In the case
of the AMTS, this would involve satisfying all objectives for all system aspects in the
AMTS. However, adherents of this approach would accept lower-confidence evidence for
system aspects associated with lower levels of criticality and would require more compelling
evidence as the criticality of a system aspect increased.
For example, consider again the objectives in Table 6.7. The objectives MV-1.1-B
and MV-1.1-C represent objectives addressing two RV objects at the opposite ends of
the criticality scale. In both cases, this approach would require the satisfaction of all
17 objectives for both objects. However, it may be the case that the evidence that is
available to demonstrate the satisfaction of objective MV-1.1-C is limited to an item of
evidence that would be classified as a Backing, Qualitative item of evidence. Given the
low criticality of the ‘Disconnect’ RV, an assurance practitioner may decide that this is
sufficient to hold MV-1.1-C satisfied. In contrast, such evidence would not be sufficient to
hold MV-1.1-B as satisfied.
A further example of this may be in the application of the techniques outlined in
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section 5.5.5.1 on the application of statistical techniques to satisfying objective MV-2.2.
This system-specific objective for the ‘History’ RV may be defined as follows:
“MV-2.2 – Establish and justify the accuracy of the parameterisation of the
History RV.”
As the AMTS parameterisation is learned from data, the statistical confidence in the
parameterisation and Chan’s parameter boundary checking technique can be applied di-
rectly to this problem. As Figure 6.4 indicates, the ‘History’ RV influences the higher
criticality SRV ‘Insufficient Anaesthesia’ RV. An assurance practitioner may therefore
seek to satisfy the above objective by first characterising the statistical confidence in the
parameter estimate. The confidence intervals for a parameter in the ‘History’ RV (assum-
ing 50 observations) are shown in Table 6.9. The lower number of observations acts to
broaden the confidence intervals, thereby making the parameter estimate more uncertain.
The ‘History’ RV was assigned a VCI-2 category earlier in this chapter. By adopting the
proposed confidence interval for this criticality as outlined in Chapter 5 (95% interval), an
assurance practitioner can have high statistical confidence that the parameter lies within
the range 52.1% and 77.7%. This establishes the accuracy of the parameter estimate.
Table 6.9: Confidence intervals on the ‘History’ RV parameter estimates.
Crit. Interval Parameter Lower Limit Upper Limit
4 75.0% 66.0% 57.9% 73.2%
3 90.0% 66.0% 54.4% 75.9%
2 95.0% 66.0% 52.1% 77.7%
1 99.0% 66.0% 47.8% 80.4%
0 99.9% 66.0% 42.9% 83.3%
As before, the next step is to justify this accuracy – why is it an acceptable accuracy
for the given application? This could once again be achieved using Chan’s technique. As
before, assuming that assurance practitioners wish to demonstrate that the ‘Insufficient
Anaesthesia’ RV would not be significantly influenced by potential errors in the ‘History’
RV, they can compute the upper and lower bounds on the possible values the ‘History’
parameters may take. Using the figures in Chan’s work, this would once again produce
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upper and lower bounds of 81% and 50% respectively.18
Given this information, an assurance practitioner can then demonstrate that the ac-
curacy of the ‘History’ RV is sufficient as the confidence intervals lie within the bounds
defined by Chan’s technique. Practically, an assurance practitioner can expect the outputs
of the ‘Insufficient Anaesthesia’ RV to be robust to errors in the ‘History’ RV. However,
if subsequent analyses were to increase the criticality of the ‘History’ RV for any reason,
this evidence would not be sufficient: the range of plausible values would lie outside of
the upper and lower bounds indicated by Chan’s technique. In this case, it would force
assurance practitioners to gather more data or run additional analyses to provide evidence
for the satisfaction of the objective – they would need greater confidence in their evidence.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the research carried out over the course of this project
suggests that an approach to the assurance of a BNS that focusses on the varying assurance
evidence should be favoured by assurance practitioners. In general, these approaches
should be able to accommodate changes within the BN field more readily, and can support
the development of more esoteric BNS applications without changes to the underlying
assurance framework – as may be the case with more prescriptive approaches.
In the context of this case study, varying the evidence instead of the objectives enables
assurance practitioners to ensure that all system aspects are explicitly considered and
targeted by their analyses. Moreover, it more readily accommodates the potential for shifts
in the criticality of system aspects as a system develops. For example, if the ‘Diagnosis
Model’ were to be updated to include additional RVs, the dynamics of the model may
be dramatically altered. This may produce different criticality assignments for variables
within the model. For assurance practitioners adhering to such an approach, this may
require only the enhancement of existing work, while those adhering to an objective-driven
approach may have to undertake entirely new assurance activities.
6.2.8 Note on Generalisability
The case study presented in this chapter has been designed to be representative of a typical
BNS used for a safety critical application. It was synthesised from several publications
and therefore reflects aspects of a number of BNSs that have been – or currently are –
18This is adopted purely for convenience and brevity. The dynamics of the ALARM network would
modify Chan’s figures and this estimate would therefore be inaccurate. However, it serves the purpose of
this example.
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in active service. However, it is still a singular case study and by extension cannot cover
all potential applications or operational scenarios of mission-critical BNSs. In particular,
while the case study covers a range of important BNS assurance concerns, it does not
provide evidence that the proposed approaches will cover all potential concerns in all
scenarios.
For example, there are no known limitations or omissions within the generic RM-BNS
objectives. However, it is possible that future work may identify concerns beyond the
scope of those considered over the course of this research. These concerns may arise as a
consequence of developing novel BNS applications, utilising BNS variants not considered
in the course of this work or from other technological advancements within the BN/PGM
modelling frameworks themselves. Importantly, it is unlikely that the emergence of new
assurance concerns would require the modification of the framework’s viewpoints or views,
though they may rather require the refinement or extension of the proposed objectives
instead. This would not invalidate the framework, and indeed the framework was designed
with thought to ensuring extensibility in the event of such a case as this.
Beyond the generic objectives themselves (justification of which has been provided in
Section 3.6), there remains the challenge of deriving a set of system-specific objectives.
When deriving objectives for this case study, no practical challenges were encountered,
and every important aspect of the system was covered by at least one derived objective.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the derivation of these objectives requires judgment
on the part of an assurance practitioner, and it is possible that a future case study may
highlight a case in which an objective is not applicable to a particular application, or that
may require modified or additional objectives to effectively cover a particular concern.
In the former case, practitioners should feel free to drop objectives provided a clear,
compelling rationale for doing so can be provided. In the latter case, the generic objectives
could be extended to accommodate these findings.
With respect to the application of the the MCA technique introduced in Chapter 4 to
this case study, no modification was required. In cases utilising ‘standard’ BN variants,
the technique should generalise well to other models, though extremely large models may
encounter issues related to scalability. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7. More
generally, some modifications to the core Sensitivity Analysis (SA) technique may be
necessary to accommodate some BN model variants, or other non-standard architectures.
In these cases, the general concept and insights will remain applicable and as outlined
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in Chapter 4, the MCA process was designed with the aim of enabling a practitioner
to replace the core SA algorithm with one of their choosing, provided a set of simple
constraints are satisfied.
In conclusion, the threats to the external validity of the techniques applied in this
case study and their ability to generalise to real systems revolve primarily around the
possibility that future work identifies omissions or shortcomings of the framework in the
light of an application that is beyond the scope of the applications considered in this
thesis. However, this would not be fatal to the framework and the contributions of this
thesis as a whole, though it may require the extension or modification to more effectively
account for such an outcome. Ultimately, this work has demonstrated the feasibility of the
provision of evidence for a subset of objectives. Future work will need to evaluate whether
the methodology presented here is equally feasible for a wider range of applications and
evidence.
6.2.9 Summary
This case study has provided an overview of the application of the techniques proposed
in this thesis to an example system. It has indicated the potential utility of the RM-BNS
framework in modelling BNSs and for generating comprehensive objectives that aim to
explicitly address unconventional system aspects and considerations. It has also provided
an example application of the MCA technique to a BN model, and illustrated a number
of the insights that may be gained through the utilisation of this approach. Finally, it
has outlined two potential strategies for ultimately assuring a BNS in the context of the
example system.
6.3 Practicability of Application
The utility of a new assurance technique or concept lies in the ability of assurance prac-
titioners to apply them to an engineering problem and observe the relative merits and
challenges associated with them. The application of the techniques and concepts pro-
posed in this thesis to a in-development BNS was not possible over the course of this
research project. However, it is possible to evaluate the practicability of these techniques
in the context of this chapter’s case study, and to explore some broader considerations
associated with the application of the contributions of this thesis to the development of a
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mission- and/or safety-critical BNS.
6.3.1 Application of the RM-BNS
The RM-BNS introduced in Chapter 3 was developed to support the description and
modelling of BNSs similar to that of the motivating example outlined in Chapter 1: a
fault diagnosis and prognosis system that directly influences the functional behaviour of a
system. The priority of the work presented throughout this thesis has been to support the
assurance of this class of system in the first instance. However, the RM-BNS framework
has been defined with the aim of accommodating a range of commonly used BN model
architectures and variants; it can be considered to be a general framework for modelling
BNSs. Consequently, it is envisioned that with relatively minor modifications, the RM-
BNS framework could be applied to any BNS.
The case study provides an indication that the RM-BNS framework can be applied
in a straightforward manner to the same class of system as the system in the motivating
example of the thesis. The case study also indicates that the techniques introduced in this
thesis can expose system aspects that may be overlooked in conventional software safety
analysis and certification approaches. In particular, it highlights the centrality of Model
Viewpoint and Data Viewpoint system aspects in the architecture of a BNS, and indicates
mechanisms through which a BNS may be exposed to its operational environment and
the potential impact of changes to this environment upon the functional behaviour of the
system. A primary function of the RM-BNS framework is to visually capture interactions
between system aspects. These interactions are crucial to understanding the behaviour of
a BNS and by extension to assure such a system.
One of the key concepts – and contributions – of the RM-BNS is the need to address
the assurance of BNSs using a multi-viewpoint approach. The viewpoints proposed in
Chapter 3 were defined to address specific BNS assurance challenges. The application of
these viewpoints both throughout this thesis, in section 6.2 and in other work suggests that
this may be a convenient and intuitive way to communicate key BNS assurance challenges
to relevant stakeholders [156]. Furthermore, the viewpoints (and to some extent the RM-
BNS framework more broadly) are intended to be relatively generic, and may be used to
describe assurance challenges associated with other AI techniques. They may therefore
provide a starting point for a generic framework for the assurance of AISs. However,
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further exploration of this work has been beyond the scope of this thesis.19
Finally, the RM-BNS provides a framework for sharing information between assurance
practitioners and BN developers about the implications of design and implementation
decisions upon a BNS using a shared language. The aim of the framework is to facilitate
an informed debate about the assurance implications of these decisions in a transparent,
interpretable format. The application of the framework to the AMTS (and other systems
within literature) indicates that the RM-BNS can capture and relay information about the
architecture of the system and that this can be used for subsequent analysis and testing
of the system. The experience of applying it to the AMTS also indicates that it is highly
flexible in terms of capturing novel system architectures.
6.3.2 Application of the RM-BNS Objectives
Much like the RM-BNS framework itself, the verification and validation objectives intro-
duced in Chapter 3 were defined to address assurance concerns associated with the system
in the motivating example of this thesis. The proposed objectives have been refined to
help ensure their generality to alternative BNS use-cases and variants. The objectives for
the Model Viewpoint have been defined with the hope of supporting the description of
other AI approaches too. This was aimed at providing a mechanism for defining a set of
generic AIS verification and validation objectives to support the assurance of AISs in gen-
eral. However, the development of these ideas was also beyond the scope of this research
project, though these ideas have been discussed in other work [207].
With respect to the case study, the RM-BNS objectives were applied and refined
according to the processes outlined in Chapter 3. The resulting system-specific objectives
facilitated the exposure of several important assurance considerations in the context of the
AMTS. The example objectives provided in section 6.2.3 highlight the need to consider
the role of various data pre-processing steps on the expressiveness of the BN models used
in a BNS, and the distinct assurance considerations that are introduced when refining a
Model Viewpoint objective for local and global model assurance considerations.
From a practical perspective, the generation of objectives for the AMTS was a slow
process. Objectives were generated for each object in the model fragment shown in Figure
6.3. This corresponded to more than 200 objectives, though the granularity and scope of
19Some of the concepts related to this idea were presented in [206,207].
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these objectives is much narrower than in existing standards.20 As the case study focussed
on only a subset of these objectives, a full exploration of the operational overhead asso-
ciated with satisfying all of these objectives was not attempted. However, the objectives
can be compartmentalised and tackled on an atomic basis, meaning that – in the limited
experience provided by the case study – the generation and management of system-specific
objectives for a larger system should not be an overwhelmingly complex problem.
More broadly, the application of the RM-BNS objectives to a BNS provides a struc-
tured mechanism for the development of a BNS that is unique within the BN domain [206].
The challenge of assuring a BNS lies in ‘unmasking’ the ‘dark art’ aspects of BNS develop-
ment for assurance practitioners and ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are fully aware
of the implications of design and implementation decisions for a given system. They pro-
vide a first step towards systematising the assurance of BNSs.
6.3.3 Application of the Model Criticality Analysis Technique
The Model Criticality Analysis (MCA) approach introduced in Chapter 4 was developed
to provide a general technique for exploring the dynamics of any BN model and to inte-
grate safety information into existing BN analysis techniques in order to provide a safety-
focussed assessment of a BN model. This assessment can then be used to derive Model
and Variable criticality metrics that can be used to provide assurance practitioners with
insight into the safety implications of BN model design decisions.
From the outset, MCA was developed with the aim of supporting the analysis of any
BN variant or BNS architecture: it does not assume the number or configuration of the
models used in a BNS, nor does it assume the internal structure of these models. Within
the case study, it was demonstrated that the MCA approach can be applied to models that
represent ‘basic’ architectures. This demonstrates that the MCA approach is applicable
to the most common forms of BN models. The implementation of the MCA algorithm
required only relatively small modifications to standard exact inference and sensitivity
analysis algorithms.
For this project, the MCA code was written as a standalone tool built upon a propri-
etary BN library that was developed specifically for this research project. The MCA tool
can parse many common BN model file formats and utilises a variant of the HUGIN algo-
20This does not include the generation of objectives for each variable in the Diagnosis Model.
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rithm for inference and sensitivity analysis. The implementation of the inference algorithm
was verified against both the SAMIAM BN tool developed by University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA), and a trial version of the HUGIN software package (HUGIN LITE). This
tool will be made available alongside this thesis, and a more detailed description of the
implementation can be found in Appendix C. A more practical long-term solution would
be to re-implement the MCA algorithm on top of an existing BN tool. An attempt was
made to implement a version of MCA using the libDAI package developed by Stanford
University, though this was ultimately abandoned due to time constraints. Integration
with other tools was not attempted due to intellectual property and cost considerations.
However, implementation of the MCA technique atop more feature-rich tools could enable
the extension of the method to other BN architectures beyond those discussed in this
thesis.
With respect to the case study, the analysis performed in section 6.2.4 indicated how
the MCA technique could be used to help identify that a number of variables within the
Diagnosis Model were highly influential with respect to the state of several Safety-Related
Variables (SRVs). The output of the MCA (shown in Figure 6.4) provided additional
information on safety-related aspects of the model, and provided information beyond that
available through a simple inspection. Furthermore, MCA can be used to provide assur-
ance practitioners with a methodology for prioritising assurance efforts when targeting
both global and local aspects of a BN model. Practically, this enables assurance practi-
tioners to work more efficiently when evaluating a BN model – they need not treat the
entire model as a ‘black box’, and can instead focus efforts aspects of a model most rele-
vant to assurance efforts. A further side-effect of the MCA technique is that it provides
assurance practitioners with a visualisation of the safety-related dynamics of a BN model.
No other tool currently exists to provide this information.
However, as indicated in Chapter 4, the MCA approach as defined in this thesis should
be considered to provide an overview of the dynamics of a model rather than a detailed
analysis of interactions between variables. The MCA as it is proposed in Chapter 4
cannot explore combinations of interactions within the model and provides comparatively
coarse-grained insight into the underlying dynamics of the model. However, the case study
indicates that the analysis can be used to highlight that important assurance information
can be obtained and used to support the assurance of the BNS.
The modified SA approach that drives the MCA may be adapted in order to more com-
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prehensively explore the parametric space of a BN model. Indeed, provided the output of
a sensitivity analysis technique can be captured using pairwise Normalised Mutual Infor-
mation (NMI) scores, any valid SA approach could be substituted for the specific approach
introduced in Chapter 4. From this perspective, the MCA technique provides a general
approach for supporting the targeted assurance of BN models through the utilisation and
extension of SA.
A final contribution of the MCA technique is in demonstrating the potential value
and practicability of adapting existing BN and AI analysis techniques to support safety-
focussed analyses of BN models. Rather than attempt to adapt existing safety techniques
with the aim of addressing the assurance of BNSs, it may be more useful to instead adapt
BN techniques for targeted evaluation activities.21
6.3.4 Application of the Evidence Framework
The evidence framework introduced in Chapter 5 was developed using existing sources
from within the safety engineering domain. The resulting framework is therefore intended
to be general, and should be used to characterise and classify any items of evidence gen-
erated over the course of the development of an AIS. However, the scope of this project
prevented the exploration of other avenues of research associated with the characterisation
and classification of evidence generated from other AI approaches.
In general, within the AI domain there is a need to provide a more comprehensive basis
for the description and understanding of evidence drawn from the plethora of evaluation
activities and metrics used within the AI domain. From an assurance perspective, the
utility of these techniques can be hard to translate into useful information about the
safety and security of a system, and the relative value of this evidence can similarly be
hard to discern.
This contribution therefore takes a small step towards a more expansive and robust
framework for managing evidence in the context of AISs. It provides a standardised
approach to classifying evidence generated during the development of a BNS that can
be used to construct a hierarchy of evidence, and to communicate the relative value of
evidence between assurance practitioners and BN developers.
In the context of the case study, the application of the evidence framework was straight-
21This is likely to be particularly important for Model Viewpoint and Data Viewpoint aspects.
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forward given the generation of the system-specific RM-BNS objectives. By directly map-
ping the evidence classes onto objectives and relating these to the criticality of a given
objective, it enables a clearer understanding of the role and availability of evidence for
that objective. During the development of the case study, it became clear that the ev-
idence framework can also be used to prioritise the selection of analysis techniques to
maximise the confidence gained with respect to the satisfaction of a given objective. This
further contributes to the aim of providing a targeted approach to the assurance of BNSs
as outlined in the thesis hypothesis.
6.3.5 Application of the Proportionality and Sufficiency Concepts
In the context of AISs, establishing the proportionality and sufficiency of efforts to assure
an AIS may prove to be the most challenging single aspect of the assurance of a given
system. In the language of the RM-BNS, answering the question: ‘How much is enough?’
for almost every Viewpoint is a technically challenging proposition. This is particularly
true for the ‘Operational’, ‘Model’ and ‘Data’ Viewpoints.
For example, the sufficiency of available data is an omnipresent issue in the field of AI in
terms of quality, quantity and the underlying patterns that will be exploited by the system.
Likewise, the modelling process for any AIS is typically fraught with intuition-driven
decision making and ad hoc development practices that make the rigorous evaluation
and assessment of the sufficiency of these activities challenging prospects for assurance
practitioners. These insights could be used to help build up a compelling justification for
the sufficiency of available data-centric aspects, and for the adequacy of a BN model for
a particular application.
The contributions of Chapter 5 are aimed at taking a step towards mitigating some
of these difficulties. By integrating the contributions of the previous chapters with the
previously mentioned evidence classification framework, the aim of this chapter was to
establish a conceptual basis upon which to more rigorously tackle these challenges. While
the discussion focussed most heavily on model-centric considerations of assurance, the
concepts introduced and discussed in this chapter should be extensible to other system
aspects.
The case study indicates that the application of these ideas is tractable for a system
similar to the AMTS. It shows how the two approaches to utilising the RM-BNS objec-
tives may be applied to a BNS, and further reiterates the apparent benefits of utilising
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an approach that varies evidence in the satisfaction of both the RM-BNS objectives, and
for assuring a BNS in general. However, from a practical perspective, the utilisation of
the objective-varying approach to establishing sufficiency may overcome some of the (po-
tentially significant) operational overheads associated with managing the large number of
system-specific objectives that may be generated using the RM-BNS approach. By only
considering subsets of objectives as defined by the criticality of a system aspect, assurance
practitioners adopting this approach may need to manage a much smaller number of ob-
jectives – thereby reducing the complexity of the assurance challenge from one perspective.
However, this should be carefully considered with respect to the loss of information that
will accompany the adoption of such an approach and the resulting effect on the confidence
of a BN developer in their system.
More broadly, the objectives themselves necessarily lose information about the system
they are applied to. They can never define and address a truly exhaustive set of assurance
concerns. The adoption of objectives with the understanding of the potential imperfection
of these objectives is standard practice within the safety domain. Objectives are defined
such that they address aspects of a system’s design and development that are perceived
to be the most pressing assurance concerns, or the most likely sources of error. This
is also true for the RM-BNS objectives: they have been defined to address aspects of
BNSs that are commonly discussed as being the most probable sources of error within the
BN literature, and based upon the operational experiences of AI developers using other
roughly comparable techniques.
However, it is likely that the ‘variable evidence’ approach to the assurance of BNSs
will be most appropriate for many applications. As discussed throughout this thesis, the
assurance of a BNS will be predicated upon the assessment of a broader range of safety
evidence and unconventional design decisions and will demand a more holistic approach
to assurance than is typical for software systems. Evidence driven approaches should
more readily accommodate the iterative nature of BN development and limit the risk of
extensive redevelopment work in the event that the criticality of a system aspect changes
over the course of the development, or other design decisions dramatically alter the scope
and role of the system.
Finally, the objectives and concepts introduced in this thesis have been defined with
the aim of minimising the worst-case outcomes for a BNS. The properties of a BNS and
the scope of the applications they are commonly applied to introduces serious concerns
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related to assurance deficits. The objectives have been defined to attempt to minimise
these assurance deficits by addressing the most serious potential shortcomings of a BN
development programme. Prior to this thesis, no existing work has unified these ideas into
a single document.
6.3.6 Scalability of Application
The case study presented in this chapter outlines the application of the methodologies
and concepts presented in this thesis to a relatively simple BNS. The process of applying
these ideas to this system was relatively straightforward. However, as discussed in Section
6.2.7.1, depending on the approach to establishing the sufficiency of evidence selected,
the number of RM-BNS objectives that were generated (and therefore must be satisfied)
can vary dramatically. This appears to be the principal challenge to the scalability of the
framework and techniques presented here.
In the case of this case study, more than 200 objectives for aspects pertaining to the
Model Viewpoint alone were produced. While many of these objectives would be relatively
straightforward to address, much larger BNSs may ultimately produce many thousands
of objectives. In general, it is likely that the number of objectives generated for system
aspects related to the Model Viewpoint will grow linearly in the number of variables within
a network.
For example, another widely studied BN model – the MUNIN network – consists
of over 1000 variables [208]. This is therefore significantly larger than the 37 variable
ALARM model presented previously and represents one of the largest publicly available
models. Applying the technique proposed in this chapter may produce over ten thousand
unique objectives. This may make the RM-BNS and its associated evidence framework
unattractive to practitioners attempting to tackle the problem without any degree of
automation. In such cases, the challenge of managing and processing evidence associated
with each objective would be possible but highly laborious, particularly in low-criticality
applications.
However, simply having a large number of objectives is not sufficient to abandon the
them and the associated framework. In high-criticality applications, the utility of the
contributions of this thesis should outweigh their cost in labour, and there are clear op-
portunities for the automation of objective and evidence management within the proposed
framework. Indeed, it may be possible to frame some of the Model Viewpoint objectives
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as more akin to test objectives for which an automated test harness could be constructed
for a given application.
Ultimately, there are no known theoretical limitations on the scalability of the con-
tributions made within this thesis, though there may arise practical scalability challenges
related to the sheer quantity of information that could be generated through their appli-
cation to a complex BNS. However, large quantities of assurance data are not uncommon
in the development of mission critical systems, and in many cases these difficulties could
be resolved or mitigated through the development of new automated tooling and testing
strategies based upon the frameworks and techniques presented here.
6.4 Evaluation Against Thesis Hypothesis
The thesis hypothesis introduced in Chapter 1 was defined to address a number of assur-
ance challenges that were defined early in the course of this research project. This section
looks at each of the main aspects of the hypothesis and evaluates them in the context of
the final contributions of this thesis.
6.4.1 Targeted Assurance
In Chapter 2, the potential shortcomings of existing safety standards and guidelines when
applied to a BNS were introduced. The development of a BNS for mission-critical ap-
plications must mitigate these shortcomings by targeting the BNS- or AIS-specific sys-
tem aspects. This was the aim of the framework introduced in Chapter 3: to provide
an approach to describing and modelling BNSs in a format that comprehensively cap-
tures all aspects of the system that are pertinent to the system’s functional behaviours.
Consequently, the RM-BNS framework provides a flexible approach to representing BNS
architectures that should ensure the unconventional aspects of the system are known to
assurance practitioners, and the roles of these aspects are analysed from a safety-centric
perspective.
The verification and validation objectives also introduced in Chapter 3 build on this
framework. The objectives are designed to ensure that BNS-specific assurance concerns are
explicitly targeted by assurance practitioners. The case study outlines how the RM-BNS
framework and objectives can be used to ensure that system-specific aspects of a BNS
are targeted by assurance activities, and that the assurance of two superficially similar
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system-specific objectives may require the use of different analysis techniques and may
involve fundamentally different assurance considerations.
The need to target the unconventional aspects of BNSs from an targeted assurance
perspective was further extended in Chapter 4. This was achieved through the introduction
of the Model Criticality Analysis (MCA) methodology that was designed to support the
targeted analysis of system aspects associated with the Model Viewpoint. Practically, the
MCA approach has been developed to ensure that the effects of a BNS’s model dynamics
are more transparent to assurance practitioners.
As indicated in the case study, the effect of this analysis is to avoid the need to treat
a BN model as a black-box, or to otherwise take an indiscriminate approach to evalu-
ating models and their constituent variables. Instead, the MCA is intended to support
the targeted analysis of BN models and provide proportionate, targeted analysis of these
models. Furthermore, it is not aimed at addressing typical model performance considera-
tions, but rather supporting the evaluation of the role of individual models and variables
on safety-related functional behaviours.
Taken together, these contributions provide a comprehensive framework for generating
a highly system-specific representation of BNSs that includes information on the role
and type of evidence, the criticality of a system aspect and system-specific assurance
considerations related to that aspect. This representation can be used to identify specific
parts of this representation that are likely to be of interest to assurance practitioners.
An assurance practitioner can pinpoint a specific BN model variable within a BNS of
interest and quickly extract information about the safety implications of that variable,
the associated strengths and weaknesses of the available safety evidence, and the variable-
specific assurance considerations that must be addressed. From this perspective therefore,
the contributions of this thesis achieve this aspect of the thesis hypothesis.
Perhaps most importantly, the assurance of a BNS will require something of a paradigm
shift with respect to existing software safety standards: the primary determinant of a
system’s functional behaviour often lies in the mathematical models encoded within the
system. Current work on the assurance of BNSs has been piecemeal, and other work on
alternative AI approaches has generally been narrow in scope. The contributions of this
thesis in providing a comprehensive overview of BNS assurance therefore provide a first
step towards enabling assurance practitioners to understand precisely what they need to
consider when assuring a BNS.
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6.4.2 Analysis and Evaluation of Underlying Probabilistic Models
A principle weakness of existing safety guidance in the context of BNSs was identified in
Chapter 2 as being the role of models in the functional behaviours of this class of system.
In Chapter 3, the shortcomings of assurance practices in identifying system failure modes
arising as a consequence of errors in models was outlined. In both chapters, the role and
importance of these system aspects was explored. In Chapter 2, the potential concerns
associated with using existing BN model analysis techniques without the introduction of
assurance information into these analyses was discussed. A case for the need to direct
assurance efforts towards explicitly addressing these aspects was introduced in Chapter 3.
A first contribution towards the integration of assurance information into the analysis
and evaluation of BN models was then introduced. The MCA approach provides a mech-
anism for both modifying existing BN model analysis techniques to account for safety
considerations (e.g. focus on worst-case influence rather than average influence etc.), and
the explicit inclusion of safety information into these techniques. This approach is there-
fore intended to provide a targeted analysis of a BN model’s dynamics, and the potential
effect of these dynamics on the behaviour of the BNS.
Finally, Chapter 5 introduced a number of assurance techniques that could be used to
analyse and evaluate the models used in a BNS. The techniques are intentionally discussed
in relatively general terms in order to capture the broad range of possible approaches
currently available in literature. As with the modification of a standard Sensitivity Anal-
ysis (SA) approach into Chapter 4’s MCA technique, many of these techniques could be
adapted to more specifically address safety considerations. Chapter 4 also aims to stress
the importance of establishing coverage of BN model aspects as an independent assurance
process that is distinct from conventional software coverage activities.
6.4.3 Analysis and Evaluation of Underlying Data Artefacts
The scope of this thesis and the nature of the motivating example for this work has limited
the amount of research that could be performed into the analysis and evaluation of data
artefacts used both operationally and during the development of mission-critical BNSs.
Furthermore, the focus of this thesis on model aspects has been spurred - in part - by
the increasing acceptance of the need to adopt alternative approaches for data-intensive
systems that has emerged over the course of the compilation of this work. This is perhaps
best captured in the publication of the Data Safety Initiative Working Group’s Data Safety
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Guidance. While due to its scope this guidance does not rigorously explore the role of
data in AISs from an AI-centric perspective, it does provide some initial guidance that
overlaps conceptually with many of the concerns detailed in Chapters 2, 3, and 5 of this
thesis.
However, the RM-BNS introduced in Chapter 3 does provide a means of performing
qualitative analyses of the role of data artefacts in a given system. It also provides an
approach that aims to explicitly capture the role of data gathering activities in the devel-
opment and assurance of BNSs. This is likely to be the most challenging (and expensive)
aspect of the development of mission-critical BNSs generally. In commercial and non-
mission-critical applications, the need to rigorously evaluate all channels through which
data is acquired and processed prior to use in the training of a given system is often di-
minished: there is currently limited work on the active analysis and evaluation of data and
the auditing of data gathering practices to ensure the absence of accidental or deliberate
errors in acquired data that may produce ’undesirable’ emergent behaviours in the system
using models trained on this data. This includes manipulation of data that may be used
to train a BNS (i.e. attacks on BNSs that are effectively executed prior to the implemen-
tation of the system). This may have significant safety implications for the completed
system. The RM-BNS therefore aims to ensure that assurance practitioners understand
how errors introduced as a consequence of flawed data gathering activities may propagate
through their system to produce erroneous functional behaviours.
Chapter 4 touched on an important by-product of the MCA technique. By establishing
the criticality of individual variables within a model, and of models within a BNS, MCA
can be used to guide assurance practitioners to identify aspects of their data that are
used by high-criticality variables. While the MCA has not been extended to account for
a notion of data criticality, such a notion may be developed based upon the results of
this approach. This may be used to develop additional targeted analysis and evaluation
techniques that explore the role of data in a mission-critical BNS. However, the thesis has
identified and discussed in detail the need to understand the role of data in BNSs, and the
MCA technique and the RM-BNS framework introduced here could be used as the basis
of additional work in this area.
On a more general note, the Data Viewpoint aspects of the RM-BNS are potentially
the most challenging aspects of a BNS to assure. The infrastructure and processes that
will be required to develop a data-driven BNS for some applications will be extensive, and
239
Chapter 6: Evaluation
will necessitate careful review of a number of ‘Human Factors’ considerations during the
acquisition and management of data for such a system [61]. This will be further heightened
for those organisations developing BNSs that utilise data from distributed sources, or
for highly novel applications. Developing a robust set of data acquisition processes and
the corresponding infrastructure may prove to be a limiting factor in the ability of an
organisation to deploy a BNS.
6.4.4 Analysis and Evaluation of Underlying Computational Techniques
As with analysis and evaluation techniques targeting data aspects, the scope of the thesis
has forced the deprecation of research into the development of approaches for analysing
and evaluating computational techniques used in mission-critical BNSs. As with the data
aspects, Chapters 3 and 5 have introduced the need to evaluate the role of learning and
inference approaches in the behaviour of a completed BNS. In particular, the RM-BNS
viewpoints introduced in Chapter 3 aim to ensure that the properties of a selected BN
learning technique are understood, and the potential safety implications are known to
assurance practitioners. This once again provides a framework for the qualitative analysis
of the role of learning and inference approaches, and the interactions of these aspects with
system aspects associated with the RM-BNS’s Model and Data Viewpoints.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the contributions of this thesis provide new mecha-
nisms for facilitating the targeted assurance of the unconventional aspects of BNSs. It has
provided a limited demonstration of these techniques on a case study, and evaluated the
results of this case study against the thesis hypothesis and other practical considerations.
This chapter – and the thesis generally – provide a first centralised overview of the assur-
ance challenges of BNSs, and provide guidance on how some of these assurance challenges
can be identified and addressed. Ultimately, it will be through the practical application
of these ideas to a BNS that the effectiveness and utility of these contributions will be
established.
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Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Thesis Contributions
This thesis has made the following contributions:
• It has identified the key challenges for the assurance of BNSs and identified a number
of important distinctions between conventional software systems and BNSs. These
insights have been condensed and organised into a structured set of viewpoints on
BNSs that define these challenges and can be used to support targeted assurance
efforts.
• It has provided a new, structured, comprehensive framework for describing and
analysing BNSs. This framework has been designed to expose the interactions be-
tween disparate aspects of BN models and to help ensure BN developers and assur-
ance practitioners can communicate effectively about the properties of a BNS. This
framework was then used to generate a set of flexible verification and validation ob-
jectives that can be used to target and comprehensively address assurance challenges
for BNSs.
• It has provided a new technique for performing targeted analyses of BN models, and
outlined how this can be used to establish the criticality of model components within
a BN model.
• It has provided an approach for describing and understanding safety evidence gener-
ated during the development of a BNS. It has provided guidance on the assurance of
BNSs that may be used to support the satisfaction of verification and validation ob-
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jectives and to address the challenge of sufficiency of evidence and assurance efforts
in the development of BNSs used in safety-critical applications.
This chapter is structured as follows. An overview of the the key contributions of
this thesis is provided. This overview discusses the novelty and necessity of the work
introduced in this thesis. Next, it gives a short summary of potential limitations of this
work in the context of the application of the techniques and concepts to the deployment
of a BNS in a safety-critical role. The following section then builds upon this to suggest a
number of potential directions for future work. Finally, the chapter concludes with some
high-level considerations for assurance practitioners working towards the deployment of
AISs in safety-critical roles.
7.1.1 Contribution - A Multi-Viewpoint Approach to BNS Assurance
Early in the course of the research carried out for this research project, it became clear that
there were no existing approaches for explicitly communicating the distinctions between
conventional software systems and BNSs to both safety practitioners and BN develop-
ers. The recognition of the necessity for a framework that supports the omnidirectional
communication of BN-specific assurance concerns was therefore the motivation for the
definition of the RM-BNS and its associated verification and validation objectives.
At the heart of the RM-BNS framework are the six proposed viewpoints on BNSs.
These viewpoints have been defined to capture and communicate the full range of concerns
that assurance practitioners will face when attempting to assure a mission-critical BNS.
As discussed throughout this thesis, assuring a BNS will demand a more holistic approach
to software assurance than is common for many existing classes of software system. For
example, the role of the environment, the nature of the underlying mechanics that drive
functional behaviour of a BNS and the role of ancillary activities and artefacts that may
otherwise be regarded as outside the scope of a system’s definition (e.g. data gathering
activities) must be carefully considered in the context of BNSs.
Indeed, describing the assurance of a BNS (and AISs more generally) as a software
assurance problem in the conventional sense may be misleading in the first instance. The
assurance of AI is currently being approached as the assurance of a software system with
unconventional aspects. However, the complexity of this class of system does not typically
lie in the software design and implementation itself. As has been discussed in this thesis,
the complexity typically lies in the models, data, environment and operational role of the
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system being developed. Conventional software engineering concerns remain important
but are unlikely to be the overriding focus of assurance activities for this class of system.
Therefore, it may be more appropriate to describe the assurance of a modern AIS as a
new class of system with software aspects, or perhaps as the assurance of a new form of
software altogether.
Assurance practitioners working towards the assurance of these systems must consider
a broader range of concerns than in conventional software systems. Work in other fields
using alternative AI techniques repeatedly highlights the need to consider aspects of an
AIS that may be overlooked if it were to be treated as a conventional software assurance
problem. The proposed viewpoints and their constituent views therefore provide a basis
for describing and communicating the properties and assurance concerns of BNSs and
could be further generalised to accommodate other classes of AIS.
7.1.2 Contribution - Reference Model for Bayesian Network-based Sys-
tems
Chapter 3 introduced the RM-BNS framework for describing and qualitatively modelling
BNSs. This framework was designed to expose the full range of challenges that assurance
practitioners may face over the course of the development of a mission-critical BNS. As dis-
cussed in section 7.1.1, at the core of this framework are the six viewpoints on BNSs. The
modelling framework built upon these viewpoints was developed with the aim of explicitly
capturing the interactions between system aspects. Indeed, many of the most challeng-
ing design decisions during the development of a BNS arise during interactions between
Models and associated Computations (for example the selection of inference algorithms
with respect to the models the algorithm will operate on), or between Data Artefacts and
Models, where the available data may determine certain model aspects, or vice versa. The
case study in Chapter 6 indicates how the RM-BNS framework directly exposes precisely
these sorts of interactions.
There are a number of prominent, existing reference models that have been successfully
utilised in the development and analysis of complex systems. Indeed, the RM-BNS was
inspired by the RA-SDS framework utilised by NASA for modelling complex space systems.
The utility of these frameworks is well documented in systems engineering literature, and
a number of architectural frameworks are in active use in several domains – though no
such reference models existed for the description of a BNS prior to the work presented in
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this thesis. The aim of the RM-BNS framework is therefore to provide a similar level of
utility to BNS developers and assurance practitioners as other reference models, though
this will of course require engagement with practitioners and BN developers to refine
and expand the RM-BNS framework to meet their operational needs and to reach the
standard of the aforementioned frameworks. However, the RM-BNS framework provides
a first step towards a systematic basis for qualitatively modelling and describing BNS
system architectures, and for capturing the important interactions that may exist within
these systems.
Finally, the RM-BNS framework was used to help structure and define a set of generic
verification and validation objectives for BNSs. These objectives also represent a novel
contribution – no comprehensive set of assurance objectives has previously been produced
for BNSs. The process of refining and satisfying the objectives was outlined in Chapters 5
and 6, and the case study presented in Chapter 6 indicated the utility of the approach for an
example system. Further evaluation of the objectives in the context of ‘real-world’ systems
will be necessary to establish their flexibility and utility from an assurance perspective.
However, in their current form, the objectives provide a first step towards generating a
comprehensive, flexible set of objectives for the assurance of a BNS that could be built
upon in future work.
7.1.3 Contribution - Assurance-Focussed Model Analysis
The analysis technique introduced in Chapter 4 was developed with the aim of providing
a technique for transparently evaluating BN models from an assurance-driven perspective.
As defined in Chapter 4, Model Criticality Analysis (MCA) integrates concepts from both
the AI domain and the systems engineering domain to produce a technique that can be
used to map criticality metrics to abstract model aspects. As shown in the case study,
this can be used to provide targeted assurance of model-centric aspects and to identify
parts of a BN model that may be of particular interest from an assurance perspective.
More generally, it can be used to avoid the need to treat a BN model as a black box
and, by extension, to treat all variables within the model as equally important from a
safety perspective. On a practical level, this may produce intractable problems in some
circumstances. Instead, assurance practitioners can target specific models and model
components and address assurance concerns in proportion to the criticality of the model
aspect. The development of techniques such as this is essential if assurance practition-
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ers are to effectively expose and address the model-centric assurance concerns associated
with the deployment of BNSs (and AISs more generally) in safety-critical roles. No tech-
nique existed prior to this work that explicitly integrated assurance information into BN
evaluation techniques for the purposes of assuring the dynamics of a BN model.
At a high-level, Chapter 4 and the application of the MCA technique in Chapter 6
indicate the utility and practicability of modifying existing AI evaluation and analysis
techniques to develop new, targeted, information-rich assurance-focussed analysis tech-
niques. Indeed, going forward more developments of this type will be needed within the
safety domain if the challenges associated with establishing model coverage and the need
for model assurance are to be addressed. This will be explored more in the following
section.
7.1.4 Contribution - Evidence Framework and Sufficiency Concepts
In Chapter 5, a novel approach to describing and classifying evidence produced by tech-
niques utilised during the development of a BNS was proposed. The aim of this approach
was to capture the hierarchy that exists within evidence, and to do this in a format that
would enable communication of this information and the outputs of a particular analysis
technique between BN developers and assurance practitioners. Prior to this guidance, no
work had been performed into describing the output of BN-specific analysis techniques
using assurance-focussed language. The proposed approach therefore provides a first step
towards a systematic basis for describing and evaluating BN-specific development activities
with respect to their assurance implications. An approach such as this has not previously
been defined for BNSs.
Alongside this framework, Chapter 5 also provided guidance on possible approaches
to establishing the sufficiency of assurance efforts for mission-critical BNSs. As with the
evidence framework, there existed no prior guidance on how this may be achieved for a
BNS. The guidance provided in Chapter 5 therefore provides a step towards understanding
how the sufficiency of assurance activities may be established for BNSs and specifically
what assurance practitioners should consider when addressing system aspects associated
with the Model viewpoint.
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7.1.5 Limitations of Thesis Contributions
While the work presented in this thesis has been defined with the aim of providing a
general set of techniques and tools for developing BNSs for safety-critical applications, the
contributions presented here have been developed primarily with the motivating use-case
of this research in mind. Consequently, the work presented within this thesis has not been
extensively reviewed in the context of other potential BNS applications or BN variants.
In certain contexts, practitioners may therefore encounter some disparities between
the RM-BNS framework and its associated objectives, and the demands of their specific
use-case. This may also be true for the MCA and evidence classification approaches
introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. However, the contributions of this thesis are
intended to be sufficiently flexible that practitioners encountering these issues should face
little difficulty in adapting or extending these contributions to meet their needs.
Secondly, though the research presented here has been developed in collaboration with
BAE Systems, the techniques introduced and defined within this thesis have not been
tested as part of an active BNS development programme. As with any technique developed
in relative isolation from their intended use, the contributions of this thesis will need to
be evaluated as part of a broader engineering effort.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the MCA technique was developed to provide a
‘baseline’ analysis technique. The sensitivity analysis (SA) technique selected is among
the most simple SA techniques in use, and has known limitations with respect to remaining
a viable technique for larger BN models and with respect to the exploration of a model’s
dynamics. However, the aim of Chapter 4 was to establish a basis upon which more
advanced techniques could be developed. The need for additional research in this direction
will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
7.2 Future Work
The research conducted over the course of this project has identified a number of research
avenues. The contributions of this thesis are novel within the assurance field, and therefore
many of these avenues represent expansions or refinements of the work presented here.
However, some represent general research avenues that need to be explored if the assurance
of a BNS is to be achieved.
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7.2.1 Generalisation of Viewpoints and RM-BNS
As discussed in section 7.1.1, the RM-BNS viewpoints have been defined to address the
assurance concerns specific to BNSs. They were defined to be relatively general, and
therefore should accommodate many different BN variants, architectures and applications.
However, they may also be generalised further to accommodate AISs generally. Indeed,
there is a need for a common systematic, comprehensive framework for structuring and
describing the assurance challenges faced by AI developers and assurance practitioners.
The viewpoints and their constituent views could therefore be expanded and generalised
to capture the assurance challenges of AISs, and perhaps even to provide a conceptual
basis for developing guidance and standards for the assurance of AISs.
Some work was performed to this end over the course of this research project, though
it remained at very early stages of development. Future work in this area could look at
the applicability of the proposed viewpoints to other classes of AISs, and how they may
be refined or otherwise modified to address the considerations of other AI techniques or
applications. The application of the viewpoints to other systems and BNSs could also be
attempted to ensure their flexibility and utility in a practical setting.
7.2.2 Extension of Model Criticality Analysis
The MCA technique demonstrates the potential utility and practicability of adopting
and adapting existing BN evaluation and analysis techniques for assurance-focussed uses.
However, as previously discussed, the technique as outlined in Chapter 4 will run into
limitations in terms of its ability to scale to large BN models, and in its ability to analyse
more complex interactions within a BN model. As indicated in Chapter 4, the results of
a MCA should be considered as a simple approximation of the underlying dynamics of a
given BN model. For some models, this will be adequate. The MCA approach as outlined
in this thesis should therefore be considered to be a ‘baseline’ approach that should be
actively improved and extended.
For example, future work could explore the utilisation of more advanced sensitivity
analysis techniques in place of the simple approach adopted in Chapter 4. More sophisti-
cated techniques can be used to explore more interactions between variables within a BN
model, and may be able to do so more efficiently than the ‘baseline’ approach. This may
give a more extensive exploration of the dynamics of a BN model. As discussed in Chapter
6, any sensitivity analysis technique that can produce the metrics introduced in Chapter
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4 could be used in place of the proposed SA technique. Another avenue of research could
be the exploration of the application of the MCA approach to hybrid BN models and
any strengths or weaknesses of the technique in these cases. Finally, the potential value
of alternative metrics could be assessed and may provide further improvements to the
‘baseline’ technique introduced in Chapter 4.
7.2.3 Adaptation of BN Evaluation Techniques and Metrics
Beyond the MCA technique, there are other techniques that could be co-opted for BN-
specific assurance-focussed analyses. Indeed, there may be scope for developing general-
purpose adaptations of other techniques for use across multiple AI modelling approaches.
For example, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) outlined in Chapter 5 provides
an approach to analysing and quantifying the diagnostic performance of BN models. How-
ever, it can also be used generically to characterise the classification performance of other
AI representational frameworks. A standard approach to integrating safety or security
information into analyses such as these could enable these techniques to be used across
AISs. For example, a safety-enhanced version of the ROC may be used to evaluate a
range of systems, including those driven by BNs, Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and
Support Vector Machines (SVMs).
7.2.4 Refinement of the RM-BNS and Objectives
As discussed in section 7.1.2, the RM-BNS (and its associated objectives) represents a
first step towards providing a structured, comprehensive basis for modelling and assuring
BNSs. However, both the reference model and the objectives have not been tested on a
‘real-world’ project to evaluate their relative merit and limitations. Future work could
therefore look into refining and enhancing the RM-BNS by evaluating its use during the
development of a BNS and produce an updated version that reflects the input of BN
developers and assurance practitioners working on ‘real-world’ BNSs. This could produce
a more mature ‘field-tested’ RM-BNS that may be more readily adopted by assurance
practitioners.
7.2.5 Role of Data in AI
Much of this thesis has focussed on assurance concerns related to the RM-BNS Model
Viewpoint. Consequently, only a comparatively limited amount of research was performed
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on system aspects associated with the other five RM-BNS Viewpoints. Of these five, per-
haps the most rich avenue of research is likely to be around the utilisation of data in BNSs.
Indeed, there are a number of commonalities between the assurance concerns associated
with the Data Viewpoint and the concerns expressed in the Data Safety Initiative Working
Group’s Data Safety Guidance (DSG) document [144]. There may therefore be scope to
more closely integrate the language and concepts outlined in Chapters 3 and 5 with those
outlined in the DSG document.
More generally, the assurance implications and considerations associated with the pro-
cesses used to gather, manage and store data used in AISs, and the properties of the data
artefacts used to train and design a mission-critical AIS are still relatively unexplored.
Furthermore, while the DSG document does provide some guidance specifically related to
data used for Machine Learning (ML) applications, this guidance is comparatively lim-
ited. Indeed, there may be significant value in producing a DSG-like document specifically
targeting AI-specific concerns. This could perhaps build upon the concepts introduced in
Chapter 3 and outlined in the RM-BNS Data Viewpoint.
7.2.6 Addressing System Evolution
Early in the course of this research, the problem of distributional drift became apparent
as a key assurance concern for BNSs. Within the AI field, distributional drift refers to
situations when the representational framework and representational instantiation (i.e.
model) at the core of an AIS begins to diverge from ‘reality’. More concretely, the learned
representation of the world may become obsolete as the operational environment of the
system evolves over time. This may occur through planned changes to a BNS platform
or the environment within which it operates, including integration of new sensors, data-
streams or deployment to a new operational theatre, for example. It may also occur
through unplanned changes, such as changing weather patterns, demographics or other
environmental factors. In both cases, the performance of a BNS will fluctuate over time.
Many mission-critical applications will demand that the operational performance of an
AIS is maintained over an extended period. An important avenue of research is therefore
into effective ways of monitoring the evolution of a BNS with respect to its environment
over time, and how these monitoring approaches may be integrated with safety or security
information. One approach that was explored briefly during this research was the notion
of developing a second standardised AI monitoring tool to track the performance of the
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first AIS. It was envisioned that this would provide on-line validation and monitoring
capabilities and may flag when the system required ‘re-educating’. The initial idea was
to develop a second BN model to diagnose the performance of the first, though this was
ultimately abandoned as it merely moved the assurance challenge from one network to
another, without resolving the underlying technical challenge. However, there may be
value in this approach if a standardised method for diagnosing distributional drift (and
other evolution-driven errors) across distinct models can be devised.
7.3 Closing Remarks
The assurance of modern BNSs in safety-critical roles will require the adoption of tech-
niques and concepts currently alien to the broader safety engineering community. The
most radical conceptual distinctions between conventional software systems and AI sys-
tems lie in the role, capabilities and limitations of the representational frameworks (i.e.
models), the data artefacts that drive them and how they may interact with the world
around them. Being able to identify, describe and address these distinctions is an impor-
tant step for the assurance of BNSs, and AISs more generally.
Of all the diverse areas of AI research, research into the assurance of AI must be
unwaveringly clear on what precisely makes these systems different from conventional
software systems and how these specific aspects can be addressed. This was recognised in
work on the assurance of rule-based AI Systems in the 1980’s, as Rushby states [86]:
“... the best way to develop credible and effective ... assurance and evalua-
tion techniques for AI software will be to identify the facets of such software
that are inherently, or essentially, different from conventional software, and to
distinguish them from those facets that are only accidentally or inessentially
different.”
The aim throughout this work has been to introduce concepts and methodologies that
can be used to expose and address BNS-specific assurance challenges. There is no extant
assurance-focussed work on these problems in the context of BNSs, and still comparatively
limited technical work on the assurance of AISs more generally. Prior to this thesis,
no single document provided a unified approach for addressing the assurance challenges
related to the development of a BNS. The concepts and techniques presented here therefore
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represent a first step towards the assurance of BNSs, and may help shape the thinking of
assurance practitioners working within the field of AI assurance more generally.
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Appendix A
A Reference Model for Bayesian
Network-based Systems
This appendix contains a full enumeration of the constituent parts of the RM-BNS frame-
work. It is broken into three sections: Viewpoints, Objectives and Reference Model.
A.1 RM-BNS Viewpoints
Table A.1 shows the full set of RM-BNS Viewpoints with their associated descriptions and
objects.
A.2 RM-BNS Objectives
Table A.2 enumerates the full collection of RM-BNS Verification and Validation objectives.
A.3 RM-BNS Reference Model
Figure A.1 shows the RM-BNS reference model.
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Table A.1: RM-BNS Viewpoints and Objects.
Viewpoint View Description Objects
Model Structure Concerned with the structure (local and/or global) of a model. Model
Parameters Concerned with the properties (e.g. confidence, quality etc.) of
all parameters and hyperparameters used in a model.
Model
Definition Concerned with aspects of the model associated with the qualita-
tive aspects of representation, including the context of the model
and the definition of model components.
Model
Dynamics Concerned with the high-level properties and dynamics of a model. Model
Data Acquisition The acquisition view defines the sources, processes and personnel
used to obtain all data artefact.
Data Artefact, Process
Transformation This view describes all processing (e.g. normalisation, discretisa-
tion) applied to data artefacts.
Process
Management The management view describes the databases and assorted man-
agement activities used to store/archive and transfer data arte-
facts. It addresses data-specific aspects of configuration manage-
ment (e.g. training and evaluation datasets).
Process
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Table A.1: RM-BNS Viewpoints and Objects.(continued).
Viewpoint View Description Objects
Artefact This view describes the properties of each resulting data artefact
(e.g. the quality and integrity of an artefact). It is particularly
concerned with identifying and addressing sources of uncertainty
in the artefact/s.
Data Artefact
Computation Optimisation This view is concerned with all aspects related to the optimisa-
tion (learning) algorithms utilised in both the development and
deployment of a BNS.
Computation
Inference This view is concerned with all aspects related to the inference
algorithms utilised by a BNS during operational use.
Computation
Data Flow The data-flow view describes the passage of information through
the system. This is aimed at addressing concerns that may arise
through the use of certain classes of hierarchical or ensemble mod-
elling approaches.
Computation
Technology Infrastructure This view defines the tools, processes and resources needed to
develop the system.
Infrastructure
Standards This view is concerned with all standards relevant to the system
and its operation.
Framework
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Table A.1: RM-BNS Viewpoints and Objects.(continued).
Viewpoint View Description Objects
Frameworks The framework view describes the modelling frameworks that will
be used in the system. This includes Knowledge Engineering and
any BN development frameworks, and the implications of these
frameworks for the BNS (e.g. performance trade-offs, limitations
etc.).
Framework
Risk The risk view is aimed at addressing BN technology-specific devel-
opmental and operational risks. It is concerned with identifying
any risks arising from developing a BNS, in terms of both the
project itself (e.g. time and expense), and any novel cultural, en-
vironmental, safety and/or security risks that may be introduced
through the development and operation of a BNS.
Framework, Infrastruc-
ture
Operational Requirements This view represents concerns associated with establishing objec-
tives for the system, and capabilities that must be achieved.
Capability
Scenario This view is concerned with how the system will be deployed, as
well as demonstrable and potential latent properties of the system
in those contexts.
Scenario, Capability
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Table A.1: RM-BNS Viewpoints and Objects.(continued).
Viewpoint View Description Objects
Evolution The evolution view refers to concerns associated with the change
of the target platform over time, both in the terms of engineered
platform change, and change due to age, operational tempo or
location etc. See also OV-4 and OV-5.
Environment, Scenario
Environment Environmental concerns include the effect of ambient environmen-
tal aspects, including atmospheric properties and weather.
Environment
Maintenance This view is concerned with maintenance practices used with re-
spect to the system, and the target platform. It is aimed at ad-
dressing concerns related to the standardisation of maintenance
practices across all sites/operational theatres and the elimination
of maintenance practices that may result in degraded performance
of BNSs (e.g. introducing errors due to distributional drift).
Environment, Capabil-
ity
Implementation Software This view is concerned with ‘conventional’ software aspects of the
system. This includes all typical software design, implementation
and testing concerns.
Function, Resource
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Table A.1: RM-BNS Viewpoints and Objects.(continued).
Viewpoint View Description Objects
Hardware This view addresses any hardware aspects of the system. In par-
ticular, sensors used to provide input into BN models and any
pertinent features of the target platform/ environment into which
the BNS is to be deployed including memory and compute power.
Function, Resource
Architecture The Architecture view addresses concerns associated with the
high-level system architectural aspects of a BNS. This includes
all ‘conventional’ system design considerations, including the top-
level allocation of functionality to hardware and software compo-
nents.
Function
Integration This view is aimed at addressing all activities necessary to – for
example – transfer a system from a simulation environment into
a target platform.
Function, Resource
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Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives.
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
Model Structure MV-1.1 Establish and justify the basis for using the [structural variant] for the
[Model].
MV-1.2 Establish and justify the any assumptions in the structure of the [Model].
MV-1.3 Establish and justify the implemented structure of the [Model].
MV-1.4 Establish and justify confidence in the structure of the [Model].
Parameters MV-2.1 Establish and justify the precision of the parameterisation of [Model].
MV-2.2 Establish and justify the accuracy of the parameterisation of [Model].
MV-2.3 Establish and justify any assumptions in parameterisation of [Model].
MV-2.4 Establish and justify the confidence in the parameterisation of [Model].
Definition MV-3.1 Establish and justify the definition of the [Model].
MV-3.2 Establish and justify any assumptions in the [Model] definition.
MV-3.3 Establish and justify the context and scope of the [Model] definition.
MV-3.4 Establish and justify the confidence in the [Model] definition.
Dynamics MV-4.1 Establish and justify the dynamics of the [Model].
MV-4.2 Establish the justify any assumptions in the dynamics of the [Model].
MV-4.3 Establish and justify any constraints on the dynamics of the [Model].
MV-4.4 Establish and justify the necessity of the [Model] dynamics.
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Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
MV-4.5 Establish and justify confidence in the dynamics of the [Model].
Data Artefact DV-1.1 Establish and justify the type of the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.2 Establish and justify the integrity of the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.3 Establish and justify the precision of the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.4 Establish and justify the sufficiency of the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.5 Establish and justify the accuracy of the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.6 Establish and justify any assumptions in the [Data Artefact].
DV-1.7 Establish and justify the confidence in the [Data Artefact].
Process DV-2.1 Establish and justify the type of the data transformation [Process].
DV-2.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the data transformation [Process].
DV-2.3 Establish and justify any assumptions in the use of the data transfor-
mation [Process].
DV-2.4 Establish and justify confidence in the data transformation [Process].
Acquisition DV-3.1 Establish and justify the types of the data acquisition [Process].
DV-3.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the data acquisition [Process].
DV-3.3 Establish and justify any assumptions made during data acquisition
[Process].
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Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
DV-3.4 Establish and justify the resilience of the [Process] activities to opera-
tional change.
DV-3.5 Establish and justify confidence in the data acquisition [Process].
Management DV-4.1 Establish and justify the integrity of the data management [Process].
DV-4.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the data management [Process].
DV-4.3 Establish and justify the resilience of management [Process] to opera-
tional change.
DV-4.4 Establish and justify confidence in any ‘physical’ dependencies of the
data management [Process].
DV-4.5 Establish and justify confidence in the data management [Process].
Computation Optimisation CV-1.1 Establish and justify the necessity of optimisation [Computation].
CV-1.2 Establish the dynamics of [Optimisation Algorithm].
CV-1.3 Establish the accuracy of [Optimisation Algorithm].
CV-1.4 Establish and justify the objective of the [Optimisation Algorithm].
CV-1.5 Establish and justify any assumptions associated with the [Optimisation
Algorithm].
CV-1.6 Establish and justify confidence in [Optimisation Algorithm].
Inference CV-2.1 Establish and justify the necessity of [Inference Algorithm].
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Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
CV-2.2 Establish and justify the dynamics of [Inference Algorithm].
CV-2.3 Establish and justify any assumptions associated with the [Inference
Algorithm].
CV-2.4 Establish and justify confidence in [Inference Algorithm].
Data Flow CV-3.1 Establish and justify the necessity of data-flow/fusion technique.
CV-3.2 Establish and justify all assumptions in data-flow/fusion technique.
CV-3.3 Establish and justify confidence in data-flow/fusion technique.
Operational Requirements OV-1.1 Establish and justify the operational requirements of the [System].
OV-1.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the operational requirements of the
[System].
OV-1.3 Establish and justify the contraints on the operational requirements of
the [System].
OV-1.4 Establish and justify confidence in the operational requirements of the
[System].
Scenario OV-2.1 Establish and justify the necessity of the system for the [Scenario].
OV-2.2 Establish and justify the manner of the utilisation of the system in the
[Scenario].
262
A
.3
R
M
-B
N
S
R
eferen
ce
M
o
d
el
Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
OV-2.3 Establish and justify confidence in the functionality of the system in the
[Scenario].
Evolution OV-3.1 Establish aspects of the system that will be exposed to evolution of the
system or [Environment].
OV-3.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the exposure of the system to
evolving system or [Environment] aspects.
OV-3.3 Establish and Justify any assumptions about the evolution of the system
in the operational [Environment].
OV-3.4 Establish and justify the [Process] for monitoring the validity of the
system.
OV-3.5 Establish and justify confidence in the [Process] for accomodating system
evolution.
Environment OV-4.1 Establish and justify the operational [Environment] for the system.
OV-4.2 Establish and justify the context and scope of the operational [Environ-
ment] for the system.
OV-4.3 Establish and justify the necessity of interactions between the [Environ-
ment] and the system.
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Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
OV-4.4 Establish and justify interactions between the [Environment] and the
system.
OV-4.5 Establish and justify confidence in the utilisation of the system in the
target [Environment].
Maintenance OV-5.1 Establish and justify the [Process] used for the maintenance of the sys-
tem.
OV-5.2 Establish and justify the resilience of the maintenance [Process] to
changes in the operational [Environment].
OV-5.3 Establish and justify the standard of maintenance staff and facilities
used to carry out the [Process].
OV-5.4 Establish and justify the dependence of the system’s performance on the
maintenance [Process].
OV-5.5 Establish and justify confidence in the [Process] for the maintenance of
the system.
Implementation Software IV-1.1 Establish and justify the necessity of the software [Function].
IV-1.2 Justify the implementation decisions for the software [Function].
IV-1.3 Establish and justify confidence in the functional behaviour of the soft-
ware [Function].
264
A
.3
R
M
-B
N
S
R
eferen
ce
M
o
d
el
Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
Hardware IV-2.1 Establish and justify the necessity of the hardware [Function].
IV-2.2 Establish and justify the integrity of the hardware [Function].
IV-2.3 Establish and justify confidence in the functional behaviour of the hard-
ware [Function].
Architecture IV-3.1 Establish and justify the architecture of the system.
IV-3.2 Establish and justify the integrity of the architecture of the system.
IV-3.3 Establish and justify confidence in the architecture of the system.
Integration IV-4.1 Establish and justify the objective of the integration [Process].
IV-4.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the integration [Process].
IV-4.3 Establish and justify the utilisation of the integration [Process].
IV-4.4 Establish and justify confidence in the integration [Process].
Technology Infrastructure IV-1.1 Establish and justify the necessity of the [Infrastructure].
IV-1.2 Establish and justify the capabilities of the [Infrastructure].
IV-1.3 Establish and justify the integrity of the [Infrastructure].
IV-1.4 Establish and justify confidence in the [Infrastructure].
Standards IV-2.1 Establish and justify the standards [Framework] applicable to the sys-
tem.
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Table A.2: RM-BNS Objectives (continued).
Viewpoint View Identifier Objective
IV-2.2 Establish the limitations of the standards [Framework]with respect to
the system.
IV-2.3 Establish and justify the confidence in mitigating the limitations of the
standards [Framework].
Frameworks IV-3.1 Establish and justify the selection of the chosen [Framework].
IV-3.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the chosen [Framework].
IV-3.3 Establish and justify the use-case of the [Framework].
IV-3.4 Establish and justify confidence in the [Framework].
Risk IV-4.1 Establish and justify the risks of using the chosen [Framework].
IV-4.2 Establish and justify the necessity of the risks associated with the chosen
[Framework].
IV-4.3 Establish and justify confidence in the acceptability of risks associated
with the chosen [Framework].
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Figure A.1: The RM-BNS reference model.
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Appendix B
Beinlich ALARM Model
This appendix contains the Bayesian Network model defined by Beinlich et al [136]. This
model was used in the case study presented in Chapter 6. When used alongside the Apollo
package (see Appendix C), this model can replicate the results of presented in that chapter.
B.1 Beinlich Model (HUGIN Format)
net
{
}
node HISTORY
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node CVP
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node PCWP
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node HYPOVOLEMIA
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
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node LVEDVOLUME
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node LVFAILURE
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node STROKEVOLUME
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node ERRLOWOUTPUT
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node HRBP
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node HREKG
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node ERRCAUTER
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node HRSAT
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node INSUFFANESTH
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node ANAPHYLAXIS
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{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node TPR
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node EXPCO2
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node KINKEDTUBE
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node MINVOL
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node FIO2
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" );
}
node PVSAT
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node SAO2
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node PAP
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node PULMEMBOLUS
{
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states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node SHUNT
{
states = ( "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node INTUBATION
{
states = ( "NORMAL" "ESOPHAGEAL" "ONESIDED" );
}
node PRESS
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node DISCONNECT
{
states = ( "TRUE" "FALSE" );
}
node MINVOLSET
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node VENTMACH
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node VENTTUBE
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node VENTLUNG
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node VENTALV
{
states = ( "ZERO" "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
272
B.1 Beinlich Model (HUGIN Format)
}
node ARTCO2
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node CATECHOL
{
states = ( "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node HR
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node CO
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
node BP
{
states = ( "LOW" "NORMAL" "HIGH" );
}
potential ( HISTORY | LVFAILURE )
{
data = ((0.9 0.1)(0.01 0.99)) ;
}
potential ( CVP | LVEDVOLUME )
{
data = ((0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.04 0.95 0.01)(0.01 0.29 0.70)) ;
}
potential ( PCWP | LVEDVOLUME )
{
data = ((0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.04 0.95 0.01)(0.01 0.04 0.95)) ;
}
potential ( HYPOVOLEMIA )
{
data = ( 0.2 0.8 );
}
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potential ( LVEDVOLUME | HYPOVOLEMIA LVFAILURE )
{
data = (((0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.01 0.09 0.90))((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.05 0.90 0.05)
)) ;
}
potential ( LVFAILURE )
{
data = ( 0.05 0.95 );
}
potential ( STROKEVOLUME | HYPOVOLEMIA LVFAILURE )
{
data = (((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.50 0.49 0.01))((0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.05 0.90 0.05)
)) ;
}
potential ( ERRLOWOUTPUT )
{
data = ( 0.05 0.95 );
}
potential ( HRBP | ERRLOWOUTPUT HR )
{
data = (((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.3 0.4 0.3)(0.01 0.98 0.01))((0.40 0.59 0.01)
(0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.98))) ;
}
potential ( HREKG | ERRCAUTER HR )
{
data = (((0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3333333)(0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3333333)
(0.01 0.98 0.01))((0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3333333)(0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.01
0.01 0.98))) ;
}
potential ( ERRCAUTER )
{
data = ( 0.1 0.9 );
}
potential ( HRSAT | ERRCAUTER HR )
{
data = (((0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3333333)(0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3333333)
(0.01 0.98 0.01))((0.3333333 0.3333333 0.3333333)(0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.01
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0.01 0.98))) ;
}
potential ( INSUFFANESTH )
{
data = ( 0.1 0.9 );
}
potential ( ANAPHYLAXIS )
{
data = ( 0.01 0.99 );
}
potential ( TPR | ANAPHYLAXIS )
{
data = ((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.3 0.4 0.3)) ;
}
potential ( EXPCO2 | ARTCO2 VENTLUNG )
{
data = (((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)
(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97))((0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01
0.01 0.97 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97))((0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01
0.97 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97))) ;
}
potential ( KINKEDTUBE )
{
data = ( 0.04 0.96 );
}
potential ( MINVOL | INTUBATION VENTLUNG )
{
data = (((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.50 0.48 0.01 0.01)
(0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01))((0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.50
0.48 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01))((0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)(0.60 0.38
0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97))) ;
}
potential ( FIO2 )
{
data = ( 0.05 0.95 );
}
potential ( PVSAT | FIO2 VENTALV )
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{
data = (((1.0 0.0 0.0)(0.95 0.04 0.01)(1.0 0.0 0.0)(0.01 0.95 0.04))((0.99
0.01 0.00)(0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.98))) ;
}
potential ( SAO2 | PVSAT SHUNT )
{
data = (((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.98 0.01 0.01))((0.01 0.98 0.01)(0.98 0.01 0.01)
)((0.01 0.01 0.98)(0.69 0.30 0.01))) ;
}
potential ( PAP | PULMEMBOLUS )
{
data = ((0.01 0.19 0.80)(0.05 0.90 0.05)) ;
}
potential ( PULMEMBOLUS )
{
data = ( 0.01 0.99 );
}
potential ( SHUNT | INTUBATION PULMEMBOLUS )
{
data = (((0.1 0.9)(0.95 0.05))((0.1 0.9)(0.95 0.05))((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)
)) ;
}
potential ( INTUBATION )
{
data = ( 0.92 0.03 0.05 );
}
potential ( PRESS | INTUBATION KINKEDTUBE VENTTUBE )
{
data = ((((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.05 0.25 0.25 0.45)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)
(0.20 0.75 0.04 0.01))((0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.01 0.29 0.30 0.40)(0.01
0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.01 0.90 0.08 0.01)))(((0.01 0.30 0.49 0.20)(0.01 0.15
0.25 0.59)(0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.20 0.70 0.09 0.01))((0.97 0.01 0.01
0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.08 0.90)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.38 0.60)))
(((0.01 0.01 0.08 0.90)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)(0.97
0.01 0.01 0.01))((0.10 0.84 0.05 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.40 0.58
0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97)))) ;
}
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potential ( DISCONNECT )
{
data = ( 0.1 0.9 );
}
potential ( MINVOLSET )
{
data = ( 0.05 0.90 0.05 );
}
potential ( VENTMACH | MINVOLSET )
{
data = ((0.05 0.93 0.01 0.01)(0.05 0.01 0.93 0.01)(0.05 0.01 0.01 0.93)) ;
}
potential ( VENTTUBE | DISCONNECT VENTMACH )
{
data = (((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)
(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01))((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01
0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97))) ;
}
potential ( VENTLUNG | INTUBATION KINKEDTUBE VENTTUBE )
{
data = ((((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)
(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01))((0.30 0.68 0.01 0.01)(0.95 0.03 0.01 0.01)(0.01
0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)))(((0.95 0.03 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01
0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01))((0.97 0.01 0.01
0.01)(0.50 0.48 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)))
(((0.40 0.58 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)(0.97
0.01 0.01 0.01))((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.30 0.68 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01
0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97)))) ;
}
potential ( VENTALV | INTUBATION VENTLUNG )
{
data = (((0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)
(0.03 0.95 0.01 0.01))((0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01
0.01 0.01 0.97)(0.01 0.94 0.04 0.01))((0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01)(0.01 0.97
0.01 0.01)(0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01)(0.01 0.88 0.10 0.01))) ;
}
potential ( ARTCO2 | VENTALV )
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{
data = ((0.01 0.01 0.98)(0.01 0.01 0.98)(0.04 0.92 0.04)(0.90 0.09 0.01)) ;
}
potential ( CATECHOL | ARTCO2 INSUFFANESTH SAO2 TPR )
{
data = (((((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.7 0.3))((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.7 0.3)
)((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.95 0.05)))(((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.7 0.3))
((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.95 0.05))((0.05 0.95)(0.05 0.95)(0.95 0.05))))
((((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.7 0.3))((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.7 0.3))
((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.99 0.01)))(((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.7 0.3))
((0.01 0.99)(0.05 0.95)(0.99 0.01))((0.05 0.95)(0.05 0.95)(0.99 0.01))))
((((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.1 0.9))((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.1 0.9))
((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.3 0.7)))(((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.1 0.9))
((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.3 0.7))((0.01 0.99)(0.01 0.99)(0.3 0.7))))) ;
}
potential ( HR | CATECHOL )
{
data = ((0.05 0.90 0.05)(0.01 0.09 0.90)) ;
}
potential ( CO | HR STROKEVOLUME )
{
data = (((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.95 0.04 0.01)(0.30 0.69 0.01))((0.95 0.04 0.01)
(0.04 0.95 0.01)(0.01 0.30 0.69))((0.80 0.19 0.01)(0.01 0.04 0.95)(0.01
0.01 0.98))) ;
}
potential ( BP | CO TPR )
{
data = (((0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.98 0.01 0.01)(0.3 0.6 0.1))((0.98 0.01 0.01)
(0.10 0.85 0.05)(0.05 0.40 0.55))((0.90 0.09 0.01)(0.05 0.20 0.75)(0.01
0.09 0.90))) ;
}
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Bayesian Network Tool
C.1 Implementation Notes
A copy of the ‘Apollo’ Bayesian Network software package has been provided alongside
this thesis. This package was developed as both a learning exercise and as a means of
exploring the ideas presented in this thesis is in a more technical setting. The development
of this package and application of it to problems such as that outlined in Chapter 6
provided a number of insights into the technical challenges associated with the end-to-end
development of a BNS.
Figure C.1: A screenshot of the Apollo Dashboard app.
The package was written in Python. Experimental parts of the package were written
in Cython and C. However, for portability, stability and ease-of-use, the copy supplied
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contains only components written in pure Python. It is capable of performing exact and
approximate inference over several types of probabilistic graphical models. This includes
Markov Networks (and by extension Markov Chains), Hidden Markov Models, Conditional
Linear Gaussian Models and of course Bayesian Networks. A user interface (‘Apollo
Dashboard’) was also developed for the Apollo package. This is shown in Figure C.1.
The interface was built on top of the Qt User Interface (UI) framework. This has not been
included in the provided package due to the terms of the Qt licensing agreement.
Included in the Apollo package is an implementation of the MCA algorithm out-
lined in Chapter 4. Instructions for the installation of the package can be found in the
README.md file (this file is also available in plain text format within the package).
Directions for the use of the package are also provided in this file. The accuracy of the in-
ference engine implemented in the package was verified against two commercially available
inference engines: HUGIN Lite and SAMIAM. The primary limitation of the package with
respect to commercial solutions is speed – it is significantly slower than both HUGIN and
SAMIAM. Updates aimed at improving the performance of the package were abandoned
due to time constraints, though these could be completed if required.
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, the MCA implementation is a simple approach to
a complex problem. Therefore, the ‘ModelCriticalityAnalysis’ has been designed to work
with any object that conforms to the interface defined by the ‘BaseSensitivityAnalysis’
object. This is intended to support the modification of the MCA technique in the event
the package were to be used for some of the ‘Future Work’ avenues suggested in Chapter 7.
Finally, the package was developed in Python 3 and utilises a minimal set of dependencies
– the only dependency outside of Python 3’s standard library is ‘NumPy’ (Version 1.14.0
or higher).
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Abbreviations
BN Bayesian Network
BNS Bayesian Network-based System
AI Artificial Intelligence
AIS Artificial Intelligence-based System
MCA Model Criticality Analysis
RM-BNS Reference Model for Bayesian Network-based Systems
ANN Artificial Neural Network
SVM Support Vector Machine
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISO International Organization for Standardization
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UAS Unmanned Aerial System
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